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Abstract: 
Throughout academic and professional circles concerned with finance or financial 
market research exchange rates are regarded as being mainly driven by expectations. In 
conjunction with the efficiency assumption of the foreign exchange market, this led engraving 
the asset approach accordingly. However, due to Meese and Rogoff’s influential paper in 
1983, in which they showed that existing efficient market models at that time fail empirically 
to explain exchange rates, the pillars of fundamental exchange rate research had been cut to 
the quick. Emerging research then turned on a broad scale its attention away from market 
efficiency towards market imperfections due to suboptimal behavior of investors, e.g. 
inattentiveness, biasedness or inefficiency. Altogether, these approaches each implement 
some particular kind of irrationality in order to design models more realistic, with which 
eventually the decoupling of exchange rates from related fundamentals should be explained. 
The aim of this work is to shed some light on the imposed irrational elements of 
investors’ behavior nowadays many exchange rate models are built upon. Hereunto we put 
particular emphasis on the examination of real world medium-term expectations of financial 
variables from different macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives. By this means we 
can trace back existing imperfections due to investors’ attitudes and behavior. Throughout this 
work, three key issues hover above the discussion: investor heterogeneity, biasedness and 
rationality. In sum, underlying research reveals following findings: fundamentals are relevant 
on the foreign exchange market; investors’ forecasting bias depends partly on their particular 
style of analysis, investor sentiment as well as dispersion are time variant, but compatible 
with rational reasons and finally, the ability of exchange rate forecasting differs in accordance 
with the individual attributes of the investors.  
We reveal different forms of investor heterogeneity as well as biases in exchange rate 
forecasting; however, these finding are compatible with rationality and so deliver further 
evidence for the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. In addition, medium-term 
exchange rate expectations appear to stabilize the market, since professional forecasters rely 
to a great extent on fundamentals. 
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Kurzfassung: 
Dass Wechselkurse vornehmlich von Erwartungen bestimmt werden, wird heute 
sowohl von akademischen Fachkreisen wie auch professionellen Finanzmarktakteuren fast 
einstimmig vertreten. Gleichwohl gerieten die Festen fundamentaler Wechselkursforschung 
bereits im Jahre 1983 durch eine Arbeit von Meese und Rogoff stark ins Wanken, welche 
aufdeckte, dass die zu jener Zeit existenten Effizienzmarktmodelle nicht vermögen 
Wechselkursbewegungen adäquat zu prognostizieren. Dieser Erkenntnis war es geschuldet, 
dass die Wissenschaft ihren Fokus teilweise neu ausrichtete, weg von Markteffizienz hin zu 
Marktimperfektionen verursacht durch suboptimales Investorenverhalten, z.B. unregelmäßige 
Informationsverarbeitung (‚inattentiveness’), verzerrte Analyseausrichtung (‚biasedness’) 
oder ineffiziente Informationsnutzung (‚inefficiency’). Mittels der Implementierung 
verschiedener Formen von Irrationalität sollen die Modelle wirklichkeitsnäher konzipiert 
werden, um so die Entkoppelung von Wechselkursen und Fundamentals zu erklären.  
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die empirische Erforschung irrationaler Verhaltensweisen der 
Finanzmarktakteure, die heute vielfach in Wechselkursmodellen a priori zugrunde gelegt sind. 
Der Fokus liegt hierbei auf reale Finanzmarkterwartungen der mittleren Frist, welche aus 
verschiedenen makro- und mikroökonomischen Perspektiven untersucht werden, um so 
bestehenden Unvollkommenheiten seitens der Investoren auf den Grund zu gehen. Drei 
Schlüsselthemen durchziehen sich durch die Arbeit: Heterogenität, Verzerrtheit sowie 
Rationalität. Insgesamt offenbaren die zugrunde liegenden Forschungsarbeiten folgende 
Erkenntnisse: Fundamentales sind für den Devisenmarkt überaus bedeutend, Verzerrtheit der 
Wechselkursprognosen hängt partiell vom Analysestil ab, Marktstimmungen sowie 
Prognoseuneinigkeit erweisen sich zeitvariable, sind jedoch mit rationalen Gründen vereinbar 
und die Prognosefähigkeit der Investoren hängt von individuellen Analyseeigenschaften ab.  
In dieser Arbeit werden verschiedene Formen von Heterogenität sowie Verzerrungen 
in realen Wechselkurserwartungen aufgedeckt. Diese Erkenntnisse sind jedoch mit rationalen 
Erklärungen vereinbar und liefern somit Hinweise zur Effizienz des Devisenmarktes. Ferner 
scheinen mittelfristige Wechselkurserwartungen stabilisierend auf den Markt zu wirken, da 
professionelle Marktteilnehmer en Gros auf fundamentale Erklärungsvariablen zurückgreifen.  
 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Wechselkurse, Erwartungen, Heterogenität, Verzerrtheit and Rationalität. 
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0 Foreword 
 
Since the end of the 1970s exchange rates are regarded as being mainly driven by 
expectations. Since exchange rates are primarily determined by expectations, for instance 
stocks and bonds, this led to the asset approach on the foreign exchange market. Moreover, 
technical tools to analyze financial prices of asset markets have been adopted over the years 
on the foreign exchange market. The belief that exchange rates underlie a stable relationship 
with fundamentals, i.e. economic variables which determine exchange rates like inflation, 
growth and interest rates, led to efficient market models. However, the monetary model 
turned out most recognized; its basic argument states that the nominal exchange rate is 
determined by the conditions of respective money markets and thus is the relative price of one 
money in terms of another (see e.g. Frankel’s later hybrid version, 1979). Next the Dornbusch 
model appeared which stresses the stickiness of the good markets (see Dornbusch, 1976). On 
account of this, PPP only holds in the long run while exchange rates overshoot in shorter 
horizons. Finally, the portfolio balance model emerged, which focuses the differences 
between domestic and foreign assets and corresponding relative supplies (see e.g. Dooley and 
Isard, 1982). So equilibrium is derived upon utility maximization by means of optimal 
portfolio diversification. Taken together efficient market models dominated at that time the 
way of thinking about exchange rate determination.  
Then in 1983 Meese and Rogoff showed that all these models fail empirically to 
explain exchange rate movements. This finding shocked the foundations of fundamental 
exchange rate economics, because fundamental research on the foreign exchange market 
appeared henceforth useless. Nevertheless new hope arose with the analyses of 
macroeconomic news. Derived from the asset approach, only unexpected changes in the 
fundamentals could trigger exchange rate movements whereas all expected fundamental 
changes are anticipated and thus already incorporated into prices (see Frankel and Rose, 1995, 
p. 1699). It does not surprise that event studies appeared most promising at that point in time 
in order to reconfirm the relevance of fundamentals for exchange rate determination and 
hence related economic theories as well.  
In the following Chapter 1 we present a review of event studies on the foreign 
exchange market. Event studies offer a particular methodology in order to measure news 
effects in financial market prices like stocks, bonds or exchange rates. In particular, news 
comprises the surprises in announcements of fundamentals, i.e. the differences between 
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realizations of respective variables and prior expectations. Hence, based upon semi-strong 
market efficiency, fundamental announcements’ influence on financial prices ought to be 
restricted to related news (see Fama, 1991). The essential findings from more than 30 years of 
event studies on the foreign exchange market sum up as follows: first, exchange rates respond 
on fundamental news, thus indicating the relevance of fundamentals for the exchange rate 
dynamics. Second, news-effects on exchange rates work through two separate channels. 
While the direct news-channel carries the public news into exchange rates instantaneously 
without any trade taking place, the indirect news-channel, which lasts for some time, absorbs 
private news-effects via order flow. Third, next to scheduled macroeconomic news a bulk of 
further news such as central bank interventions and technical market signals prove to be 
relevant for exchange rate movements as well. Fourth, whereas a few news sources show 
alternating influence on exchange rate movements over time (e.g. trade balance and inflation) 
the majority of relationships are stable over time. Nevertheless, fifth, exchange rate reactions 
on macroeconomic news underlie some asymmetric patterns, i.e. the timing of specific 
announcements as well as the discrimination between good and bad news matter.   
What efficient market models as well as event studies have in common is that they are 
built on the assumption of rational expectations. However, this has been questioned already 
since some time and a bunch of papers have studied actual expectations taken from surveys.1 
It has become a stylized fact that exchange rate expectations are on average biased, i.e. the 
mean of the related forecast error is significantly unequal zero, and inefficient, i.e. respective 
forecasters do not use the entire public information set, which clearly contradicts to the 
assumption of rationality (see surveys by Takagi, 1991, and MacDonald, 2000). However, 
little is known about the possible sources of irrationality.  
In Chapter 2 earlier studies on the formation of exchange rate expectations are 
extended by using a survey dataset of US-dollar expectations, which includes information 
about forecasters' reliance on fundamental analysis. The findings are the following: First, we 
show that related biases in exchange rate expectations are systematically related to belief in 
PPP. Second, when we group respondents on their reliance to fundamental analysis, we find 
that fundamentalists’ biases of mean-reversion prove to be even stronger, whereas technical 
analysts tend to expect too much trend extrapolation. Third, the further the exchange rate 
moves from the (fair) PPP rate, the stronger the biases in expectations. Fourth, while the 
                                                 
1
 The use of survey expectations is widely spread in the economic literature (see Pesaran and Weale, 
2006), amongst others Consensus Economics (London), Money Market Services (International) and 
the Financial Market Survey of the Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany). 
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group-specific expectations prove to be inaccurate, they all show directional forecasting 
ability. 
However, the empirical failure of market efficiency models to explain exchange rate 
movements, led to a bunch of empirical studies revealing several empirical puzzles 
concerning the behavior of exchange rates. The foremost empirical puzzle in international 
economics has been called the "exchange rate disconnect puzzle". According to Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2001), the "exchange rate disconnect puzzle" includes the "exchange rate 
determination puzzle", i.e. more often than not, exchange rates prove to be disconnected from 
their underlying fundamentals (see in a renewed work Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual, 
2005).2 
In spite of exchange rates’ disconnection from economic variables, the foundations of 
efficient market models remained popular and with the availableness of more sophisticated 
techniques and newer considerable datasets, the validity of these exchange rate models has 
been reviewed. One strand of empirical literature uses long spans of data in order to increase 
the low power of accordant testing procedures (see e.g. Lothian and Taylor, 1996, and Rapach 
and Wohar, 2002). Second, a number of studies employ panel techniques from the post-
Bretton Woods float, again in order to increase the power of respective tests (see e.g. Papell, 
1997, and Taylor and Sarno, 1998). The third strand has emerged using nonlinear techniques 
to capture more complex relationships among the respective variables (see e.g. Kilian and 
Taylor, 2003, and Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001). Indeed, all these developments refreshed the 
exchange rate literature, but still some related puzzles remain. One such caveat deals with the 
joined observation that exchange rates are apparently connected to fundamentals in the long 
run, whereas professionals form consistently irrational exchange rate expectations (see also 
Chapter 2). In fact, professionals’ exchange rate expectations have never been reconciled with 
accordant long-term movements towards exchange rate equilibriums. Instead, evidence shows 
that professionals’ exchange rate expectations underlie considerable "expectational errors" 
(see Frankel and Froot, 1987, p.150).  
We tackle this question in Chapter 3 from a different perspective, by analyzing the 
effective time horizon of investor sentiment in exchange rates and further, by distinguishing 
between its short- and long-run determinants. We reveal following findings in investor 
                                                 
2
 Other well known puzzles in the exchange rate literature include the lack of feedback from the 
exchange rate to the macro economy (see Engel, 1996), the excess volatility of the exchange rate in 
respect to fundamentals (see Baxter and Stockman, 1989) and the forward premium puzzle (see Fama, 
1984). 
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sentiment in the US-dollar: sentiment is longer-term oriented than accordant predefined 
forecast horizons indicate. Second, sentiment is connected to well-known exchange rate 
fundamentals; third, the fundamental long-term relation between investor sentiment and 
exchange rate fundamentals becomes stronger, the larger the misalignment of the actual 
exchange rate from the long-run PPP rate. 
However, in contrast to confirm the market efficiency models, a different strand of the 
literature developed new exchange rate models. In fact, three different modeling approaches 
have established. First, the Obstfeld-Rogoff framework, which is based upon dynamic utility 
optimization of a representative agent (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996), second, the 
microstructure of the foreign exchange market (see Lyons, 2001), which led in particular to 
new insights of how information is aggregated into prices and third, the chartist-
fundamentalist approach, initiated by Frankel and Froot (1987). The latter literature rejects the 
validity of the use of a representative agent and proposes heterogeneous agents, holding 
different beliefs about the dynamics of the exchange rates. There is now plentiful evidence 
that market participants have fairly heterogeneous beliefs in the sources of exchange rate 
determination and thus on future exchange rates (see e.g. Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004, 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006, and De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). Further, it appears 
rather difficult to explain the huge trading volumes on the foreign exchange market, which 
turns out to be a multiple of the trade volume in goods and services. Even though investor 
heterogeneity is key to understanding exchange rate dynamics, empirical studies on 
expectation heterogeneity have mainly studied cross-sectional differences, i.e. differences 
between some certain individuals.  
Tying up the findings of Chapter 2, where we already revealed differences between 
fundamentalists and chartists, in Chapter 4 we deepen the analyses of heterogeneity in the 
foreign exchange market by investigating dispersion in exchange rate expectations. We 
confirm the importance of the chartist-fundamentalist approach such that misalignments of the 
exchange rate as well as exchange rate momentum explain heterogeneity. Moreover, the risk 
premium influences heterogeneity as well, but neither macroeconomic variables nor exchange 
rate’s volatility further influences heterogeneity.  
Finally, regarding the stylized fact of inaccurate exchange rate expectations, Bacchetta 
and van Wincoop (2007) have recently reconfirmed the existence of expectation errors in 
consensus forecasts. However, this questions the rationality of market participants and so the 
efficiency of the foreign exchange market, since other professional market participants could 
take profit on these bad forecasts by opening market positions against them. Moreover, since 
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tremendous funds of currencies are dealt on the foreign exchange market, the finding that 
professional market participants consistently form bad forecasts appears questionable.  
Hence, in Chapter 5 we shed new light on this apparent puzzle by investigating 
individuals’ trend forecasts of exchange rates. It should be stressed that trend forecasts seem 
to replicate real forecasts much better, because market participants in fact do not form point 
forecasts. Furthermore, we link individuals’ forecasting performances to related personal 
information and their expertise in fundamental analyses. In sum, the following main findings 
result: fist, professionals’ forecasting performances differ systematically. Second, knowledge 
of future interest rates trends influences individual’s forecasting ability in exchange rates. In 
addition to that exchange rate forecasting performance depends on individual’s experience 
(positively) and personnel job responsibilities (negatively).  
Throughout this work three key issues determine the overall discussion: investors’ 
heterogeneity, biasedness and rationality. Surveying news-effects in Chapter 1, we confirm 
the relevance of fundamentals for exchange rates. Moreover, the fact that order flow processes 
different expectations and opinions into market prices indicates the importance of 
heterogeneity. Actually, in Chapter 2 we reveal overall investor heterogeneity, which we can 
trace back to the presence of fundamentalists and technicians. Since investors hold too much 
on their specific beliefs, they underlie respective forecasting biases which points to 
irrationality. Further, analyzing in Chapter 3 the forecasting bias of investor sentiment over 
time, we confirm its connection to fundamentals. Bearing in mind that investors are aware of 
the difficulties of forecasting shorter-term exchange rates and the fact that longer-term 
exchange rates depend on fundamentals, it appears rational to fall back on fundamental 
concepts when analyzing exchange rates. Additionally, we uncover heterogeneity over time in 
Chapter 4 and link it to rational causes: the relevance of fundamental misalignments, higher 
market momentum and market uncertainty for investor heterogeneity can be traced back to the 
validity of fundamentals, technical analysis and a risk premium for exchange rates. In addition, 
we find in Chapter 5 cross-sectional heterogeneity by looking at investors’ forecasting 
performance. The composition of forecasters’ accuracy appears in accordance with market 
efficiency and the individual causes explaining respective performance differences (e.g. 
experience and competence in fundamentals) harmonize with rationality.  
In sum, examining heterogeneity from the macroeconomic and the microeconomic 
perspective, we reveal different forecasting biases. However, linking them to comprehensible 
causes, we see them in accordance with rationality. Beyond, as investors rely on (long-term) 
fundamental concepts, exchange rate expectations appear to stabilize the market. 
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1 Review of event studies on the foreign exchange market 
 
1.1 Introduction 
"Changes in exchange rates will come to provoke no more comment than changes in 
the real price of an airline ticket!", these are the presidential words of Fischer Black (1985, p. 
530) addressing the outlook on the future of the foreign exchange market in his paper "Noise" 
(published in the Journal of Finance). Certainly, Black’s statement is very provoking since he 
implicitly relates exchange rate movements largely or even solely to occurring noise. 
Nonetheless, economic science is confronted with the mission to link these asset price 
changes to fundamental causes which would otherwise remain in public’s perception "noise", 
even if exchange rates would be in fact connected with macroeconomic conditions. One 
appropriate technique to accomplish this task proves the application of event study approach.3 
Surveying the literature of empirical exchange rate research Frankel and Rose (1995, p. 
1699) state that the primarily reason for exchange rate movements is connected to unexpected 
news and so presume the relevance of fundamentals in the foreign exchange market. Event 
studies in turn provide a specific methodology to measure news effects in financial market 
prices like stocks, bonds and exchange rates. However, news comprises only the surprises in 
announcements of fundamentals, i.e. the differences between realizations of variables and 
respective prior expectations–the unexpected parts of variable changes. 4  Assuming the 
validity of semi-strong market efficiency, fundamental announcements’ influences on 
financial prices ought to be restricted to respective news, which traces back to the following 
idea: surprises in announcements of macroeconomic variables influence investors’ mindsets 
and in turn change expected future fundamental outcomes wherefore asset prices change 
instantaneously (see Fama, 1991, and Frankel and Rose, 1995).5 
The event study approach can look back on a long history. MacKinlay (1997) 
constitutes its origin to the thirties of the last century, when Dolley (1933) published an 
                                                 
3
 Ironically, if Black’s statement (1985) does not hold he in turn "blame(s) it on noise" (p. 530). 
4
 Fundamentals are macroeconomic variables, which are seen relevant for the specific variable of 
interest. 
5
 Though fully anticipated announcements should not lead to asset price changes, otherwise the 
assumption of semi-strong market efficiency is violated (given that future developments and are not 
anticipated to change). However, the traditional thinking suggests that exchange rates should 
completely and instantaneously reflect movements in underlying fundamentals, which implicitly rules 
out the occurrence of news. 
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analysis of equity splits and their effects on subsequent stock prices. However, this 
methodology established in stock market research only in the seventies with a series of many 
more studies analyzing stock price reactions on fundamental news. But then again, one had to 
wait until the eighties before event studies were taken over in foreign exchange market 
research. Mussa (1976) observes that exchange rate movements are mainly unexpected and 
traces them back to new information (see also Dornbusch, 1980, p. 159). Edwards (1983) 
confirms this presumption and finds that exchange rates are strongly influenced by arising 
macroeconomic news. Nevertheless, this coincided with Meese and Rogoff’s (1983) 
influential paper, which shows that out-of-sample exchange rate forecasts produced by 
structural models based on exchange rate fundamentals are worse than those obtained by 
using the random walk (naive) model. This finding shocked the pillars of exchange rate 
economics especially at this particular time and fundamental research appeared useless. For 
this reason, new hope arose to revitalize fundamental exchange rate research by analyzing 
macroeconomic news in-depth.6 The asset approach became widely accepted on the foreign 
exchange market, hence ever since exchange rates have been primarily regarded as driven by 
expectations (see Hakkio and Pearce, 1985, p. 621, and Frankel and Rose, 1995).  
New developed models have alternated during time to arising finer techniques in 
econometrics, which have been accompanied closely by the disclosure of larger datasets. 
Whilst in the beginning (rough) news-models had dominated the scene, accordant critics 
regarding the low-frequency of related data series quickly prevailed, leading to announcement 
studies. These are more alike the preceded stock market event studies since they focus on only 
those days following respective fundamental announcements. The opening of tick-by-tick data 
then provided an enormous amount of data and led to high-frequency models. The inclusion 
of order flow was then reflected in the hybrid approach, which is basically based on two 
different news-channels. In recent times, several studies examine different asset price changes 
like stocks, bonds and exchange rates simultaneously in order to reveal mutually news 
reactions. 
Until today the event study literature of the foreign exchange market can look back on 
nearly 30 years of research. Since various meaningful insights have been revealed, it is about 
time to survey comprehensively the developments and findings of this strand of literature and 
this is what this article aims for. 
                                                 
6
 Further news-applications are devoted to the efficiency of the foreign exchange market (see Fama, 
1991) or the quantification of the risk premium in exchange rates (see Froot and Frankel, 1989, 
Koedijk and Wolff, 1996, and Bams, Walkowiak and Wolff, 2004). 
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1.2 The news-model 
The first event studies on the foreign exchange market are based on monthly or 
quarterly data and are known in the literature as news-models (see Dornbusch, 1980, Frenkel, 
1981, Edwards, 1983, and Bomhoff and Korteweg, 1983). 
 
1.2.1 The baseline model 
The news-model is formulated as follows: 
 
 t
k
t
k
k
ttt NsEs εβα +⋅+=− ∑− ][1  (1.1) 
 with ][1 kttktkt fEfN −−= , 
 and  Kk ,...,1= . 
 
The expectation error in the exchange rate, s t – E t-1 [s t], is regressed on the related 
errors in the fundamentals, f kt – E t-1[f kt], as well as the disturbance variable, ε t, which is 
assumed iid. Assuming that market participants are rational, the expectations are based on all 
relevant public information up to time t-1 (see MacKinlay, 1997, p.13).7 Since exchange rates 
show asset-like behavior, they are supposed to react first, only on unexpected news, i.e. 
surprises in fundamentals, and second, instantaneously without any related trading in the 
foreign exchange market (see Frenkel, 1981, p. 686).    
However, three issues prove being essential for this model setting: first, the choice of 
the considered fundamentals, i.e. the macroeconomic variable set which enters into equation 
(1.1) in order to explain exchange rate surprises; second, the way how expectations of 
fundamentals are actually obtained and third, how to generate exchange rate surprises at all.  
So regarding the first issue, structural macroeconomic models based on conventional 
fundamentals deliver respective variables. An alternative approach relies on the rather ad-hoc 
choice of popular variables, which are seen as important at the time.  
Regarding the way of modeling fundamental expectations, two possibilities are at 
hand: first, generating statistical innovations via univariate time series analysis (see e.g. 
                                                 
7
 This implies a relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals, ∑ +⋅=
k
t
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Frenkel, 1981, Copeland, 1984 and 1984a, and MacDonald, 1985) or via multivariate analysis 
(e.g. Edwards, 1983). Alternatively, again one could rely on accordant macroeconomic 
models in order to produce corresponding fundamental surprises (e.g. Edwards, 1982, 
MacDonald, 1983, MacDonald and Taylor, 1992). 
Turning now to the third issue, several authors use the forward rate to proxy exchange 
rate expectations (e.g. Frenkel, 1981, Edwards, 1982a, and MacDonald, 1985). Obviously, its 
indisputable advantage turns out to be the easiness of getting corresponding data. However, 
by using the forward rate one assumes implicitly that the exchange rate risk premium either 
does not exist or is constant over time, since otherwise the risk premium would be instable 
which in turn would bias severely upcoming estimation results (see Frankel and Rose, 1995).8 
Alternatively, by modeling the exchange rate process arising residuals could be pulled up to 
proxy the unexpected exchange rate movements, since those increments cannot be explained 
by the respective underlying exchange rate model. In this manner Copeland (1984, 1984a) 
runs an ARIMA-process and uses corresponding residuals as exchange rate surprises. In a 
second attempt, he pulls up exchange rate returns in order to proxy respective news, by 
attributing implicitly all exchange rate movements to fundamental news. Considering the 
concept of uncovered interest parity, Dornbusch (1980) uses exchange rate excess return, i.e. 
subtracting corresponding interest differences from exchange rate returns (see also Rose, 
1984). However, what speaks in turn against these alternatives is that they depend on the 
validity of the underlying model, which proves a priori unknown. However, if the true data 
generating process is different from the one assumed, the specification is incorrect and the 
estimated parameters severely biased.     
 
1.2.2 Empirical evidence 
A bulk of papers applying the news-model arose, but from today’s perspective several 
serious shortcomings distort the results. Even though corresponding R-squares prove to be 
very high, the parameters of many popular fundamentals are insignificant (see Dornbusch, 
1980, Frenkel, 1981, and Edwards, 1982). Comparing the results of related studies to one 
another, parameter estimates and corresponding significances vary extremely and apparently 
depend on the data period, the specific exchange rate and the data frequency as well.  
                                                 
8
 A constant forward premium would be captured by the constant α in equation (1.1) and so would not 
bias the estimated parameters. Needless to say, that the results would be unbiased too, if a risk 
premium would not exist. 
  
16
Thus, several authors analyze for delayed news-effects. Assuming rationality, such 
occurrences should not exist since "past innovations are not news any more" (see Edwards, 
1982, p. 219). Nonetheless, if news is announced with delays, corresponding lag-structures in 
news-effects appear consistent with rationality. Indeed MacDonald (1983) finds significant 
lags in money-news on exchange rates. However, a clear structure is missing and so he leaves 
it open to what sources they are linked. Bomhoff and Korteweg (1983) in fact find lagged 
news-effects, but too long to be connected either with delayed publications or with related 
revisions. However, they attribute central bank interventions to causing these belated effects. 
In fact, announcements are published with large delays and beyond underlie serious revisions, 
which even occur several months later. Market participants do not hold final macroeconomic 
announcements on which most of the news-models are based and so Hoffman and 
Schlagenhauf (1985) focus on the announcement values, which actually have been available 
to investors at the time. They cannot make any meaningful improvements; nevertheless, they 
declare that the validity of the results depend on dataset’s frequency. By analyzing monthly 
and quarterly data respectively, they reveal more stable results upon the former data. Finally, 
from today’s perspective disregarding for cointegration among the variables most certainly 
helps to explain somewhat the generated high R-squares in news-models.9  
In sum, news-models prove to be very instable, due to questionable expectation 
modeling, too low data frequency and perhaps the dependence on time-invariant relationships 
between exchange rates and fundamentals–the latter argument is owed again to the low data 
frequency (see Frankel and Rose, 1995, p. 1701).  
 
1.3 Announcement studies 
Thus, considering all these critics it is not surprising that late in the eighties the news-
model was replaced by a more accurate technique, i.e. announcement studies. These studies 
use daily data and thus are able to focus on only these days, when economic announcements 
actually take place.  
By comparing the news-model with announcement studies, the latter’s event window 
is considerable smaller, i.e. it decreases from a month (or a quarter respectively) in news-
models to a day in announcement studies. By this means, exchange rate reactions on news can 
be much better separated from other influences as before in news-models such as applied in 
                                                 
9
 In fact studies relying on quarterly data generate even higher R-squares than accordant studies on 
monthly data. 
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Dornbusch (1980), Frenkel (1981) and Edwards (1982) (see this statement in Ito and Roley, 
1987, p.256). Picking up the hesitations connected to final released fundamental 
announcement data, announcement studies overcome this issue by using original release data 
in order to replicate occurring news-effects at that time. Even though fundamental 
announcements underlie several revisions afterwards, this does not bother upcoming results, 
because more importantly the focus rests only on measuring how markets actually react on 
news.10 Since for most industrialized countries the dates of fundamental announcements are 
known beforehand, news-effects can now be revealed much easier than via the rough news-
model (see Frankel and Rose, 1995). So regressing exchange rate changes on respective news, 
Hardouvelis (1988, p. 23) finds the application of announcement studies "a different, more 
direct strategy".  
Another innovation connected to announcement studies is the implementation of 
survey forecasts in order to replace artificially generated fundamental expectations in news-
models.11 In the likely case that latter sub-models turn out being misspecified, this source of 
inaccuracy is not anymore present. However, accordant surveys deliver forecasts typically 
from financial markets professionals, whose day-by-day business depend partly on their 
forecasts’ appropriateness. Thus, this kind of data proves to be promising–see for more details 
of the use of survey data Takagi, 1991, MacDonald, 2000, and further Pesaran and Weale, 
2006). Therefore, most announcement studies fall back on surveys’ consensus data in order to 
cover fundamental expectations, since this is seen most suitably to cover market opinions (see 
Hakkio and Pearce, 1985, p. 627).12 
 
1.3.1 The baseline model 
Concerning the description of an announcement study we refer to MacKinlay (1997) 
who describes the implementation of an event study in several different steps. Above all, the 
success of an event study depends on the exact identification of the times, when events 
actually take place. Once again, we see the asset-like character of exchange rates since the 
                                                 
10
 In this spirit Faust, Rogers and Wright (2003) investigate the forecasting performance of original 
release data of standard exchange rate fundamentals, i.e. in a real-time forecasting framework and 
argue its major relevance. 
11
 It is interesting to note that Dornbusch (1980) is first who uses expectation data in an event study on 
the foreign exchange market. Running a news-model he relies on OECD-forecasts to proxy current 
account and economic growth expectations.  
12
 Specific surveys are e.g. Consensus Economics (London, Great Britain), Financial Market Survey 
(Mannheim, Germany) and Money Market Services International. 
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foreign exchange market generates continuously market prices, which proves to be very 
useful for an event study (see Hardouvelis, 1988, p. 23). Thus the announcement study 
presents as follows: 
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In spirit of market efficiency, the exchange rate change, ∆s t,i, is regressed in equation 
(1.2) on surprises in fundamentals and an iid disturbance variable as well. Thus the exchange 
rate change replaces the forward premium of the news-model. However, since announcement 
studies are typically based on only those days, when actually at least one announcement took 
place, corresponding exchange rate changes are interpreted as rational surprises on the foreign 
exchange market–this is why every fundamental together with its parameter can be assigned 
to an individual regression. In this manner, expectations in exchange rates prove to be 
irrelevant and hence are not part of the analysis anymore.13 The surprises in fundamentals, Nk, 
consist of the differences between consensus expectations and corresponding originally 
released announcements. Next to current news-effects, respective leads and lags are captured 
by index j. 
Equation (1.3) tests additionally for market efficiency. So if the foreign exchange 
market proves to be efficient in fact, the parameters α and βk have to be insignificant different 
from zero–equation (1.2) implicitly assumes efficiency (see Cornell, 1983). Further, both 
equations allow for lagged news-effects. Since the event-window is much smaller than the 
one in the news-model, it appears self-evident to examine additionally for delayed news-
effects that reach beyond the specific announcement day (see Hakkio and Pearce, 1985).14 
 
                                                 
13
 Mussa (1976) claims that approximately 90 percent of exchange rate movements are unanticipated. 
So taking the return in exchange rates as a proxy of unexpected exchange rate changes appears 
logically. 
14
 Moreover, anticipated news-effects could also be on hand and are therefore considered in equation 
(1.2) and (1.3) via lead-effects – a few studies actually found some news anticipation (see e.g. Hakkio 
and Pearce, 1985). 
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1.3.2 Empirical evidence 
Thus, Engel and Frankel (1984) analyze news in monetary policy and show that 
exchange rates appreciate after positive money surprises (i.e. money being larger than 
previously expected). Cornel (1983) questions this finding, since he does not find such a 
relationship before October 1979. After this date the relationship becomes significant; 
however, it is contradicted by the finding that bond rates react positively on money news too, 
since the latter relationship indicates long-term inflation expectation. Hardouvelis (1984) 
confirms Cornell’s findings and additionally reveals a positive relationship between long-term 
exchange rate expectations and money news. In his opinion, the Fed regained credibility in 
financial markets after its policy change in October 1979, but some related uncertainty 
remained, which shows up in an inflation premium. Hakkio and Pearce (1985), who use three 
exchange rates per day, show a structural break in the relationship between the exchange rate 
and money news in October 1979, when the Fed changed its policy orientation from the Fed 
Funds rate to money (for further accordant studies see Roley, 1986, Tandon and Ulrich, 1987, 
and Hardouvelis, 1988). 
Irwin (1989) states a positive relationship between the exchange rate and current 
account deficit, but only after June 1984. At this time the deficit hit a critical high, which 
alarmed financial market participants and switched market attention to current account 
announcements. Ever so often, market participants anticipated central bank interventions 
when surprisingly negative current account numbers have been published. Klein, Mizrach and 
Murphy (1991) analyze the effect of the Plaza agreement in September 1985 on the influence 
of US-current account news on exchange rates. Surprisingly, they find a structural break first 
in March 1986, several months later. In their understanding, market participants had been 
skeptical in the beginning concerning the credibility of the policy change but believed in it 
later. Aggrarwal and Schirm (1992) consider in addition to that the Louvre Accord in 1987. 
They state that next to central banks’ strategies, particularly international agreements matter 
for the influence of current account-news on exchange rates. However, if particular policy 
acts prove to be creditable, financial markets react very strong on them. Karfakis and Kim 
(1995) examine Australian current account news for two periods, one before 1989 and one 
thereafter. Regarding the first time, they find the exchange rate appreciating significantly after 
higher current account deficit news, which they connect to anticipated central bank 
interventions. In contrast to that, the relationship turns out to be insignificant thereafter. They 
attribute this to a change in 1989 of Australian central bank’s monetary strategy from 
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restrictive to more relaxing, wherefore market participants did not anticipate interventions on 
the foreign exchange market anymore, following negative Australian current account news. 
Taking together, actual policy orientations and accordant strategies determine the way how 
particular fundamental news influences exchange rates. But next to institution’s orientation 
and connected actions, the power of enforcement and the will to act accordingly, determine if 
and how news is incorporated into exchange rates.  
Further specific news-issues have been analyzed, e.g. lagged and anticipated news-
effects, which contradict market efficiency at first glance. Hakkio and Pearce (1985) show the 
existence of lagged effects in CPI and money announcements and attribute them to central 
bank interventions of the Bank of Canada. MacDonald and Torrance (1988) however, cannot 
reveal any lagged news-effects in British-money. Further Goodhart (1988) expects under- and 
overshooting to news, attributed to vague effects arising from interactions between short-term 
orientated speculators, sluggish fundamentalists and central bankers following political targets. 
However, Goodhart cannot show such a lag-structure and presumes that daily-data proves 
inappropriately to reveal such interrelations, if it is a matter of an intra-daily phenomenon.  
Beck (1993) shows anticipated news-effects of two to three days in US-public deficits. 
He presumes the existence of heterogeneous information the way that a few market 
participants hold some private information, wherefore he claims that asymmetric reactions on 
news can be inline with efficiency of the foreign exchange market. Karfakis and Kim (1995) 
separate their data in good and bad current account news and show that negative news is 
followed by significant exchange rate appreciations, i.e. the current account deficit is lower 
than expected. They connect this finding with anticipated interventions of the central bank, 
which obviously would not arise if current account news turns out to be positive.15 
Summing up, a lot of announcement studies have been applied on the foreign 
exchange market focusing in contrast to news-model analyses additionally on some specific 
issues such as lagged effects and heterogeneous reactions. Several advantages of 
announcement studies are at hand: first, the use of survey expectations renders artificially 
generated fundamental expectations obsolete; second, the event-window decreases 
dramatically that is why news-effects can now be better separated from other influences than 
before; third, exchange rate expectations prove irrelevant and so another potential source of 
misspecification vanishes. However, even though this model proves clearly superior, some 
                                                 
15
 They admit that the insignificant effects arising from positive news could be connected with 
anticipated future data revisions – at this time good news has turned to bad news via later data 
revisions quite often.  
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shortcomings still remain. Above all, the main critic concerns the event-window, which may 
remain still too wide to capture certain news-effects properly. 16  Further, despite many 
significant fundamental news and much more consistent results between the different 
announcement-studies, R-squares turn out very low. Frankel and Rose (1995) confess "that 
(news) effects typically diffuse rapidly in a stream of other information that the researcher is 
not able to observe, so that statistical significance disappears when exchange rate changes are 
measured a day or two late" (p. 1701). 
 
1.3.3 Recent studies 
As a matter of fact, two announcement studies have been published recently which 
brought some further insights into the news-literature of the foreign exchange market. Since 
these studies do not belong conceptually to later approaches, we present them hereunder in a 
separate subchapter. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) analyze daily changes of the US-dollar/euro (until 
1999 -/D-mark respectively) by using real-time news of macroeconomic announcements 
during the period 1993-2003. They confirm that US news have larger influence on exchange 
rates than respective news from the euro area (or Germany). Further, by pooling respective 
news for the US and the euro area in a composite variable, they analyze for the existence of 
several asymmetries in news-effects. In particular they find that news-effects depend on 
certain market conditions. News tends to have more impact if previous exchange rate 
volatility is higher, news is large or bad. So in accordance to the Veronesi-effect more 
uncertainty leads to larger news-effects (see Veronesi, 1999).17  
Another interesting issue arises with the use of proxies for the macroeconomic 
variables, which are considered as exchange rate fundamentals. Since the latter’s data underlie 
some severe problems, i.e. low frequency, obsolete data, some difficulty of generating related 
expectations and so accordant errors, the use of appropriate proxies seems promising to 
                                                 
16
 Hakkio and Pearce (1985) already point at this issue, wherefore they use three exchange rates per 
day and indeed generate relative to Cornell (1982) and Hardouvelis (1984) more consistent results.  
17
 Manzan and Westerhoff’s (2005) show in a behavioral news model that investors’ perception of 
fundamental shocks on exchange rates vary, depending on latter’s volatility. When volatility is low, 
they tend to underreact on fundamental news, whereas overreaction takes place when volatility is high. 
Even though Ehrmann and Fratzscher do not investigate this issue explicitly, their finding of higher 
news-effects arising from larger news-surprises could be consistent with under- and overreactions in 
the foreign exchange market on fundamental news. 
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perform more accurate event studies.18 In this notion, Fatum and Scholnick (2006) analyze 
whether US monetary policy matters for D-mark/-, GB-pound/- and JP-yen/US-dollar rates on 
a daily basis. Hence, they use daily changes in the 2-month ahead Federal Funds future rate to 
extract market expectations of future US monetary policy without relying on too infrequent 
survey outcomes or questionable model specifications. Next to actual exchange rate responses 
on infrequent actual policy changes, they show that monetary policy also matters for daily 
exchange rate determination. In accordance with the efficiency of the foreign exchange 
market, they show that exchange rates react without delays on day-to-day changes in 
monetary policy expectations and further, only on the unexpected elements of actual monetary 
policy changes.19 
 
1.4 High-frequency studies and the hybrid approach 
In the late eighties studies turned up using tick-by-tick data, minimizing the event-
window radically and thus this high-frequency model ever since then has dominated the event 
study literature. However, this development appeared to be only a matter of time, due to the 
immense data-mass the foreign exchange market produces–highly-liquid currency pairs 
deliver several thousand quotes per day. Whereas first such attempts were restricted to 
announcement data only (see e.g. Goodhart and Figliuoli, 1991, and Goodhart, Hall, Henry 
and Pesaran, 1993), later studies use related expectations again in order to generate the 
surprise elements.  
 
1.4.1 The baseline model 
Since the event-window ranges from just a minute or so to a maximal of a few hours, 
de-facto single regressions result, which are separated by the specific fundamental news items. 
The high-frequency model arises as follows: 
                                                 
18
 Solnik (1987) follows a news-model-like approach using monthly (and quarterly) data for the period 
July 1973 to December 1983 in order to explain real exchange rate changes. In contrast to the classical 
news-model he uses financial market prices to proxy macroeconomic variables since corresponding 
news are real-time and more directly measured. So he proxies changes in economic activity by real 
stock returns and monetary shocks by interest rates respectively.18 In sum, his results are fairly weak, 
which he explains partly by the use of poor proxies. However, he emphasizes that using financial 
prices in lieu of traditional macroeconomic time series proves to be a promising field of further 
research. 
19
 In fact, Faust et al. (2007) also use Federal Funds future prices in order to generate corresponding 
surprises. 
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In equation (1.4), the exchange rate change, ∆st,t+s, is regressed on the news items, Nk, 
and an iid disturbance variable. By using several event-windows with different lengths s 
(measured in e.g. 5-minute units), the durations of the individual news-effects can be 
analyzed; though index j includes all sorts of respective lead and lag effects. However, if 
asymmetric news-effects exist, corresponding parameters would be instable. So dependent on 
the validity of the current economic state, equation (1.5) provides the relevant news 
parameters (for illustrative purposes the focus rests on one period without leads and lags): 
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1.4.2 Empirical evidence 
Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) analyze exchange rate reactions on news-effects upon 
minute-by-minute data for two trading days. Even though they allow for lag effects, they 
cannot reveal significant relationships. However, the study of the full 3-month dataset could 
indeed reveal several meaningful price jumps following news (see Goodhart, 1989). 
Nevertheless, both studies lack the implementation of corresponding fundamental 
expectations, which questions the results as such. Goodhart, Hall, Henry and Pesaran (1993) 
follow the issue, whether news-effects on exchange rates are permanent or temporary. 
Hereunto they analyze the US-dollar/GB-pound during April and July in 1989 regarding the 
US trade balance and a particular rise of the UK prime rate. They find that both the mean and 
the variance of the exchange rate react significantly on this news, but only temporarily, 
because during the following trading week such effects are reversed. However, one should 
keep in mind that Goodhart et al. (1993) only examine two individual events. Analyzing 5-
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minute intervals of the D-mark/US-dollar from January 1992 until December 1994, Almeida, 
Goodhart and Payne (1998) wonder how much time it takes until news-effects are fully 
processed into exchange rates. In fact, using MMS expectations in order to generate the 
surprising elements in announcements, they show that in general the news-effects are 
significant until a two hour-horizon after release except for the Payroll and consumer 
confidence figures. The latter continue to be significant until twelve hours after respective 
releases and therefore confirm "that the very short-term reaction to news is drowned very 
rapidly in subsequent noise" (p. 392). Furthermore, they reveal that US news reaches its 
maximum impact after 15 minutes, but German news only after approximately three hours; 
however, both significant levels are maximal at the 15-minute horizon. Almeida, Goodhart 
and Payne (1998) attribute this to the fact that the dates of US announcements are known in 
advance, whereas German announcements are most often unscheduled and thus market 
participants need some extra time to process the latter news. Andersen and Bollerslev’s 
(1998) study intraday volatility of the D-mark/US-dollar using tick-by-tick data from October 
1992 to September 1993. They show that macroeconomic announcements induce the largest 
intraday movements; however, taken together the typical intraday volatility patterns clearly 
continue to dominate overall.20 Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) analyze five-
minute intervals for five exchange rates from 1992 to 1998 on 41 German and US 
announcements.21 Moreover they use MMS-expectations to generate corresponding surprises. 
Indeed, much US news is significant, e.g. economic cycle variables let the US-dollar to 
appreciate. In contrast, German news is seldom relevant, which they explain in accordance to 
Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998). While US news often explain 30 percent and more of 
exchange rate’s variance (trade balance news achieves almost 60 percent), German news 
contributes rarely more than 15 percent. Further, Almeida, Goodhart and Payne show that the 
timing of news matter. Grouping the news-variables in different groups, e.g. real-activity, 
consumption and prices, and arranging them chronologically on the announcement date and 
the respective time, they are able to calculate if news’ impacts differ accordingly. As 
presumed, first announcements of each group reveal the highest impact on subsequent 
exchange rate changes. The authors explain this finding with the fact that later news often 
only confirm the former and therefore are not really news anymore. Finally, separating good 
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 In particular US announcements related to the real economy appear most significant, while in 
Germany monetary announcements dominate – they link this to different perceived central bank 
policies. 
21
 Andersen et al. (2003) find that prices adjust fully to news within five minutes while volatilities 
adjust gradually with complete adjustment within about an hour.  
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from bad news, the authors look for a specific source of parameter instability in respect to 
news-effects by using equation (1.5). In fact, they find asymmetrical exchange rate reactions 
on news, particularly on the trade balance and payroll announcements. Furthermore, the 
authors follow the idea that bad news should have an unusually large impact in "good times" 
and consult the standard deviation of exchange rate expectations as a proxy for market 
uncertainty. Focusing on bad news, payroll employment, durable goods orders and trade 
balance increase market uncertainty after bad news of about 30, six and twelve percent.22 
In sum, the major critic who has rested on event studies could be met. Thus, by using 
tick-by-tick data, the event-window shrinks to only a few minutes, wherefore potential 
disturbances, which could dilute the respective news-effects, are most likely removed. On the 
other hand, high-frequency studies focus on only the instantaneous exchange rate changes 
after news. So it should not surprise that R-squares of up to 60% arise, since the major part of 
exchange rate movements is masked out. Furthermore, high-frequency studies allow to 
analyze the required duration needed to incorporate news into market prices. However, 
pulling up the first tow statistical moments of the exchange rates, it figures out that news-
effects last only temporary. Moreover, earlier preliminarily findings in announcement studies 
showing asymmetric reactions arising from good and bad news can be confirmed (see e.g. 
Karfakis and Kim, 1995, and Andersen et al., 2003). However, one major critic remains: high-
frequency studies focus on only these short-term exchange rate changes, which follow 
macroeconomic news. Hence, considering on only a small part of exchange rate movements 
by construction, high-frequency studies leaves the major part of the variance unconsidered.23 
 
1.5 The hybrid approach 
Thus, short-run exchange rate movements do not correlate well with macroeconomic 
variables, why various announcements do not appear significant in explaining exchange rate 
changes. Today broad agreement exists in the exchange rate literature regarding investor 
heterogeneity arising from differing information bases, market uncertainty or diverse opinions 
(see e.g. Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006, Flood and Rose, 1996, and De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi, 2006). Moreover, microstructure models, which rely inter alia on the heterogeneous 
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 Good news in bad times is not considered since good news dominates over the whole period of the 
dataset. 
23
 Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) estimate that high-frequency models, which do not include order 
flow as an additional regressor, can only explain less than one percent of the total of exchange rate 
movements. 
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expectations assumption, are seen to be relative successful in explaining exchange rate 
movements in the short run, e.g. via order flow.  
Haven said that the bulk of the exchange rate variance still remains unexplained; news 
may affect exchange rates additionally via another channel. Andersen et al. (2003, p. 59) note 
that the consideration of order flow appears promising and the microstructure variable order 
flow found its way in high-frequency studies.24  
 
1.5.1 News, exchange rates and order flow 
In fact, we already introduced the direct news-channel in Section 2 without 
mentioning this explicitly, since at that stage we did not consider trading as a vehicle to 
process fundamental news into market prices. Hence, the direct channel is restricted to news 
on which market participants fully agree and thus is based upon public information, which 
consequently is called common knowledge (CK) information. So CK information is 
transported directly and instantaneously into market prices and has to be distinguished from 
non-common knowledge (NCK) information, which arises due to divergent expectations 
about future fundamentals’ paths and their respective impacts on exchange rates (see Evans, 
2002). The latter reflects heterogeneity in information among market participants, which in 
turn causes speculative trades and though can be observed in order flow.25  Hence, NCK 
information, i.e. private information, is processed into market prices via order flow and 
constitutes the indirect news-channel, which in contrast to the direct channel requires trading. 
Cai et al. (2001) reveal a strong influence arising from customer order flow on the 
volatility of the JP-yen/US-dollar during 1998, even after taking into account US and 
Japanese macroeconomic announcements. Actually, Evans and Lyons (2002) find a 
significant relationship between exchange rates and related interdealer order flow (IOF) from 
May until August 1996. Using daily data, they explain 63% of the variance in the US-
dollar/D-mark and 40% in the US-dollar/JP-yen. Considering the disappointing results of 
empirical exchange rate modeling (see Meese and Rogoff, 1983, and in a later study Cheung, 
Chinn and Garcia Pascual, 2005), Evans and Lyons’ results appear striking.  
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 The market microstructure classifies order flow as private information, e.g. heterogeneous 
expectations, interpretations and information. Hence, order flow is declared as an elementary medium 
to process disagreement among market participants into prices. However, in contrast to that, the 
traditional macroeconomic theory claims market homogeneity and hence no such influences arsing 
from order flow on market prices. 
25
 The sum of these trades flows in order flow, whereas the latter is defined as the overall difference 
between the volume of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. 
  
27
In addition to that, Evans und Lyons (2007a) show in their intraday analyses that order 
flow following macroeconomic news contributes more to US-dollar/D-mark movements than 
at other times. Trade intensity rises significantly after announcements, accompanied by higher 
order flow. It stands to reason that market participants do not share common opinions in 
respect to the meaning of certain news and thus, form different expectations which finally 
lead to corresponding order flow. Hence, it does not surprise that when following news, order 
flow’s influence on exchange rates rises, since arising uncertainty due to heterogeneous news’ 
interpretations have to be processed into market prices (see Evans and Lyons, 2002).26 A 
further interesting aspect of Evans and Lyons’s (2007a) intraday analyses reveals that trade 
intensity in exchange rates following scheduled news proves to be higher compared to 
unscheduled news. Since order flow’s impact on exchange rates increases with more trades, 
order flow proves at least as important in subsequent price reactions following scheduled 
news as non-scheduled news. This observation surprises since the former news are 
standardized and thus more transparent than unscheduled news.  
Known as the hybrid approach in the literature, news influences exchange rates via 
two dimensions (see Lyons, 2001, p. 16). 
 
1.5.2 Empirical evidence 
Analyzing simultaneously daily US-dollar/D-mark rates, order flow and a broad pool 
of different fundamental announcements, Evans and Lyons (2007a) explain approximately 
36% of the exchange rate movements via the hybrid model. Furthermore, they show that the 
indirect news-channel is twice as important as the direct channel in order to process 
corresponding news. Nevertheless, regarding both news-channels German news explains 
more than double the amount of US-American news. However, due to the fact that German 
news occurs four times as often as US-American news in the dataset, one news item of the 
latter has a slightly larger effect on prices. Love and Payne (2007) analyze high-frequency-
data comprising exchange rates of the euro, US-dollar and GB-pound. They confirm that the 
indirect news-channel is more relevant than the direct channel (the former contributes 2/3 to 
the explained variance). Moreover, by increasing the event-window up to 20 minutes they 
show that the relevance of the indirect channel increases following announcements. Further, 
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 Following fundamental news, traders are confronted with uncertainty concerning subsequent price 
setting. However, with arising order flow traders learn how to interpret news which in turn reduces 
uncertainty. 
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in respect to the question how news effects spread out, this depends on news’s geographical 
origin; news that do not stem from one of the two countries of the regarded currency-pair is 
processed exclusively via order flow. Thus, analyzing news-effects in the foreign exchange 
market, Love and Payne propose a multi-country approach. 
So combining these results with the finding in Evans and Lyons (2002, 2007a), where 
order flow explains 60% of the US-dollar/D-mark, Evans and Lyons confess that 
approximately 1/3 of the explained exchange rate variance is related to indirect 
macroeconomic news-effects, whereas the remaining share is not related to news. 
Furthermore, 15% of the unexplained exchange rate variance by order flow stems from direct 
news-effects, leaving only 25% of further unknown sources altogether (see Evans and Lyons, 
2007a). All in all, the authors claim that currency traders primarily use order flow to interpret 
new macroeconomic information correctly, in order to process them accurately into market 
prices afterwards. This agrees to Frömmel, Mende and Menkhoff (2007), who analyze 
different trading groups of the foreign exchange market and show that only order flow from 
banks and financial customers is positively related to exchange rate volatility. Their 
interpretation that this result is a consequence of information aggregation in the market is 
confirmed since some order flow, i.e. from commercial customers, is not related to volatility.  
Thus, order flow establishes as an important element in order to incorporate 
macroeconomic news into financial prices. However the question arises, how much time this 
process requires from being complete? Love and Payne (2007) show that indirect news-
effects arising from order flow following macroeconomic announcements are processed 
within two minutes only, thus the foreign exchange market appears efficient. In contrast to 
that, Evans and Lyons (2007a) find that order flow is autocorrelated up to 90 minutes after 
corresponding announcements, and so they disagree with Love and Payne’s view. Using tick-
by-tick transaction data of the D-mark/US-dollar rate, Carlson and Lo (2006) focus on a 
particular interest rate raise by the Deutsche Bundesbank on October 9, 1997. This unforeseen 
event triggers an interesting intra day pattern in order to study the reactions of currency dealer 
to news in detail. However, even though Carlson and Lo reveal some instantaneous 
speculation following news triggered by these people, they show that those destabilizing 
actions die out soon after; trading volume and volatility settle down to normal conditions after 
two hours. Further evidence for an even longer-lasting information process is indicated in 
Evans and Lyons (2007), who show highly persistent expectation errors in respect to 
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exchange rate fundamentals. In fact, autocorrelation proves to be still significant after three 
months of the corresponding announcements.27  
Finally, pulling up again the exemplary 25% unexplained variance of exchange rates 
from news and order flow (see Evans and Lyons, 2002 and 2007a), it is possible that further 
relevant but so far unconsidered news sources are still unconsidered. Thus, the news-pool has 
to be extended and to some extent reshaped. Scheduled macroeconomic news only comprises 
past information of very low frequency, i.e. monthly or quarterly; so their information content 
appears somewhat outdated (see also Fatum and Scholnick, 2006). Consequently, the 
extension of the considered information basis about unscheduled macroeconomic news (e.g. 
new economic laws and central bank interventions) and non-fundamental information (e.g. 
technical trade-signals and market sentiment) stand to reason to meet the critique of too low 
(fundamental) news frequency.28  Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) analyze high-frequency 
data using 20-minute intervals to explain US-dollar/euro- and US-dollar/GB-pound-returns 
via both news-channels.29 Considering an extensive set of additional variables, many novel 
news items prove to be significant, even though R-squares rise just marginally (about 1% and 
4% concerning the US-dollar/euro and -/GB-pound respectively).30 However, if Dominguez 
and Panthaki split the datasets in two separated regimes, dependent on respective exchange 
rate volatility, R-squares rise from 15% to 32% in respect of the US-dollar/euro and from 6% 
to 21% regarding the euro/GB-pound. So the authors confirm that news-effects spread out 
primarily via order flow and state that the indirect news-channel dominates in the foreign 
exchange market.31 Further, it shows that next to (common) scheduled macroeconomic news, 
unscheduled macroeconomic news and non-fundamental news prove to be relevant as well to 
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 Evans and Lyons (2007) examine US-American and German money and economic growth as well 
as inflation rates and show that order flow forecasts future fundamentals better than accordant 
exchange rates do. 
28
 Conducting a questionnaire among currency traders, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2004) show an 
increasing popularity of non-fundamental analysis. In fact, these professionals assign technical 
analysis more relevance than fundamental analysis. 
29
 In fact Melvin and Yin (2000) first examine the role of (broad) public information arrival on the D-
mark/US-dollar and the JP-yen/US-dollar. They show its relevance on related volatilities and quote 
frequencies as well. 
30
 We have to confess that Evans and Lyons (2007a) already consider a broad spectrum of news. 
However, they restrict the analyses to macroeconomic announcements since they see other news as 
being negligible. 
31
 Regime 1 holds, when current exchange rate volatility exceeds two times the standard deviation of 
its average volatility, whereas regime 2 holds otherwise. When splitting the sample dependent on the 
amount of arising news, results prove to be very similar. 
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explain exchange rate movements. Nevertheless among those news sources it figures out that 
scheduled macroeconomic news influences exchange rates in first place. 
 
1.6 The multi-asset approach 
In this section we put together the findings regarding cross-market linkages and 
dynamic responses to news of joint analyses of different financial variables such as stocks, 
bonds and exchange rates. Particularly the later works aim to reveal further findings 
concerning mutually news reactions from financial markets en bloc and accordingly, 
corresponding interdependencies. 
First of all, by surveying the prior literature related to this approach, Hardouvelis 
(1988) examines daily exchange rate and interest rate reactions to news in macroeconomic 
announcements from October 1979 to August 1984. He shows that markets react primarily on 
monetary news, but also on trade balance, inflation and real economy news. In accordance 
with models stressing price rigidity and absence of strong form of purchasing power parity, he 
finds for all news items that positive interest rate responses are accompanied by US-dollar 
appreciations and vice versa. Ederington and Lee (1993) analyze several different assets 
following scheduled macroeconomic announcements in order to disclosure the duration of 
news-procession in market prices. Analyzing 5-minute intervals for the Treasury bond, 
Eurodollar and US-dollar/D-mark, they find that most of the price adjustments occur within 
one minute, whereas volatility remains considerably higher than normal circumstances for 
another fifteen minutes. Ederington and Lee (1995) stick on the analysis by analyzing even 
finer intervals of only ten seconds and reveal some overreaction within the first 40 seconds 
following the release, which is then corrected in the following one or two minutes. However, 
the latter two studies have in common, that they do not relate the bond and exchange rate 
findings to one another. 
 Edison (1997) examines daily news-reactions of the D-mark/US-dollar and the JP-
yen/US-dollar as well as the responses of US, German and Japanese interest rates. Using 
survey data, she extracts the news items of several US macroeconomic announcements and 
finds that the exchange rates react systematically to real economy news, but not to inflation. 
Regarding the interest rates, only US rates respond more or less to all country-specific news 
(Japanese interest rates respond less strong and German rates not at all). Again, respective 
results are not related between the different assets. 
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Fair (2003) focuses on direct news-effects on future prices of the S&P 500, Treasury 
bond, US-dollar/D-mark (-/euro beginning 1999), -/JP-yen and -/GB-pound respectively. He 
uses accordant tick-by-tick transaction data from April 1982 to March 2000 in order to study 
the intraday reactions of these variables following announcements (he does not only consider 
macroeconomic news). It should be noted that his proceeding is different to others such that 
he fist localizes significant intra-daily price jumps after the announcements in at least one of 
the considered assets; those incidents he then calls news.32 Once a news item is localized, the 
relationships among the asset prices can be analyzed in order to reveal systematic 
interdependencies. Amongst others he shows that many of the news can indeed be attributed 
to US macroeconomic announcements. Further, exchange rates are relative to bond rates less 
affected by price news, than by monetary and real news. However, even though Fair relates 
the different influences arising from news to one another, the overall picture remains unclear. 
Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2007) analyze joint movements of exchange rates as 
well as US and foreign term structures following US macroeconomic announcements (the 
foreign countries are Great Britain, euro area and Germany until 1999 respectively). Using 
high-frequency data for a considerable long period which spans 1987-2002, they are able to 
investigate time-variation in the direct news-effects. Moreover, they use survey data in order 
to extract the net news elements. In contrast to Ehrmann and Fratzscher’s (2005) findings, 
responses on real and nominal announcements show a very consistent pattern over time, thus 
instable relationships between the considered asset prices and respective news prove of little 
evidence.33 In sum, they show that positive surprises regarding real activity in the US lead the 
US-dollar to appreciate and raise short-term as well as long-term interest rates particularly in 
the US. However, consulting the uncovered interest parity relationship supplemented by the 
risk premium they show that a positive surprise in US real activity which is accompanied by a 
stronger US-dollar implies either an expected weaker US-dollar in the future, a lower risk 
premium for holding foreign currency assets or a combination of these. Furthermore, positive 
US surprises in inflation leave the US-dollar nearly unchanged, but implies either an increase 
in the premium required for holding US-dollar assets, an expected US-dollar depreciation or 
again a combination of these. 
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 An event is considered being news, if at least one of the analyzed assets shows a one- to five-minute 
price change greater than 0.75% in absolute value. Doing so, he reveals 221 such news. 
33
 Exceptions are surprises in PPI, CPI, nonfarm payrolls and the trade balance, whose responses tend 
to fall in magnitude and significance over time. 
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Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2006) examine the simultaneous response of 
US, German and British stocks, bonds and exchange rates to real-time US macroeconomic 
news. They use accordant price data from July 1998 to December 2002 and in addition to that 
survey data in order to extract the news-elements. Following a multi-market analysis, 
Andersen et al. allow for dynamic news responses and cross-market as well as cross-country 
linkages in the periods surrounding US macroeconomic announcements. They show that all 
examined markets are linked to fundamental news in a high-frequency horizon, while bond 
rates respond most strongly to news. Equity market reactions actually depend on the current 
condition of the real economy thus considering that, stocks and exchange rates react almost 
equally strong to macroeconomic news. Further, whereas news about inflation does not affect 
exchange rates in a systematic way, positive shocks related to the real economy lead to 
exchange rate appreciations. In sum, stocks, bonds and exchange rates show significant 
contemporaneous cross-market and cross-country intraday linkages, even after controlling for 
news-effects. Focusing on the exchange rates, negative bond returns (higher bond rates) and 
positive stock returns–indicating a stronger real economy–induce corresponding exchange 
rate appreciations.  
 
1.7 Resume 
The appearance of event studies on the foreign exchange market is driven ab initio 
from the hope to revitalize fundamental exchange rate research, since Meese and Rogoff 
showed in 1983 that macroeconomic models fail to forecast exchange rates more accurately 
than the random walk. Since then, event studies underwent several methodological 
refinements, flanked by larger and finer datasets which led to date on one side to the hybrid-
approach, separating a direct and an indirect news-channel and on the other side to the multi-
asset approach, examining news-effects on different asset prices simultaneously.  
The essential findings sum up as follows: first, news-effects on exchange rates work 
through two separated channels. While the direct news-channel incorporates CK information 
in exchange rates instantaneously, NCK information is processed into prices via order flow. 
Second, next to scheduled macroeconomic news, unscheduled macroeconomic news and non-
fundamental news prove to be relevant for exchange rate movements as well. However, as 
Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) state, the latter two groups are of minor importance. Third, 
questioning how quick prices adjust to news, on the one hand direct news-effects can be 
considered to be processed instantaneously, whereas on the other hand no consensus 
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establishes so far in respect to the speed of indirect news-procession via order flow (see e.g. 
Love and Payne, 2007, and Evans and Lyons, 2007a). Fourth, closely related to the former 
issue the question arises how the pattern of the instantaneously news reactions appear. 
Carlson and Lo (2006) show exemplarily that after excessive trading among traders in the 
interdealer market, normal market conditions regarding trading volume and volatility of the 
exchange rate are reestablished about two hours following the macroeconomic surprise. Fifth, 
the timing of macroeconomic announcements matter. Regarding news items attributed to one 
specific macroeconomic group, first released announcements impact exchange rates 
presumably higher, whereas later news tend to confirm the former with accordingly lower 
impacts (see Andersen et al., 2003). Sixth, asymmetrical exchange rate reactions on news 
partly exist, most likely dependent on whether the news is good or bad; especially bad news 
have an unusually large impact in good times and vice versa, which can be traced to market 
uncertainty on hand. Seventh, except for inflation, nonfarm payrolls and the trade balance, 
exchange rate reactions on macroeconomic news do not vary basically over time; however, 
this is different for stock-reactions, depending on related economic conditions (see Andersen 
et al., 2006). Eights, comparing the magnitudes of news-reactions between stocks, bonds and 
exchange rates, bonds respond strongest to macroeconomic announcements. Further, if we 
consider the asymmetric reaction pattern of stocks (conditional on real activity), stocks and 
exchange rates react equally strong. Ninths, in principal news indicating a stronger real 
economy leads the related currency to appreciate, though expected related future pathways 
depend on market participants’ mindsets, which are eventually unobservable (see e.g. UIP 
considerations in Faust et al., 2007).  
Overall, by looking back on 30 years of event studies on the foreign exchange market, 
it appears justified to conclude that exchange rates react on macroeconomic news, which in 
turn confirms that exchange rates are in fact related to fundamentals. Nonetheless, reviewing 
the insights gained from the hybrid approach, it follows that the success of event studies 
depends highly on the (accurate) integration of expectations; as Mussa (1976, p. 236) points 
out, the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates depend on the influence of 
news on accordant expectations. Since the latter map the general perception pattern, it is part 
of individual’s experience. So, more comprehensive datasets and finer techniques may help in 
future to model market’s expectations more precise that would in turn emerge in a better 
understanding of the relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. 
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2 Do dollar forecasters believe too much in PPP?34 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since about 20 years we know that exchange rate forecasts of professionals show 
some degree of "irrationality" (Dominguez, 1986, p.281). It has become a stylized fact that 
these forecasts do not hold predictive power and that forecasters do not even use the entire 
information available (surveys by Takagi, 1991, Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Too little is known 
about possible sources of this pattern. Our research contributes towards a better understanding 
of this seemingly "irrational" behavior by using a new database. This enables us to analyze 
monthly US-dollar/euro and US-dollar/D-mark forecasts for more than 12 years, i.e. 
significantly longer than earlier studies. Additionally and for the first time on this literature, 
the forecasts of professionals are examined in groups defined by their relative reliance on 
fundamental analysis. We determine that forecasters in general rely too much on mean 
reversion on exchange rates, mean represented by purchasing power parity (PPP). The 
revealing fact is that fundamentalists show even more biased forecasts–this is consistent to the 
opinion that Dollar forecasters believe too much in PPP. 
Right from its beginning the thorough analysis of exchange rate expectations have 
been motivated under the issue of market efficiency. The Frankel and Froot (1987) "finding of 
systematic expectational errors" (p. 150) set the ball to roll and was confirmed by numerous 
authors and various samples (see MacDonald, 2000). The many repetitions of the early results 
might have been responsible for the fact that a caveat has been readily neglected so far: 
Frankel and Froot (1987) reveal systematical errors but they also report that the sign of the 
error may depend on the sample period. This puts into question, whether deeper forces at 
work appear that may play a responsible part upon the changing sign. An analysis of this issue 
requires longer time series exceeding the often used two to four years. 
Another important issue already addressed by Frankel and Froot (1990a) is the 
forecast heterogeneity. Earlier studies, such as Dominguez (1986) or Frankel and Froot (1987, 
1987a), are based on consensus forecasts. More recent studies though analyze individual 
expectation data to reveal indeed different pattern in forecasts (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
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 Co-authors: Lukas Menkhoff, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany and Michael Schröder, 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Germany, forthcoming in Applied Economics, see 
also article in press: http://www.informaworld.com, copyright Taylor & Francis.  
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2003). This line of work describes and examines heterogeneity but does not allow inferences 
on possible sources of heterogeneity. For the latter purpose one would need additional, 
exogenous information (see, Moosa and Shamsuddin, 2004, p. 1606). A rare example is 
shown in the analysis of the exchange rate forecasts of commercial services (Goodman, 1979), 
where technically-oriented services perform better than economics-oriented services. 
However, the data spans less than three years and considers only 13 forecasting services. 
Another example is the examination of a relatively short Japanese sample which allows 
classification of six groups, such as exporters etc. This data indicates that expectations can be 
affected by private information (Wakita, 1989) but is also influenced by wishful thinking (Ito, 
1990). It is again Frankel and Froot (1990a) who suggest another cut in the data that might be 
warranted: they speculate that there may be forecasters "who think long-term" and 
consequently form regressive expectations then again others "who think short-term" form 
rather static expectations. We know that professionals picture expectations differently, though 
we need a rationale for this behavior–such as the one suggested by Frankel and Froot–
provided that we want to reach beyond description and build an economic understanding 
instead. 
We read the suggestion of long-term motivated regressive exchange rate expectations 
as a hint towards the possible importance of PPP. PPP is a core part in many exchange rate 
models; it is an intuitively plausible benchmark for thinking about exchange rates and–most 
important–it has received credit as an empirically valid concept as surveyed by Rogoff (1996) 
or Taylor and Taylor (2004). To pinpoint it further: as there is no single exchange rate theory 
that holds empirically (Frankel and Rose, 1995, Sarno and Taylor, 2002), which economic 
concept forecasters ought to be used if not PPP?  
An examination of this issue would therefore profit from data that fulfills two 
conditions: the time series should be long and there should be information indicating that the 
economic concept of PPP drives expectations. The long period is needed in order to cover 
exchange rate movements to and from PPP. Additional information towards motivation of 
forecasters is useful to derive directly the importance of PPP. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no data set in the literature that would fulfill these two conditions except for the data 
used here. 
We show that professionals from Germany, covering more than the past 12 years, 
behave very conventionally: our first result shows that according to standard surveys their 
expectations are not purely rational and they seem to apply different kinds of expectation 
formation. As this is in unison to the literature, we declare it as indication that other results 
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derived from our data can be generalized too. Second, biases in expectations are identified in 
the consensus forecasts, as professionals significantly belief too much in mean reversion, 
mean being represented by PPP. Third, according to their reliance on fundamental analysis 
and as soon as the sample is divided into three groups, the forecasters who rely most strongly 
on fundamentals analysis–"fundamentalists"–reveal an even stronger bias. The group who 
relies the least on fundamentals–prefer technical analysis instead: "technicians"–shows a 
much smaller bias. So, stronger belief in fundamentals and thus PPP is revealed as a source of 
bad forecasting performance. Fourth, though, the technicians' "advantage" in this respect is 
compensated by another bias not unexpected for technicians, showing too much expectation 
of trend extrapolation. Fifth, we illustrate, that forecasting biases of fundamentalists and 
technicians will get stronger when the exchange rate is further away from PPP. Finally, ‘point 
forecasts' performance of both groups is of similar poor quality. Interestingly, all groups 
distinguished show some directional forecasting ability. 
The remainder is structured as follows. Subchapter 2.2 describes data, whereas results 
are presented in Subchapter 2.3 Subchapter 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2 Data 
Our expectation data is based upon the ZEW Financial Market Survey. The Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) of Mannheim (Germany) collects every month 
numerous economic and financial 6-month horizon forecasts. The ZEW survey is a qualitative 
questionnaire, which has been driven since December 1991 and soon grew up to a stable 
panel with more than 300 participants in Germany. Around 75 per cent of the participants 
work in the banking sector (as analysts, fund managers etc.) and 25 per cent work either in the 
insurance or in the industrial sector. 35  In comparison to other surveys the amount of 
participants is relative large and its composition according to their profession is similar to 
others (Consensus forecasts, London, contain 75 per cent participants from financial 
institutions). The forecasts collected are standardized by fax and are usually processed on the 
last Friday of each month. 
Our dataset contains the individual six months exchange rate forecasts of the US-
dollar/euro (respectively the US-dollar/D-mark) from December 1991 to April 2004 and sums 
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 The ZEW publishes out of the ZEW Financial Market Survey regularly amongst others the ZEW 
Indicator of Economic Sentiment, which is a leading indicator for the German economy and of similar 
prominence like the ifo Index. 
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up to a total of 149 surveys. To our knowledge no other study uses a panel of monthly 
exchange rate expectations with a dataset as long as ours.36 Additionally we use daily US-
dollar/euro and US-dollar/D-mark rates from the Deutsche Bundesbank, six month Libor rates 
from EcoWin and price index data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
We are aware about criticism regarding the use of survey data for modeling 
expectations in general and for financial forecasts in particular. Nevertheless, incentives for 
participants not to reveal their true beliefs are very limited as the ZEW publishes the 
aggregated forecasts (consensus forecasts) only. Moreover manipulating the data with 
extreme forecasts is practically impossible, due to around 300 participants and the qualitative 
responses given. Additionally the incentive to participate at the survey in order to get an 
extensive summary of the consensus data with additional background information from the 
ZEW directly seems to be quite strong as this data is well covered by the financial media. 
To get a first impression of the exchange rate forecasts, some descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 2.1 For comparison we include the corresponding six month forward rates 
and the realized exchange rates at the same time. With respect to the level statistics one 
recognizes that consensus forecasts as well as forward rates behave similar to realized 
exchange rates though forward rates resemble exchange rates even better. If one looks at the 
change statistics, consensus forecasts still behave similar to realized exchange rates, in 
contrary to forward rates which differ especially on their variability measures. Finally the 
consensus expects a slightly stronger US-dollar on average towards the euro whereas the US-
dollar actually weakens on average. 
Additionally in a specific survey ZEW participants were asked on which information 
they actually base their exchange rate forecasts (see ZEW Financial Market Report, 2004).37 
This enables us to categorize the participants according to their use of analytical instruments. 
We base our classification on the use of fundamental analysis and organize the survey 
participants in fundamentalists, technicians and intermediates. We could not find any 
significant difference between people who use primarily technical analysis or flow analysis 
due to the fact, that flow analysis is used to a much smaller degree than other instruments of 
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 Recently Audretsch and Stadtmann (2005) uses the Wall Street Journal survey which covers a 
longer time period (1989 – 2003), but at the cost of semi yearly data only, which generates just 30 data 
points. 
37
 Participants were asked to distribute 100 points amongst the categories fundamental, technical and 
flow analysis according to the way how they do their exchange rate analysis. 
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analysis (the average share of flow analysis in the forecasting process sums up to 10 per cent, 
whereas technical analysis adds up to 30 per cent and fundamental analysis to 60 per cent).38 
The respective outcome of this questionnaire is summarized in Table 2.2. One can see that the 
group of fundamentalists is about as big as the group of technicians, due to the threshold 
values being chosen. The average numbers of these two groups representing more than 35 
seem big enough for our analysis.39 
 
2.3 Results 
In the following analysis we use OLS estimators corrected for Newey-West standard-
errors (see, Newey and West, 1987). We choose five lags as a result of the overlapping 
problem attributed to monthly forecasts with a six month forecast horizon, which imparts a 
fifth order moving average error process (see, for example Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). In 
addition and owing to the qualitative nature of the expectation data we use the quantification 
technique from Carlson and Parkin (1975) to generate point forecasts. 40  Due to non-
stationarity characteristics of the time series, we use change forecasts rather than point 
forecasts. Detailed descriptions of the calculations and analyzed variables are given in each of 
the attached tables. 
 
2.3.1 Rationality of expectations 
In order to check characteristics of our survey participants with well established results 
in the literature, we perform conventional tests of forecast rationality. Since Dominguez 
(1986) and for this purpose primarily it is common to check the degree of unbiasedness as 
well as efficiency.  
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 This could be connected to the panel composition, i.e. analysts being more represented than traders. 
We know that traders rely significantly more than others on flow analysis (see Gehrig and Menkhoff, 
2004). The high representation of technical analysis seems very plausible, however, as it is known that 
fund managers – which are represented here too – heavily rely on technical investment strategies, such 
as momentum trading (Menkhoff and Schmidt, 2005). 
39
 This average number of responses reflects the fact that we include only those observations in the 
sample where the person responding to the "use of information-question" does not change during time. 
Therefore, it seems almost unavoidable that the sample becomes smaller the more we go back into 
history. 
40
 Taylor (1989), among others, also uses this method to quantify categorical responses. 
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Test of unbiasedness: ett ss 66 ++ ∆⋅+=∆ βα  (2.1) 
Test of efficiency: 666 +++ ⋅+=∆−∆ tt
e
t FDss βα  (2.2) 
 
The unbiasedness test is modeled in equation (2.1), where the change of the exchange 
rate (∆s
 t+6) is regressed on the corresponding expectation change (∆se t+6). To satisfy the 
postulate of rationality, the estimated value of β has to be one, whereas α needs to be zero. 
Additionally in equation (2.2) the difference of the expected exchange rate change and the 
actual change is regressed on the six months forward rate premium (FD
 t+6). To confirm 
efficiency and rationality of the expectations, it is required that β as well as α are both zero. 
Table 2.3 presents results on the test of unbiasedness which reject the hypothesis of 
rational expectations, because β is significantly below unity. Furthermore the test of 
efficiency shows evidence of irrationality too, since β is significantly above null which 
implies that even data easily available such as the forward premium is not completely 
processed in exchange rate forecasts.41 Taken together, the unbiased expectations hypothesis 
(and therefore the assumption of rationality) on consensus forecasts has to be rejected, being 
well in-line with the literature (e.g. Kim, 1997, MacDonald, 2000). 
 
2.3.2 Bias of expectations 
However, our primary interest lies on the sources for the irrationality of FX-forecasts. 
To reveal the kind of forecast pattern we estimate a hybrid model. Since the work by Frankel 
and Froot (1987) a lot of analyses have been carried out to estimate the expectation formation 
for exchange rates, i.e. extrapolative, adaptive, regressive expectations and some sort of 
mixed models on former (see e.g. Cavaglia et al., 1993, Ito, 1994, Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2003). 
In sum, it figures out that depending on the forecast horizon, short-term forecasts exhibit 
evidence of destabilizing behavior whereas long-term forecasts show stabilizing evidence. 
Here we use a mixed model to regress the exchange rate forecasts on an extrapolative 
and a regressive term, since the former term covers well technical orientated forecaster 
behavior, whereas a regressive term should display the way how fundamentalists form their 
expectations. Furthermore, this procedure fits well into the relevant literature for comparative 
purposes (e.g. Moosa and Shamsuddin, 2004). 
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 Not surprisingly, running the unbiasedness test for the forward rate reveals strongly biased results as 
well. 
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Expectations formation: )()( 16 ttttet sssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆ −+ υγα  (2.3) 
Systematic bias: )()( 166 tttttet ssssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆−∆ −++ υγα  (2.4) 
 
Equation (2.3) shows the expectation mechanism. The expected change of the 
exchange rate is regressed on an extrapolative term (s
 t – s t-1), which contains the previous 
one month change of the exchange rate. The second term on the right side of the equation 
displays the regressive formation ( s
 t – s  t). The latter one is based upon the difference 
between a fundamental equilibrium and the current exchange rate. To generate the 
fundamental variable we have chosen the well known relative PPP model and calculated 
corresponding rates upon PPI differences. In addition to that we would like to find out, 
whether the consensus relies too much on these expectations concepts on average. Doing so, 
we use again the expectation errors (see notes to equation 2.2) and follow the approach of 
Frankel and Froot (1987a, pp. 147-150) in equation (2.4), regressing them on the expectations 
mechanisms. 
The results in Table 2.4 show that the consensus is based upon a mixture of 
extrapolative and regressive expectation, so both mechanisms seem to matter. More 
interestingly the results for equation (2.4) show that forecasters rely too much on regressive 
expectations on average, whereas the same doesn’t hold in respect to the extrapolation of 
current trends. We can summarize that the participants of the ZEW panel rely too heavily on 
the concept of PPP when forming US-dollar/euro forecasts in some way. 
 
2.3.3 Expectations of fundamentalists and technicians 
In this Subchapter we run the same regressions for the separated groups as in 
Subchapter 2.3.2. We would like to know, whether there are any differences in the way that 
groups form exchange rate expectations (indicator i separates the different groups). 
 
Expectations formation: )()( 1, 6 ttittiiiet sssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆ −+ υγα  (2.5) 
Systematic bias: )()( 16, 6 ttittiitiet ssssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆−∆ −++ υγα  (2.6) 
 
Table 2.5 shows that the γ i coefficient of equation (2.5) differs between the different 
groups. Technicians seem to rely most heavily on the extrapolative term and fundamentalists 
least, whereas intermediates take a position in between. On the other hand forming regressive 
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expectations seems to be most important for fundamentalists, followed by intermediates and 
least important for technicians. Not surprisingly when we compare the biased coefficients in 
equation (2.6) fundamentalists rely significantly too much on the regressive term but not on 
the extrapolative term. Contrary, technicians orientate on a smaller degree too much on the 
regressive term, but additionally, they seem to follow too much on trend extrapolation (here 
the statistical significance is less obvious). Again intermediates find themselves between the 
other two groups with biased forecasts towards the regressive term.42 
 
2.3.4 A threshold analysis of expectations 
Following our last results we use a switching regression model with different regimes 
in order to get deeper insights into the structures of US-dollar/euro forecast biases. We 
determine the absolute value of the regressive term as the transition variable (c
 t = | s  t – s  t|), 
set the number of regimes to two (r = 2) and choose the threshold level (κ i) via a grid search 
method (see e.g. Franses and Dijk, 2000, p. 84). Function (I
 i [c t]) indicates the valid regime 
in time t. The expectations model (f r,i[•]) shows different parameters, depending on the 
regime and the group. We follow this approach to see, whether the group specific forecast 
biases differ between periods, where the US-dollar/euro shows large deviations from PPP and 
periods, where exchange rates are in line with the fundamental concept. Earlier research by 
Taylor et al. (2001) has in fact indicated that adjustment speed in real exchange rates towards 
PPP may change faster in periods of large deviations from PPP. 
 
Expectations formation: ])[1(][][][
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 To test whether expectation coefficients are statistically different between groups, t-tests are 
performed. Between fundamentalists and other groups all coefficients are significantly different, 
whereas this applies between technicians and intermediates only for the regressive term in equation 
(2.5). 
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Table 2.6 represents the corresponding results and explains our procedure in detail. 
Summarizing and focusing on the estimation results of equation (2.7), the group of 
fundamentalists forms regressive expectations in both regimes, whereas the extent in regime 1 
is greater (periods of major exchange rate deviations from PPP). This could contribute to 
stabilization in exchange rates and the utility of PPP. Additionally fundamentalists rely on 
trend extrapolation, but only in regime 2 (periods of minor exchange rate deviations from 
PPP). Contrary, technicians show a mix of regressive and extrapolative formation in both 
regimes. Further and looking at the parameter estimations of equation (2.8), all groups show a 
regressive bias in regime 1 but not in regime 2.43 Finally we reveal also an extrapolative bias 
in the expectation formation of technicians but only for regime 1, while fundamentalists still 
do not show any adherence on an extrapolative bias. These results on forecasting bias may 
cause some worries: they indicate that expectations about mean reversion in exchange rates 
towards PPP might appear too optimistic; moreover, some professionals–the technicians–
seem to form even extrapolative expectations to an unjustified degree and might consequently 
destabilize the market. 
 
2.3.5 Performance of expectations 
Our last analyses examine the forecast ability of the separated groups. Additionally we 
deal with related forward rates and random walk forecasts. The results are shown in Table 2.7 
and include four accuracy tests applied to corresponding point forecasts and a hit rate (share 
of right direction forecasts) applied to underlying trend forecasts. 
To cut a story short, one can not detect significant differences in the performance 
between fundamentalists, intermediates and technicians. However, if we concentrate on the 
analysis for point forecasts such as MAE (mean absolute error) and RMSE (root mean square 
error), the random walk beats all groups of forecaster as well as the forward rate, even though 
the latter one performs also better than the forecaster groups. On the other hand if we consider 
the hit rate, which is calculated upon underlying trend forecasts, that all groups perform 
significantly better than the random walk, whereas forecasts based on the forward rate are 
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 The different behavior of the bias depending on the currently valid regime approves, that in 
conventional regressions the bias varies over time (see, Frankel and Froot, 1987a, p. 150). 
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significantly worse than the random walk.44 In addition to that, corresponding differences 
between the forecaster groups and the forward rate are highly significant.45 
Taken together, both groups, fundamentalists and technicians, perform upon point 
forecast measures significantly worse than the random walk, as well as the forward rate. On 
the other hand, if we consider just the implicit trend forecasts, than these forecaster groups 
outperform the other forecast series. It definitely shows that participants of the ZEW survey 
have forecasting abilities despite all kinds of biases revealed (see also Wakita, 1989). If they 
would be able to avoid systematical distortions there would be an even better chance to 
forecast. This result stands in line with Elliott and Ito (1999, p. 455), "that more is going on in 
the models of the respondents than static expectations with random noise". 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
Our study on exchange rate expectations intends to bring fresh evidence into an 
established field. Thus, we first reproduce the stylized fact of non-rational expectation 
formation and conclude that our participants do not differ in this respect from those of earlier 
survey studies. We also notice–largely in line with the literature–that forecasts are biased, in 
particular that the sign of the bias does change over time. Our objective is, however, not just 
to perform the conventional tests for another survey at another time. We rather aim for adding 
a completely different and most interesting kind of information to the field to understand 
biased forecasts better: our survey is the first to combine a large data set of forecasts with 
information on the forecasters' preferred analytical instrument, e.g. their reliance on 
fundamentals. 
We reveal that the preference of fundamental analysis is useful information to 
understand the way how exchange rate expectations are formed. Moreover, we detect that the 
preference of fundamental analysis helps to understand specific biases: fundamentalists 
believe too much in mean reversion of the US-dollar/euro, more than others. So, this 
misguided belief is consistent with poor forecasting performance. However, any claim of 
superior performance due to reliance on technical analysis is premature. Although the 
technicians' expectations are less distorted by too much reliance on PPP, they also show a 
misguided belief: they extrapolate short-term trends as one would assume, yet, they 
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 Note that the origin of the individual forecasts is of qualitative nature. Derived point forecasts are 
only used for comparative purposes. 
45
 Performance statistics separated by PPP regimes show, that the groups perform better in regime 2. 
Moreover, if we pull up the hit rate, their out per
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extrapolate too much. Consequently, this additional expectation distortion hinders them to 
form appropriate forecasts. 
Overall, we argue that our data provide new evidence on possible sources of 
systematic forecasting biases. In addition to Ito's (1990) discovery of wishful thinking we 
reveal too much belief in mean reversion which can be interpreted usefully as too much belief 
in PPP. One ought to speculate whether Ito's and our detections may be connected to 
behavioral distortion in decision making: in this sense, our participants possibly overestimate 
the precision of their knowledge of exchange rate changes relying too much on their 
interpretation of PPP. However, there is also a competing explanation for fully rational 
forecasters, who show proper understanding of fundamentals: as we are covering 
professionals with somewhat long-term orientation, markets might act inconsistent to them. 
Then, foreign exchange markets are possibly dominated by short-term considerations which 
are less consistent with the directions that fundamentals advise. 
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Tables 2 
 
 
TABLE 2.1  
Statistics of consensus forecasts, forward rates and exchange rates 
 
consensus forecasts  forward rates  exchange rates 
 
e
tS 6+  
e
ts 6+∆   
f
tS 6+  
f
ts 6+∆   6+tS  6+∆ ts  
mean 1.1169 -0.0141  1.1297 0.0006  1.1294 0.0033 
variance 0.0120 0.0037  0.0224 0.0006  0.0221 0.0052 
std. dev. 0.1094 0.0604  0.1497 0.0249  0.1487 0.0709 
min. 0.8808 -0.1470  0.8464 -0.0604  0.8510 -0.1304 
max. 1.3282 0.1312  1.4358 0.0292  1.4120 0.1828 
Notes: Using the method of Carlson and Parkin (1975) to derive aggregate point expectations requires two 
assumptions. First, each individual forecast is based upon a subjective probability distribution concerning the 
outcome of this forecast. However, applying the logistic distribution did not yield the results in any qualitatively 
different way. Second, the corresponding means of the individual probability distributions follow-up a normal 
distribution, which can be justified with the Central Limit Theorem. Furthermore we have to set a scaling factor, 
which displays the threshold, of which the forecasters perceive noticeable changes in the exchange rate. We 
choose a symmetric scaling factor of three percent. In a special survey the participants of the ZEW Financial 
Market Survey were asked to reveal their individual thresholds in correspondence to their different forecasts. 
The average median for the US-dollar/D-mark was a symmetric threshold of roughly three percent. Nevertheless, 
choosing other thresholds around three percent, didn’t show any qualitatively different results. Taylor (1989) 
also uses the normal distribution and sets his scaling factor on 2.5 per cent. Other methods like choosing the 
threshold that the mean expected change is equal to the mean actual change or that squared prediction errors are 
minimized seem inappropriate because of overwhelming evidence towards irrational and inaccurate exchange 
rate expectations. Finally, in order to rescue some data points, in cases where the probability of a category is 
zero, we used neighboring estimated volatilities to compute the forecast (Carlson and Parkin, 1975, p. 130-131). 
S e is defined as the (consensus) forecast of the US-dollar/euro, whereas ∆s e represents the percentage  
 change forecast of the US-dollar/euro. 
S f is defined as the implicit forecast of the US-dollar/euro based upon the 6 month libor rate  
 difference and ∆s f represents the corresponding change forecast in percentage. 
S is defined as the US-dollar/euro and ∆stt+6 represents the percentage change of the US-dollar/euro  
 from t to t+6. 
 
  
46
TABLE 2.2  
Statistics of the numbers of participants divided by groups 
 
fundamentalists  intermediates  technicians 
group criteria: 
Fundamental analysis  
≡  X 
X ≥  80 
 
80 < X > 40  X ≤  40 
mean 35  80  38 
min. 12  9  8 
max. 57  122  58 
Notes: All measurements are based upon a quantity of people. The statistics are calculated on the ZEW surveys 
from 12.1991 to 04.2004. Accordingly the number 35 that corresponds to the combination "mean" and 
"fundamentalists" represents the average number of people amongst all surveys, who use fundamental analysis to 
a degree of 80 or more per cent. Furthermore the combination "max." and "technicians" shows 58 and implies the 
maximum number of technicians in one survey. Concerning the participants in the survey, whom we categorized 
as technicians, their mean of technical analysis adds up to 52 per cent (considering the mean of the whole survey 
is 30 per cent) whereas they use 17 per cent on flow analysis on average (the corresponding overall mean is 10 
per cent). In fact we are dealing with 237 individuals as not all participants of the ZEW survey responded to our 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.3  
Testing rational expectations: Unbiasedness and efficiency tests 
 
e
tt ss 66 ++ ∆⋅+=∆ βα  
 666 +++ ⋅+=∆−∆ tt
e
t FDss βα  
 β  [t-value] α  [t-value] DF adj. R2 F-test (α=0, β=1) 
6+∆ ts  0.00 [0.02] 0.00 [-0.07] 147 -0.01 19.86*** 
66 ++ ∆−∆ t
e
t ss  1.79*** [3.73] 0.02 [1.35] 147 0.23 - 
Notes: Here, as in the following tables of this chapter (except for Table 2.7), all variables are calculated in 
natural logarithmic form so that their differences represent corresponding changes: 
∆st+6  is defined as the difference between the current euro/US-dollar rate (D-mark/US-dollar-) and their  
  prior six month rate. 
∆se is defined as the difference between the expected euro/US-dollar consensus rate (D-mark/US- 
 dollar-) and their subsequent actual realization. 
FD is defined as the forward discount of the euro/US-dollar (D-mark/US-dollar), calculated upon the  
 difference of 6 month libor rates. 
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard-errors (see, Newey and West, 1987). Asterisks refer to 
the level of significance: *: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent. 
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TABLE 2.4  
Hybrid model for consensus expectations 
 )()( 16 ttttet sssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆ −+ υγα   
 )()( 166 tttttet ssssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆−∆ −++ υγα   
 
γ  [t-value] υ  [t-value] α  [t-value] adj. R2 
e
ts 6+∆  0.38*** [3.81] 0.35*** [10.25] 0.00 [0.72] 0.68 
66 ++ ∆−∆ t
e
t ss  0.34 [1.26] 0.26*** [2.96] 0.01 [0.56] 0.16 
Notes: The extrapolative term represents the previous one month change of the euro/US-dollar rate. Longer 
periods e.g. 3 months or 6 months changes show less significant results therefore we use the one month changes. 
The equilibrium rate of the foreign exchange rate is based upon the relative PPP concept. Corresponding rates 
are calculated upon PPI differences between the euro area and the USA. The use of CPI data could not reveal 
qualitatively different results. In addition to that robustness checkups show that the parameters indeed vary over 
time. Specifically we separated by equal time periods, up and down periods of the exchange rate as well as over- 
and undervaluation periods upon the PPP concept. However, in the majority of cases their signs remain equal. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.5   
Hybrid model for group expectations 
 )()( 1, 6 ttittiiet sssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆ −+ υγα  
)()( 16, 6 ttittitiet ssssss −⋅+−⋅+=∆−∆ −++ υγα  
 
 
iγ  [t-value] iυ  [t-value] iα  [t-value] adj. R2 
1,
6
e
ts +∆  0.14 [0.58] 0.46*** [6.18] 0.00 [-0.54] 0.59 funda-
mentalists 
6
,
6 ++ − t
ie
t ss  0.12 [0.35] 0.37*** [3.31] 0.00 [-0.02] 0.23 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2,
6
e
ts +∆  0.63** [2.33] 0.42*** [5.13] 0.01 [1.26] 0.40 inter-
mediates 
6
2,
6 ++ − t
e
t ss  0.58 [1.54] 0.33*** [3.14] 0.02 [1.00] 0.17 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3,
6
e
ts +∆  0.64*** [3.32] 0.40*** [6.73] 0.02** [2.16] 0.45 
technicians 
6
3,
6 ++ − t
e
t ss  0.59* [1.79] 0.31*** [3.06] 0.02 [1.38] 0.16 
Notes: The extrapolative term as well as the regressive one is calculated in the same way as showed in 
Subchapter 2.3.2 As well as in above calculations we carried out robustness checks. Eventually the results 
appeared qualitatively very much alike. It is worth pointing out, that above all the differences between 
fundamentalists and technicians approved according to corresponding conclusions in this chapter. 
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TABLE 2.6  
Hybrid model for group expectations with thresholds 
 ])[1()(][)(
,2,1
,
6
i
ti
i
ti
ie
t cIfcIfs −⋅•+⋅•=∆ +  
])[1()(][)(
,2,16
,
6
i
ti
i
tit
ie
t cIfcIfss −⋅•+⋅•=∆−∆ ++  
 with  )()()( 1 ttirttirirr ssssf −⋅+−⋅+=• − υγα  and 2,1=r , 
  with  || ttit ssc −=  and )( itcI  0
1
=
=
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ssif
ssif
κ
κ
<−
≥−
||,
||,
 . 
  r  
i
r
γ  [t-value] i
r
υ  [t-value] i
r
α  [t-value] adj. R2 
1 0.06 [0.16] 0.46*** [5.95] 0.00 [-0.15] 0.60 1,
6
e
ts +∆  
2 0.29** [2.22] 0.37** [2.45] -0.01 [-1.12] 0.32 
1 0.30 [0.73] 0.39*** [3.42] 0.00 [-0.16] 0.30 
funda-
mentalists 
6
1,
6 ++ − t
e
t ss  
2 -0.15 [-0.48] 0.20 [0.47] 0.00 [0.21] -0.02 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0.70* [1.75] 0.40*** [5.01] 0.03* [1.91] 0.39 2,
6
e
ts +∆  
2 0.51** [2.48] 0.47** [2.29] -0.01 [-0.72] 0.31 
1 0.92** [2.03] 0.33*** [3.24] 0.03 [1.20] 0.21 
inter-
mediates 
6
2,
6 ++ − t
e
t ss  
2 0.06 [0.16] 0.24 [0.53] 0.00 [0.19] -0.01 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0.67** [2.48] 0.38*** [6.41] 0.03** [2.58] 0.43 3,
6
e
ts +∆  
2 0.60*** [3.62] 0.41*** [2.71] 0.00 [-0.01] 0.40 
1 0.87** [2.25] 0.31*** [3.12] 0.03 [1.34] 0.19 
tech-
nicians 
6
3,
6 ++ − t
e
t ss  
2 0.17 [0.52] 0.23 [0.55] 0.01 [0.64] -0.01 
Notes: Regime one represents the periods, when the euro/US-dollar deviates ten percent or more from his 
fundamentally fair value based upon the relative PPP theory. Regime two therefore represents the periods, when 
the realized exchange rates deviate less than ten percent from PPP exchange rates. The indicator function I(ct) 
shows in which regime exchange rates are currently located. Concerning the grid search method, we restrict the 
search for the threshold in a range of 2.5 – 25.0 per cent (with intervals of 2.5 per cent in between). Additionally 
we require that the number of observations in each of the regimes contains 30 per cent at minimum. Finally, the 
threshold is selected, if the overall residual sum of squares is minimized. Alternatively, setting wider threshold 
ranges results in slightly different thresholds between the separated groups; however, the outcomes do not show 
any qualitative changes. 
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TABLE 2.7  
Tests of accuracy and quality of performance 
 ME MAE RMSE Theil’s U hit rate 
fundamentalists -0.0157 0.0964 0.1226 1.5367 0.6154*** 
intermediates -0.0319 0.0974 0.1246 1.5613 0.5946** 
technicians -0.0392* 0.0956 0.1247 1.5681 0.5959** 
forward rate -0.0006 0.0746 0.0912 1.1455 0.3289*** 
random walk -0.0010 0.0656 0.0796 - - 
Notes: Random walk forecasts are calculated on current exchange rates, respectively no change forecast. 
ME represents the mean error based on euro/US-dollar forecasts and realized exchange rates. 
MAE represents corresponding absolute mean error. 
RMSE represents corresponding root mean square error. Differences between groups and other forecast 
 series were examined upon  
Theil’s U represents the relation between the group specific RMSE and the RMSE of the random walk.  
hit rate represents the share of right direction forecasts. In brackets you find the p-values of the chi-square 
test statistic in correspondence to the hypothesis of no directional forecast ability (Diebold and 
Lopez, 1996, pp. 256-258). Differences between the forecast series were tested upon contingency 
tables in connection with χ2-tests. 
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Figures 2 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1  
US-dollar/euro rates, PPP exchange rates and consensus forecasts 
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Notes: This figure shows actual realizations of the US-dollar/euro and US-dollar/D-mark exchange rates, where 
the latter are transformed on the official exchange rate between the D-mark/euro of 1.95583 (left scaled). In 
addition to that it shows PPP exchange rates, which are calculated upon the PPP concept (left scaled) and 
consensus change predictions (right scaled). The consensus data were generated with the quantification method 
introduced by Carlson and Parkin, 1975 (for further details see note in Table 2.1). To calculate the fundamental 
exchange rates we used the PPP concept (further explanations are given in chapter regressive expectations). 
Whereas the US-dollar/euro as well as the PPP exchange rates are presented in their levels (corresponding left 
axis), the consensus data are shown in their changes (corresponding right axis). It can be seen, that the swap of 
the consensus forecasts from an appreciation of the US-dollar/euro to a depreciation occurred around the same 
time, when the US-dollar/euro crossed the line of the PPP exchange rates. Furthermore the amplitudes show a 
similar pattern, at least in their peaks. 
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3 Investor sentiment in the US-dollar: longer-term, nonlinear 
orientation on PPP46 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Foreign exchange markets, such as the US-dollar/euro market, seem to be 
characterized by a separation along the time horizon (see Frankel and Rose, 1995, p.1718). At 
shorter horizons, i.e. up to one or two years, there reigns the "exchange rate disconnect 
puzzle" (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). At longer horizons, however, exchange rates appear 
linked with economic fundamentals (see e.g. Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Unfortunately, this 
longer-term tendency of exchange rates towards equilibrium values—revealed in empirical 
exchange rate research—has never been reconciled with actual professionals’ expectations. 
On the contrary, evidence shows that professionals’ exchange rate expectations are 
consistently irrational.47 This leaves us with a puzzle: why are exchange rates in the long run 
in line with fundamentals, whereas professional forecasts underlie considerable "expectational 
errors" (Frankel and Froot, 1987, p.150)? This chapter contributes to this question from a 
different perspective, first by analyzing the effective time horizon, to what investor sentiment 
is connected with subsequent exchange rate returns, and further, by distinguishing between 
sentiment’s short- and long-run determinants. In sum, we find investor sentiment in exchange 
rates to be longer-term oriented than the predefined forecast horizon states, to be aligned with 
exchange rate fundamentals and to depend nonlinear on the actual exchange rate deviation 
from long-run purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Researchers have always been unsatisfied with the consistent finding of "poor" 
exchange rate expectations of professionals. We argue that this result underlies a joint 
hypothesis problem, i.e. next to irrational expectations, drawing on an inappropriate time 
horizon could be on hand as well.48 According to the empirical exchange rate literature, we 
propose three hypotheses concerning investor sentiment, which we test in this study (see e.g. 
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 Co-author: Lukas Menkhoff, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany, forthcoming in Journal of 
Empirical Finance, copyright Elsevier. 
47
 In fact, MacDonald (2000) surveys the related literature and states that professionals’ exchange rate 
expectations violate throughout the criteria of unbiasedness and orthogonality. Thus, it seems "hard to 
avoid the conclusion that [this finding] implies some irrationality among market participants" (p. 94). 
48
 There may be other reasons as well, such as Peso problems or learning processes (see e.g. 
MacDonald, 2000). 
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Sarno, 2005): first, sentiment derived from qualitative 6-month exchange rate expectations is 
longer-term oriented than the predefined forecast horizon states, which second, is attributed to 
its alignment with economic fundamentals. Third, higher deviations of current exchange rates 
from PPP cause stronger dependence of investor sentiment on fundamentals. 
One robust finding in the empirical literature states that exchange rate models fail to 
outperform naïve (random walk) forecasts over shorter-term horizons (see Cheung, Chinn and 
Garcia Pascual, 2005). However, there exists a lot of evidence, which shows that exchange 
rates are linked to fundamentals in the long run (see early contributions e.g., MacDonald and 
Taylor, 1994, Mark, 1995). 49  Recent contributions confirming the latter finding include 
Abhyankar, Sarno and Valente (2005), who reveal the economic value of out-of-sample 
exchange rate forecasts using a monetary model as well as Rapach and Wohar (2002) or 
Sarno, Valente and Wohar (2004), who show cointegration between monetary fundamentals 
and exchange rates using long spans of data. Taken together, it appears to us, that professional 
forecasters cannot seriously expect to predict exchange rates in shorter-term horizons 
successfully, but are possibly aware about the long-term relation between exchange rates and 
fundamentals, which motivates our first hypothesis: because exchange rate expectations are 
aligned with fundamentals, they may well be biased towards longer-term horizons.50 
Concerning the actual fundamentals, which probably influence investor sentiment, we 
refer particularly to the prominence of long-run PPP as a main building block of the monetary 
model. Its economic motivation is well understood and calculating equilibrium values is 
simple. Furthermore, the debate on the validity of PPP has experienced a complete reversal in 
the literature during the 1990s, since its absolute rejection has been later replaced by gradual 
acceptance (see Taylor and Taylor, 2004). In the beginning, PPP was seen as a very long-run 
phenomenon at best. However, calculated half-lives for deviations of exchange rates from 
PPP have remarkably decreased in empirical analyses, due to the application of more 
sophisticated methods. Estimated half-lives have decreased from five to six years (see Rogoff, 
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 The fact that some contributions show the long run linkage between exchange rates and 
fundamentals as early as in the 1990s, supports our argument, since professional forecasters could 
have known about this finding at the time the ZEW survey began. 
50
 There is indeed early evidence of regressive expectations, e.g. in Frankel and Froot (1987). However, 
even 12-month expectations prove to be poor, when compared to related exchange rates. 
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1996) to approximately one to two years only (see Coakley and Fuertes, 2000, Imbs et al., 
2005).51 Thus, the concept of PPP has probably gained importance for investor sentiment. 
With respect to our third hypothesis, empirical exchange rate research shows the 
existence of nonlinear adjustment processes towards fundamental concepts. Particularly it is 
found that the speed of exchange rates’ mean reversion depends on the deviation of the 
current exchange rate from its equilibrium level. If exchange rates are close to fundamental 
equilibrium values, adjustments turn out being slow, if existent at all. However, if exchange 
rates deviate from fundamentals substantially adjustments towards related equilibriums are 
significantly stronger. Various studies confirm this finding, e.g. Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001) 
or Kilian and Taylor (2003), both use an ESTAR model, different from Canjels, Prakash-
Canjels and Taylor (2004) who run a TAR model, and Sarno and Valente (2006) who apply a 
Markov switching model. It follows that investor sentiment’s relation to exchange rate 
fundamentals may be nonlinear, i.e. depending positively on the distance of the current 
exchange rate from its fundamental equilibrium.52 
In the following subchapters we test whether these three hypotheses—i.e. longer-term 
orientation, alignment with fundamentals and nonlinear dependence on the PPP deviation—
are reflected in investor sentiment in the US-dollar/euro. Our analysis is based on 
professionals’ expectations, arisen from a monthly survey of the Center for European 
Economic Research at Mannheim (ZEW). This survey, which started in December 1991 and 
queries on average about 300 financial market professionals, has established as a standard 
source for financial market analyses and is featured inter alia by Bloomberg and Reuters. 
We pursue the first hypothesis by applying long-horizon regressions, which allow us 
to investigate investor sentiment’s orientation over various time horizons. In doing so, we 
follow Brown and Cliff’s (2005) simulation technique, which is used to analyze investor 
sentiment’s impact on US stock markets. Furthermore, since we are dealing with qualitative 
expectations, we condense the latter into a conventional sentiment indicator by calculating the 
relative share of upwards minus downwards expectations (i.e. known as "bull-bear spread"). It 
turns out that investor sentiment is not connected with subsequent exchange rate returns over 
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 Flôres et al. (1999) show that half-lives are about two years for various European countries, but 
considerable longer for Japan and Canada. Coakley et al. (2005) show further evidence in favor of 
relative PPP. 
52
 Coakley and Fuertes (2006) reveal analogous stock dynamics concerning their related adjustment 
speeds. 
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shorter horizons, but becomes relevant to a significant degree in time horizons of more than 
two years.53 
This finding encourages us to analyze investor sentiment’s determinants. We examine 
a range of potential determinants, derived from common exchange rate models, e.g., interest 
rates, moneys and growth rates (see Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Since investor sentiment shows 
very persistent behavior, we apply Johansen’s vector error-correction approach (see Johansen, 
1995), which in addition enables us to separate sentiment’s short-term and long-term elements. 
In fact, we reveal one cointegration relation to which sentiment error-corrects and which in 
turn confirms hypothesis two, i.e. investor sentiment is aligned with fundamentals. 
Finally, in order to test for nonlinear effects underlying investor sentiment, we apply a 
threshold vector error-correction model, attributed to Hansen and Seo (2002). There are two 
reasons for following the threshold approach. First, threshold models, such as Canjels, 
Prakash-Canjels and Taylor (2004), have been applied successfully in the empirical exchange 
rate literature and, second, it seems economically plausible that sentiment changes somewhat 
abruptly, depending on accordant changes in professionals’ mindsets. Studies arguing along 
this line include Shiller (1990), referring to financial markets in general, and Bacchetta and 
van Wincoop (2004) referring to the foreign exchange market. In so far, the "coordination 
channel", regarding the usefulness of official exchange rate intervention (see Sarno and 
Taylor, 2001, Reitz and Taylor, 2006) provides a plausible economic explanation. In this 
connection, central bank interventions act as a coordinating device to bring about the 
combined engagement of fundamentally oriented, stabilizing speculators at the same time. 
Accordingly, this linkage motivates to follow a threshold approach in order to test hypothesis 
three, i.e. the nonlinear dependence on the PPP deviation.54  
Reassuringly, we reveal nonlinearity concerning investor sentiment’s error-correction. 
Thus, once we consider the existence of different regimes, depending on the exchange rate’s 
deviation from long-run PPP, mean reversion is weak inside a specific range around the PPP 
value. However, if actual exchange rates are outside this range, mean reversion becomes 
significantly stronger. 
A misunderstanding could possibly arise by relating our findings to sentiment research 
on stock markets: most such studies find that investor sentiment reflects short-term 
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 Recently Ang, Bekeart and Wei (2006) find that surveys forecast better future US inflation than 
several other models, e.g., ARIMA processes or term structure models.  
54
 We are aware that threshold as well as smooth transition models are approximations of the true but 
unknown nonlinear process. Both approaches have been successfully applied in many earlier studies. 
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exuberance, caused by irrational market forces, which disconnects stock prices from related 
fundamentals.55 One plausible explanation of these findings states that investor sentiment 
comprises noise trader risk, which is introduced by less informed investors, such as private 
investors. In fact, separating market participants into informed institutionals (professionals) 
and uninformed individuals (private investors) reveals the latter being the driving force of 
stock price misalignments.56 However, we cannot reveal such a phenomenon in our long-
horizon regressions, possibly because there are hardly any individual investors in the foreign 
exchange market. 
Nevertheless, also exchange rates may well be influenced at shorter-horizons by 
sentiment even though this does not show up in our long-horizon regressions. One way of 
considering this alternative, which is consistent with findings in stock market research, is 
thinking of sentiment as the sum of two unobserved components: a longer-term (stabilizing) 
component, described as a non-stationary process, and a shorter-term (destabilizing) 
component, constituting the stationary process. A plausible reason why we only find the 
longer-term component in investor sentiment may be due to the survey’s composition, which 
consists mainly of analysts, strategists and portfolio managers. These groups tend to hold 
longer-term views on exchange rates, whereas short-term oriented foreign exchange traders 
amount only a minor fraction in the dataset (see e.g. Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2006). 
In sum, we conclude that investor sentiment in exchange rates reflects three 
characteristic features: longer-term orientation, alignment with fundamentals and nonlinear 
dependence on exchange rate’s deviation from PPP. We emphasize that we do not argue 
investor sentiment causing exchange rate dynamics in longer-term horizons. In lieu thereof, it 
reflects anticipation of apparent longer-term mean reversion in exchange rates towards PPP–
acknowledged in several studies e.g., Kilian and Taylor (2003), Coakley et al. (2005), and, 
Sarno and Valente (2006). However, we emphasize that our findings contribute to put the 
apparent puzzle of contemporaneous exchange rate’s long-run move towards fundamentals 
and professionals’ seemingly irrational beliefs in perspective: given that investor sentiment in 
exchange rates is strongly aligned with fundamentals, it proves biased towards longer-term 
horizons. 
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 See e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brown and Cliff (2004, 2005), Coakley and Fuertes (2006), and 
Fung and Lam (2004). 
56
 The finding, that institutional investors often behave more sophisticated than individuals, has been 
shown in several studies (see e.g. Locke and Mann, 2005, Schmeling, 2006). 
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The chapter is structured as follows: Subchapter 3.2 presents a description of the data 
used for the empirical analyses. Subchapter 3.3 examines investor sentiment’s orientation on 
future exchange rate returns. In Subchapter 3.4, sentiment’s determinants are revealed, 
whereas we allow in Subchapter 3.5 for nonlinearity in the corresponding relations. 
Subchapter 3.6 summarizes the main findings. 
 
3.2 Data 
Our analysis is based on the well-established monthly financial market survey of the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. Compared to other 
surveys of financial market professionals, the ZEW’s survey structure is conventional (e.g., 
similar to Consensus Forecasts, London), but participation is large with about 300 responses.  
The ZEW collects every month numerous economic and financial expectations, which 
are based on a time horizon of six months. For this purpose, the ZEW conducts a standardized 
questionnaire via fax, where responses are usually processed on the last Friday of each month. 
About 75 percent of participants work in the financial sector. Among these financial 
professionals, analysts represent the main fraction; however, traders, portfolio managers and 
senior bankers are included in the sample as well. Participants outside the financial sector 
work in finance or accounting departments and thus are likewise familiar with financial 
markets. The ZEW survey asks participants to reveal their qualitative expectations, i.e. "up", 
"down" or "no change". This sort of data fits absolutely to generate a bull-bear spread, which 
is a common measure in the financial community (see Brown and Cliff, 2004): 
 
SENTIMENT = UP - DOWN (3.1) 
 
Investor sentiment is analyzed for the major foreign exchange market, i.e. the US-
dollar/euro market, which links the two largest economic areas in the world (we convert the 
D-mark/US-dollar into euro/US-dollar until December 1998 respectively). In order to ensure 
continuity we take the reciprocal value of the euro’s conventional notation, i.e. from January 
1999 we use the euro/US-dollar exchange rate. Accordingly, "up" contains the relative 
amount of participants who forecast a stronger US-dollar vis-à-vis the euro and vice versa 
  
57
with respect to "down". Both numbers are measured in relation to all participants; thus, 
sentiment yields zero when the numbers of upwards and downwards expectations are equal.57 
We cover the period from December 1991, i.e. the survey’s introduction, to August 
2005, which sums up to 165 observations. In addition to the sentiment series, further data is 
necessary for the analysis. Thus, we use euro/- and D-mark/US-dollar end of month rates 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank in order to generate the required exchange rate series. Both 
time series, i.e. sentiment and exchange rate, are shown in Figure 3.1 over the investigation 
period. Moreover, we consider various fundamental variables, which are used in standard 
exchange rate models. Taking the monetary model as the reference model, these variables are 
the following: differences of changes in money and income as well as of interest rates 
between the euro zone (Germany until December 1998 respectively) and the US. In detail, we 
use a broader definition of money, i.e. M3, and a narrower one, M2. In order to proxy income 
growth on a monthly basis, we rely on industrial production; additionally quarterly GDP is 
interpolated to generate a monthly frequency. With respect to interest rates, we use six months 
Libor rates. Furthermore, in order to consider Frankel’s real interest differential model (1979) 
we incorporate 10-year government bond yields. Finally, and somewhat pragmatic, we control 
for the following variables in addition to this reference model. First, inflation is often seen to 
be a better proxy to capture price trends than money aggregates. Second, the trade balance is 
often assessed as a further exchange rate determinant (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) and, 
third, capital flows reach out money market instruments why we consider stock index returns 
too (see Hau and Rey, 2006).58 Before we run the analyses, the time series properties of the 
underlying data have to be examined. Hence, we consult standard unit-root tests (Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller, Philips-Perron as well as KPSS).  
Overall, these tests provide somewhat mixed results, depending on the particular 
procedure as well as the exact investigation period (see Table 3.1). Hence, the level series of 
the considered variables show at least very persistent behavior.59 
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 Unless all participants expect either "up" or "down", investor sentiment outcomes range below one 
and above minus one. However, in this study investor sentiment never hits one of these borders. 
58
 6-month Libor rates and stock indices are taken from EcoWin. M2, M3, industrial productions, GDP, 
CPI inflation and trade balances stem from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. German 
government bond yields are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank and equivalent US yields from the 
Federal Reserve. 
59
 However, the differences of the time series are stationary, so we can exclude dealing with I(2)-ness 
in the data. 
  
58
3.3 Investor sentiment’s horizon 
By investigating professional’s expectations formation, respective studies have taken 
formal forecast horizons literally—the related horizon of our data spans six months. However, 
we allow for various time horizons and find that investor sentiment in exchange rates is 
connected to longer-term returns. Nevertheless, the validity of aggregated exchange rate 
expectations based upon their predefined time horizons have been consistently irrational (see 
MacDonald, 2000). The same result applies to our data, as shown in Appendix 3A.60  
Initiating our somewhat different approach; we draw on long-horizon regressions in 
order to test investor sentiment’s orientation on future exchange rates by considering a bulk of 
different time horizons—ranging from one month to 60 months. In doing so, we follow 
Brown and Cliff’s bootstrap technique (2005) with which they investigate investor sentiment 
in the US stock market. 
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t Sr ε+⋅β+⋅+α= z'Θ  (3.2) 
 
We regress k-period future average returns of the euro/US-dollar, rtk, on a vector of 
control variables, zt, and on investor sentiment, St. The variables in the control vector are all 
those exchange rate determinants, which we already discussed in Subchapter 3.1 Thus, we 
follow the question, to which exact time horizon investor sentiment is related. The 
methodological difficulty of this approach is twofold. First, we deal with overlapping 
observations. Calculating average returns of sequential periods, one generates a moving 
average process in the error term, εtk, of order k-1. Using Newey-West standard errors would 
be a way out, but due to our relatively small sample size, this correction has small power and 
so turns out being inappropriate (see Hodrick, 1992). Second, the persistent behavior of some 
of the regressors as well as the regressand has to be considered. The regressors appear as 
stochastic processes, possibly influenced by innovations, which are correlated with the 
disturbance term, εtk. Accordingly, corresponding estimations would be biased, even though 
the regressors are predetermined, and hence, spurious regressions are the outcome (see 
Stambaugh, 1999). Therefore, significance levels of estimates of long-horizon regressions 
could increase even though an actual relation does not exist, because the overlapping of 
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 Here we analyze the accuracy of expectations: the test results are very much alike as that in other 
studies, which are based on different surveys (see Menkhoff et al., 2006, analyzing a somewhat shorter 
sample). 
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sample fractions alters the stochastic orders of the variables, which in turn generates 
persistence (see Valkanov, 2003).61 Following Brown and Cliff (2005), we deal with this 
issue by applying a bootstrap simulation technique. Hence, we run 10,000 repetitions in order 
to derive simulated distributions of the estimates, which in turn allow us to calculate accurate 
test statistics. 
Results presented in Table 3.2 reveal an interesting pattern. In the short run, investor 
sentiment does not correlate with future exchange rate returns at time horizons up to twelve 
months. However, by increasing the time horizon, corresponding beta coefficients rise and 
probability values decline, indicating that longer horizons matter. From month 32 upwards, 
investor sentiment’s corrected coefficients turn out being statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  
Thus, we receive our first finding: investor sentiment does not correlate in the short 
run with subsequent exchange rates but in longer horizons, which supports hypothesis one 
that investor sentiment is longer-term connected with exchange rates than the predefined 
forecast horizon states.62 
 
3.4 Determinants of investor sentiment 
Since we showed that investor sentiment is connected to longer-term exchange rates, 
one may wonder to which sources this finding is attributed. Therefore, we search in this 
subchapter for investor sentiment’s economic determinants. In fact, we find that sentiment 
depends on several exchange rate fundamentals, i.e. the difference in inflation and in bond 
yields as well as the current exchange rate. Altogether, investor sentiment seems to align with 
long term PPP, which backs up hypothesis two that professionals are influenced by the 
insights from long-run exchange rate modeling. Due to the strong persistence of our data, we 
use a vector error-correction model (VEC model) in order to explain investor sentiment. 
Treating investor sentiment as integrated of order one, we can separate between its shorter-
term and longer-term elements. Bearing in mind that investor sentiment is longer-term aligned 
we expect to reveal a long-term relation between fundamentals and investor sentiment. If 
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 Ferson et al. (2003) show that even if the regressand is not highly persistent, spurious regressions 
could result. 
62
 We do not judge sentiment being of value in forecasting longer-term exchange rate returns. 
Although our dataset covers almost 14 years, it constitutes one entire up- and down-cycle of the 
Euro/US-dollar (see Figure 3.1). 
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investor sentiment also consists of destabilizing elements, we expect them being captured in 
sentiment’s stationary component and thus showing up in the short-term relation. 
In the following, the VEC model is formulated in differences, in which we restrict the 
constants into the cointegration space:63 
 
tttt xxx ε+⋅+⋅= −− 111 ∆ΓΠ∆  (3.3) 
 with 'β⋅α=Π , 
 with ),0(~ Σpt Nε  and Tt ,...,1= . 
 
Vector X
 t contains the essential variables forming the system, in which we have 
considered all variables mentioned in Subchapter 3.2, inter alia interest rates, growth etc. Our 
objective is to find a dataset, which delivers best model-fit and specification properties in 
order to explain sentiment. By checking the model specification, we run residual tests and 
present respective results in Table 3.3. Multivariate maximum-likelihood-tests do not reveal 
autocorrelation, but autoregressive heteroskedasticity of order three and five. Furthermore, 
residuals do not seem to be normally distributed; however, asymptotic test results are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and non-normality (see Johansen, 1995 and 2006). Identifying the rank 
of the VEC model, we run Johansen’s Trace tests, which show that our model underlies one 
long-run relation (see results in Table 3.4). Assuming the chance that one variable of X
 t 
generates a unit-root in this multivariate system we consult related LR-tests. Results in Table 
3.5 show clearly that the revealed long-run relation does not constitute one of the variables 
being a unit-root.64 
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results of the VEC model.65 Regarding the long-run 
relation, it turns out that all variables of X
 t are significant. Putting investor sentiment on the 
left, both the inflation and the bond yield difference affect sentiment positively. We associate 
the influence from bond yields on sentiment with longer-term inflation expectations. 
Moreover, the exchange rate correlates negatively with investor sentiment, which points to 
anticipated mean reversion in the euro/US-dollar. Turning to the short-run dynamics, next to 
investor sentiment only the bond yield difference significantly error-corrects to the 
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 For robustness, we consider other specifications without restrictions on the constants. Respective 
results do not change qualitatively the outcome. By testing for seasonal effects, no meaningful changes 
in the results show up.  
64
 By selecting the lag-length of the VEC model via LR-tests, the lag of one proves being sufficient. 
65
 Other attempts, using different variable sets, turn out being less fruitful than our final set up. 
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cointegration relation. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the corresponding alpha-coefficients 
seem rather small, which consequently puts the economic significance into question. 
Furthermore, regarding the short-run coefficients arising from lagged differences of investor 
sentiment, we notify that investor sentiment does not influence any other variable in the short 
run. Looking at the significant determinants of investor sentiment’s short-run equation, 
investor sentiment is affected negatively by the bond yield difference and positively by the 
euro/US-dollar. Whereas we attribute the short-term impact from the nominal exchange rate 
to common extrapolative behavior in financial markets, the negative short-run affect arising 
from the bond term is in line with the importance of real interest rates in foreign exchange 
markets (see Frankel, 1979). 
Summarized, investor sentiment shows some destabilizing elements in the short run, 
caused by exchange rate momentum and changes in bond yields. In contrast, its nonstationary 
component is driven by stabilizing elements, which are associated with anticipated mean 
reversion in the exchange rate and expected future inflation. Regarding sentiment’s error-
correction parameter value, the long-run relation is lacking economic significance, which may 
indicate that some further sort of nonlinearity underlying investor sentiment has not been 
taken into account yet. 
 
3.5 Threshold effects in investor sentiment 
Following the idea of different speeds of investor sentiment’s reaction on exchange 
rate misalignments, we analyze whether sentiment error-corrects differently by using a 
regime-switching model. Hereunto, we set up a threshold vector error-correction model 
(threshold VEC model), in which investor sentiment depends on exchange rate deviations 
from long term PPP. 
Picking up our third hypothesis, i.e. investor sentiment’s alignment with fundamentals 
depends on the exchange rate’s deviation from PPP; we refer to Kilian and Taylor (2003). 
They assume that in a market with heterogeneous beliefs, consensus’ anticipation of exchange 
rate mean reversion grows, the larger the misalignment from PPP (see also Taylor and Taylor, 
2004, p.148). Relying on our previous results, we assume one cointegration relation, to which 
investor sentiment error-corrects.66 Next to sentiment and the bond term, the long-run relation 
contains the inflation difference and the actual exchange rate (see Table 3.6). However, we 
                                                 
66 In fact, the linear VEC analyses in Subchapter 3.4 do not indicate another existing long-run relation 
(see Table 3.4). 
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incorporate the latter two variables into a regressive term, which comprises the difference 
between the actual exchange rate and the corresponding PPP value. 67  Our procedure is 
motivated by Frankel’s (1979) real interest differential model, in which next to the regressive 
term, the bond yield difference determines exchange rate expectations. By considering the 
latter variable, Frankel extends Dornbusch’s sticky-price monetary exchange rate model by 
longer-term inflation expectations (proxied by bond yields).68 In spirit of Kilian and Taylor 
(2003), investor sentiment should error-correct stronger to the cointegration relation, the 
higher the current exchange rate deviates from PPP. Hence, we draw on Hansen and Seo’s 
model (2002), which combines cointegration and regime-switching and incorporates an 
exogenous threshold variable (see Appendix 3B).69 Since recent studies in nonlinear exchange 
rate modeling show symmetric behavior of exchange rates, irrespective of being above or 
below their fair values (see e.g. Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001, Kilian and Taylor, 2003), we 
use symmetric thresholds as well by measuring the threshold variable in absolute values. 
Hence, we handle a two–regime model; in regime 1, the exchange rate is close to its PPP 
value, whereas in regime 2, exchange rate deviations from PPP are comparatively huge. Our 
model shows up as follows: 
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Vector X
 t comprises sentiment, the regressive term and the bond yield difference. 
Since we follow the idea that investor sentiment is subject to nonlinear (symmetric) error-
correction, depending on exchange rate’s misalignment from PPP, we regard the regressive 
term measured in absolute values as being the threshold variable, z. Hence, the current value 
of the latter identifies in connection with the endogenously generated threshold, γ, the 
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 Indeed, we estimated also the accordant linear VEC model and obtained very similar results to that 
in Table 3.6. 
68
 MacDonald and Marsh (1997) consider balance of payment equilibriums, that’s why they integrate 
the interest rate differential in an augmented PPP model. So in their setting, exchange rate 
expectations show up as being determined by a PPP term and the interest rate differential. 
69
 Seo (2003) tests the expectations hypothesis of the term structure and shows significant nonlinear 
mean reversion in the term structure. He puts this down to threshold effects existing in the error-
correction process. 
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effective regime, whereas all short-term coefficients are considered to vary between the two 
regimes.  
Results are shown in Table 3.7, denoting a threshold value of 0.1597. Accordingly, 
regime 1 applies, if the exchange rate’s misalignment is small, i.e. in a range of up to 
approximately 16 percent around the PPP value, whereas regime 2 holds, if the exchange rate 
is respectively outside this range. Overall, 64% of the observations take place in regime 1 and 
so the remaining 36% belong to regime 2. As expected, error-correction of investor sentiment 
to the cointegration relation increases significantly from 0.06 to 0.25, when switching over 
from regime 1 to regime 2. Looking at investor sentiment’s short-run relation, the bond term 
influences sentiment negatively in regime 1, whereas no such relation shows up in regime 2. 
Moreover, influence from the regressive term on investor sentiment only takes place in 
regime 2. 
Although we do not claim to take the estimated 16% threshold value too literally, we 
provide some intuitive interpretation regarding its usefulness. Looking at Figure 3.2 that 
shows the PPP-rate for the full post-Bretton Woods period it seems interesting to note that the 
frequency of regime 2 turns out almost equal to the corresponding frequency in our dataset. 
The last occurrence of regime 2 happened between February 2000 and October 2002, i.e. a 
period of considerable US-dollar strength and euro weakness, respectively. A look at investor 
sentiment given in Figure 3.1 shows that, indeed, sentiment turned strongly negative during 
this episode, indicating a fundamental undervaluation of the euro from the viewpoint of 
survey participants. Obviously, investor sentiment runs ahead of the later euro appreciation, 
whereas in the second half of 2000 actual interventions almost precisely mark the point when 
the euro weakness stopped.70 
Overall, we find that sentiment’s error-correction depends on the degree of the 
exchange rate misalignment from long-run PPP. In a 16 percent-range around the 
corresponding PPP value, investor sentiment does not show economically significant error-
correction. However, outside this range, error-correction becomes definitely significant. 
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 Fratzscher (2006) reveals around the years 1999 and 2000 heavy oral interventions by the European 
Central Bank with the purpose of supporting the Euro; however, these coincide with higher sentiment 
in the euro strength. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes investor sentiment in the euro/US-dollar–based on 
professionals’ qualitative expectations. In sum, investor sentiment is longer-term connected 
with exchange rates than the predefined forecast horizon states. Adapted from our analysis, 
we attribute this to investor sentiment’s alignment with fundamentals, which in turn depends 
positively on exchange rate’s deviation from long-run PPP.  
By applying long-horizon regressions, we investigate investor sentiment’s alignment 
over various time horizons, independent from its predefined forecast horizon. In fact, it turns 
out that sentiment is connected with future exchange rate returns over horizons of more than 
two years. In order to distinguish between investor sentiment’s short- and long-run 
determinants, we set up a VEC model and reveal one statistically significant cointegration 
relation to which sentiment error-corrects. The long-run relation comprises variables, which 
closely mirror the concept of long-run PPP. By contrast, as the short-term relation of investor 
sentiment shows some extrapolative behavior, exchange rate sentiment seems to be influenced 
by destabilizing forces as well. However, since recent empirical studies reveal some sort of 
regime-switching behavior in exchange rates, we run a threshold VEC model in order to 
capture such nonlinearity. In fact, we identify that investor sentiment error-corrects regime-
dependent: error-correction shows up being weak, when current exchange rates are close to 
long-run PPP, i.e. inside a range of about 16 percent around the corresponding PPP value, but 
strong, when exchange rates’ misalignments are high, i.e. outside this specific range.  
Overall, these three findings regarding investor sentiment closely match with well-
established facts of empirical exchange rate modeling, i.e. longer-term validity of 
fundamentals, exchange rate’s mean reversion towards long term PPP and stronger mean 
reversion the greater the distance of actual exchange rates from PPP values. 
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Tables 3 
 
 
TABLE 3.1   
Unit-root tests 
 ADF PP KPS 
sentiment -1.25 -1.13 0.11 
[prob. value] [0.1936] [0.2328] - 
∆sentiment -22.59 -31.89 0.08 
[prob. value] [0.0000] [0.0000] - 
inflation -2.28 -2.92 0.13 * 
[prob. value] [0.1802] [0.0456] - 
∆inflation -18.62 -26.11 0.03 
[prob. value] [0.0000] [0.0000] - 
dollar-rate -1.12 -1.27 0.18 ** 
[prob. value] [0.2390] [0.1885]  
∆dollar-rate -16.10 -19.75 0.05 
[prob. value] [0.0000] [0.0000] - 
bonds -2.20 -2.62 0.13 * 
[prob. value] [0.0275] [0.0904] - 
∆bonds -21.54 -26.37 0.04 
[prob. value] [0.0000] [0.0000] - 
Notes: The chosen unit-root test specifications depend on intercepts’ and trend variables’ significances–i.e. if 
significant, then the additional regressor is included. We chose the integration of maximum twelve lagged 
differences. Appropriate lag-length selections in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) are determined by 
the modified Akaike-procedure. In order to calculate the bandwidths for the Philips-Perron tests (PP) as well as 
for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin tests (KPS), we use Andrew’s procedure, whereas Bartlett’s kernel is 
chosen for the spectral estimations. ∆ symbolizes the first difference of the respective variable. All tests are 
based upon 165 observations, containing observations from December 1991 to August 2005. The variables are 
investor sentiment (sentiment), relative-rate of year-to-year inflation (inflation), euro/US-dollar rate (dollar-rate) 
and the bond yield difference (bonds). Asterisks refer to the significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, ***: 
one percent. 
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TABLE 3.2  
Long-horizon regression tests 
 1-mon. 6-mon. 12-mon. 24-mon. 36-mon. 48-mon. 60-mon. 
β 0.0021 0.0002 0.0014 0.0054 0.0086 0.0089 0.0082 
β
 (adj.) 0.0020 0.0023 0.0026 0.0069* 0.0097*** 0.0088*** 0.0073*** 
[prob.(adj.)] [0.3833] [0.2109] [0.1906] [0.0822] [0.0051] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
Notes: All regressions are estimated using Newey-West standard errors, in which the lag-lengths depend on the 
number of return periods minus one. The vector of control variables, zt, contains differences in domestic vs. 
foreign growth rates, stock returns, money growths and relative trade balance as well as respective interest rates, 
bond yields and inflation differences. The sample contains 165 monthly observations from December 1991 to 
August 2005. 
The simulation procedure works as follows: first, long-horizon regressions of the exchange rate returns on the 
control variables and investor sentiment are run using Newey-West standard errors. Second, we estimate a VAR-
model including the 1-month return and the control set, whereas investor sentiment’s beta coefficient is set to 
zero in the exchange rate return equation. The arising residuals are stored. Third, using the latter, we conduct 
10,000 bootstraps in order to generate recursively new time series, which in turn are used, fourth, to run Newey-
West estimations in an analogous manner as in the first step. Fifth, simulated t-values are calculated by pulling 
up investor sentiment’s beta coefficients, which we correct by subtracting thereof the mean beta estimation of the 
bootstraps and further, by dividing the latter term over the mean standard deviation estimation accordingly. Sixth, 
now we set up the simulated distributions, which in turn enable to calculate adequate probabilities of investor 
sentiment’s betas, in which the latter have to be adjusted as well. β represents sentiment’s original coefficient, 
whereas β (adj.) shows the respective adjusted coefficient, generated by the above-described bootstrap. Prob. (adj.) 
represents the p-value of the null, i.e. the adjusted coefficient is zero. Asterisks refer to the significance level: *: 
ten percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. 
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TABLE 3.3   
Misspecification tests of the VEC model 
tests for autocorrelation 
 LM-test (1): Χ2 (16) = 21.31 [prob. value] = [0.167] 
 LM-test (2): Χ2 (16) = 20.33 [prob. value] = [0.206] 
 LM-test (3): Χ2 (16) = 6.15 [prob. value] = [0.986] 
 LM-test (4): Χ2 (16) = 15.25 [prob. value] = [0.506] 
 LM-test (5): Χ2 (16) = 14.08 [prob. value] = [0.592] 
 
   
 
test for normality 
 LM-test: Χ2 (8) = 53.56*** [prob. value] = [0.000] 
 
   
 
tests for ARCH 
 LM-test (1): Χ2 (100) = 110.69 [prob. value] = [0.218] 
 LM-test (2): Χ2 (200) = 189.37 [prob. value] = [0.694] 
 LM-test (3): Χ2 (300) = 341.12* [prob. value] = [0.051] 
 LM-test (4): Χ2 (400) = 427.92 [prob. value] = [0.161] 
 LM-test (5): Χ2 (500) = 563.13** [prob. value] = [0.026] 
Notes: The test of normality distribution of the residuals is strongly rejected, indicating that residuals are not 
normally distributed. Additionally, the tests of ARCH-effects reveal heteroskedasticity in the data. Univariate 
tests reveal that normality is rejected due to skewness of investor sentiment and of the inflation difference as well 
as excess kurtosis of the latter. However, asymptotic results based upon the assumption of a Gaussian likelihood 
function, seem to be robust to some deviations of the residuals from the Gaussian distribution–i.e. 
heteroskedasticity and non-normality (see Johansen, 1995, 2006). Asterisks refer to the significance level: *: ten 
percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.4   
Cointegration rank determination (Trace tests) 
 rank three rank two rank one rank zero 
eigenvalue 0.0193 0.0415 0.0963 0.2225 
LR-test 3.15 10.03 26.44 67.20*** 
[prob. value] [0.562] [0.643] [0.322] [0.002] 
LR-test #
 
2.51 9.20 24.44 64.75*** 
[prob. value] # [0.679] [0.720] [0.440] [0.004] 
Notes: The LR-tests and the p-values marked with a hash are the Bartlett-corrected LR tests and the 
corresponding p-values, considered because of small sample-size effects on the power of the rank tests. Asterisks 
refer to the significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. 
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TABLE 3.5   
Multivariate unit-root tests 
 sentiment inflation dollar-rate bonds 
LR-test - rank 1  35.52*** 24.81*** 33.25*** 20.46*** 
[prob. value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LR-test - rank 2 11.40*** 3.54 10.16*** 13.28*** 
[prob. value] [0.003] [0.170] [0.006] [0.001] 
LR-test - rank 3 2.79* 1.73 0.68 3.75* 
[prob. value] [0.095] [0.189] [0.411] [0.052] 
Notes: Here, constants are restricted to the cointegration space. The numbers in brackets are the respective p-
values. Since the Trace tests in Table 3.4 reveal a rank of one, we have to look on respective likelihood-ratio-tests. 
Hence, we find that the long-term relation does not constitute a unit-root underlying one of the endogenous 
variables. Asterisks refer to the significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. 
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TABLE 3.6   
Unrestricted VEC model estimation and model-fit 
cointegration equation     
 
 sentiment (-1) =
 
inflation (-1) dollar-rate (-1) bonds (-1) constant 
 β
′ 1.00     = 0.17 - 2.51 0.61 - 0.17 
 
 
 
    
error-correction equations     
  ∆sentiment ∆inflation ∆dollar-rate ∆bonds  
 
α
 
- 0.08*** 0.07 0.00 0.11***  
 
[t-value] [- 5.03] [1.18] [0.31] [2.91] 
 
 ∆sentiment (-1) - 0.20*** - 0.02 0.04 0.03  
 
[t-value] [- 2.63] [- 0.08] [1.62] [0.15] 
 
 ∆inflation (-1) 0.03* - 0.00 0.00 - 0.06  
 
[t-value] [1.71] [- 0.03] [0.45] [- 1.25] 
 
 ∆dollar-rate (-1) 0.62** 2.49** 0.06 - 1.17*  
 [t-value] [2.34] [2.36] [0.65] [- 1.75] 
 
 ∆bonds (-1) - 0.08** 0.10 - 0.03*** 0.04  
 [t-value] [- 2.44] [0.77] [- 2.66] [0.51] 
 
 R2 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.06  
 adj. R2 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.04  
 Akaike IC -2.15 0.62 -4.31 -0.28 
 
   
  
 
 
log likelihood of the system:           1461.20    
Notes: This table shows the coefficients of the VEC model. The sample contains 165 monthly observations from 
December 1991 to August 2005. The variables of the system are investor sentiment (sentiment), relative-rate of 
year-to-year inflation (inflation), euro/US-dollar rate (dollar-rate) and the bond yield difference (bonds). The 
numbers in brackets are the respective t-values. Other variables were tested, amongst others production, trade 
balance and interest rates, which could not improve the estimation results and are therefore abandoned. We do not 
report LM-test statistics for binding cointegration restrictions, since no coefficients are restricted. Based upon 
calculated t-values, the cointegration parameters prove to be highly significant. Nevertheless, since latter test-
statistics are not valid, they just provide rough indications, wherefore we do not present them. Asterisks refer to 
the significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. 
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TABLE 3.7   
Threshold VEC model estimation and model-fit 
cointegration equation     
  sentiment (-1) =
 
PPP term (-1) bonds (-1) constant 
 β
′
 1.00     = -1.66 0.41 0.02 
γ = 0.1597      
    
  
error-correction equations     
  α ∆sentiment (-1) ∆PPP term (-1) ∆bonds (-1) 
REGIME 1 ∆sentiment - 0.06*** - 0.16 - 0.27 - 0.09** 
 [t-value] [- 3.13] [- 1.61] [- 0.57] [- 2.42] 
 ∆PPP term 0.00 0.06*** 0.25*** - 0.02** 
 [t-value] [0.86] [2.86] [2.63] [- 2.02] 
 ∆bonds 0.05 0.30* - 1.79* - 0.07 
 [t-value] [0.99] [1.69] [- 1.93] [- 0.95] 
      
REGIME 2 ∆sentiment - 0.25*** - 0.13 1.40** - 0.06 
 [t-value] [- 4.97] [- 1.13] [2.54] [- 1.41] 
 ∆PPP term 0.01 0.06 0.14 - 0.03** 
 [t-value] [0.72] [0.70] [1.01] [- 2.08] 
 ∆bonds 0.49*** - 0.52*** - 1.60 0.03 
  [t-value] [3.66] [- 2.13] [- 1.17] [0.23] 
  
     
 
fixed regressor p-value for threshold effect    [0.09] 
 
 
Wald p-value for equality of dynamic coefficients    [0.05] 
 
 Wald p-value for equality of ECM coefficients    [0.00] 
 
Notes: We illustrate the coefficients of the threshold VEC model. Investor sentiment is set to one in the long-
term space, whereas no further restrictions are set in the cointegration space or in the short-run relations. The 
sample contains 165 monthly observations from December 1991 to August 2005. The endogenous variables are 
investor sentiment (sentiment), the regressive term (PPP term) and the bond yield difference (bonds). The 
regressive term corresponds to the difference between the current euro/US-dollar and the related PPP rate. The 
numbers in brackets are the respective t-values. The latter variable, however, is based upon long-run validity of 
the relative PPP concept. Respective rates are calculated upon PPI differences between the euro area and the 
USA. Using CPI data, the results do not change qualitatively. Regime 1 includes 64 percent of the observations, 
whereas the remaining 36 percent belong to regime 2. The estimation of the related linear VEC model without 
threshold effect reveals qualitatively the same results as the ones reported in Table 3.6– -0.07 error-correction of 
investor sentiment. Again, based upon calculated t-values, the cointegration parameters are highly significant 
(see hereunto related notes in Table 3.6). Asterisks refer to the significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, 
***: one percent.   
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Figures 3 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1  
Euro/US-dollar rates (shifted 6 months forward) and sentiment 
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Notes: This figure shows US-dollar investor sentiment (right scaled) and the 6-month-subsequent euro/US dollar 
(left scaled). The sample contains 165 monthly observations from December 1991 to August 2005. 
Corresponding exchange rates until December 1998 are transformed based upon the official fixed exchange rate 
of 1.95583 between the D-mark and the euro. Investor sentiment is calculated upon qualitative 6-month euro/US-
dollar forecasts–D-mark/US-dollar until December 1998 respectively–from the ZEW Financial Market Survey. 
We calculate investor sentiment as follows: the share of participants, which forecasts a stronger US-dollar vis-à-
vis the euro, is subtracted from the share of participants, who forecast vice versa a weaker US-dollar. Since, both 
numbers are measured in relation to the total amount of participants, who forecasted the exchange rate, 
maximum and minimum value show up at one and minus one. However, investor sentiment never hits one of 
these borders. 
FIGURE 3.2  
Euro/US-dollar rates and PPP rates 
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Notes: This figure shows the spot rate of the euro/US-dollar and the related PPP rate. The sample contains 392 
monthly observations from January 1973 to August 2005. Corresponding exchange rates until December 1998 
are transformed based upon the official fixed exchange rate of 1.95583 between the D-mark and the euro. The 
related PPP rate is based upon long-run validity of the relative PPP concept. Respective rates are calculated upon 
PPI-differences between the euro area and the USA. Highlighted grey areas symbolize the periods, when the 
difference between the spot rate and the PPP rate results in 15.97 percent or more. Regime 1 includes 66 percent 
of the observations, whereas the remaining 34 percent belong to regime 2.  
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Appendix 3A 
To replicate common of earlier studies, we perform several accuracy tests. Since most 
of the standard analyses are calculated upon point forecasts, we quantify our qualitative 
expectations data by using Carlson and Parkin’s technique (1975). In doing so, we obtain 
point forecasts (consensus), which enables us to run standard accuracy tests. 
Table A3.1 presents derived results, which are based upon the predefined six months 
forecast horizon. Furthermore, for comparable purposes, we run the same calculations upon 
the forward rate as well as the random walk without drift. Obviously, the derived consensus 
performs throughout worse than the competing forecast series, except upon the hit rate, which 
is defined as the share of correct trend forecasts. Consensus’ mean error, the mean absolute 
error as well as the root mean square error are all larger than accordant errors of the forward 
rate and the random walk. Taken together and blinding out the hit rate, the forward rate 
performs in all tests the best. Again, drawing on the hit rate, the consensus performs 
undoubtedly better than the other forecasts, by generating a hit rate of more than 55 percent, 
whereas the forward rate forecast proves correctness in only approximately 34 percent of the 
observations.71  
 
 
 
TABLE 3A.1  
Tests of accuracy based on six months time horizon 
 ME MAE RMSE Theil’s  U hit rate 
consensus -0.0242 0.0923 0.1112 1.3624 0.5564  
forward rate  0.0061 0.0758 0.0938 1.1500   0.3383*** 
random walk  0.0043 0.0664 0.0816 - - 
Notes: In order to generate aggregate point expectations, we use Carlson and Parkin’s quantification method 
(1975). This requires three assumptions. We assume that the subjective probability distributions, concerning the 
individual forecast realizations, are normally distributed. However, using the normal distribution for related 
means of the individual probability distributions is justified upon the Central Limit Theorem. Moreover, we set a 
symmetric scaling factor of three percent according to a related ZEW questionnaire, in which the survey 
participants revealed their perceived threshold wherefrom noticeable the exchange rate changes are perceived. 
Nevertheless, results did not change qualitatively by pulling up other thresholds around three percent. Random 
walk forecasts are calculated upon current exchange rates, implying no change forecasts. Asterisks refer to the 
significance level: *: ten percent, **: five percent, ***: one percent. ME represents the mean error based on US-
dollar/euro forecasts and realized exchange rates. MAE shows the accordant mean absolute error whereas RMSE 
represents the root mean square error–significance levels of the error differences are calculated upon Theil’s U. 
The hit rate shows the share of inherent accurate direction forecasts–significance levels are based upon χ2-tests. 
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 Since a random walk without drift forecasts no change, the appropriate benchmark is set at 50 
percent. 
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Appendix 3B 
By using a grid search algorithm in connection with accordant LM-tests, we estimate 
jointly short-run and long-run coefficients as well as the threshold. Required confidence 
intervals for the grid search of the cointegration parameters (β) are evenly spaced around 
related parameter estimations derived from the accordant linear VEC estimation. Hence, the 
grid search examines all possible combinations of the parameter vector, β, and the threshold, γ, 
which meet the minimum regime size, i.e. the trimming parameter defines the required 
minimum fraction of the population in each regime. Due to our relatively small sample of 165 
observations, we set the trimming parameter rather conservative at 0.20. By choosing the grid 
size for the cointegration coefficients and the threshold variable of 100 and 300, we run 1,000 
bootstraps at a time. Furthermore, we use the Eicker-White covariance matrix in order to 
correct for arising heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Since the parameterization of the 
threshold model is a priori unknown, we base the null hypothesis upon the accordant linear 
model. Nevertheless, the asymptotic distributions of the arising LM-tests, which check the 
validity of the threshold model, figure out being intractable. In order to run inference analysis 
anyhow, Hansen and Seo (2002) suggest two alternative LM-tests via bootstrap techniques, 
which in contrast deliver appropriate asymptotic distributions. The "fixed regressor bootstrap", 
upon which we base our threshold tests, fixes in contrast to conventional bootstrap techniques, 
next to the estimated coefficients and the resulting residuals under the null, the original 
variable series as well as the estimated error-correction term. Modifying these residuals by 
adding i.i.d.-innovations of a standard normal distribution, then one regresses them on the 
variables–once for the whole sample and another time for the split samples determined by the 
threshold variable. By using jointly the latter generated coefficient matrixes and the modified 
residuals from the former complete regression, makes it possible to calculate the Eicker-
White covariance matrix estimators. This in turn enables to calculate a LM-like statistic. By 
repeating these steps numerous times, simulated distributions of the test statistics with 
appropriate critical values are delivered. The alternative procedure is closer to standard 
bootstrapping, in which residuals are presumed being i.i.d., but without taking control of 
heteroskedasticity. Since Subchapter 3.4 reveals heteroskedasticity in our data, we stick to the 
fixed regressor bootstrap, which proves, accordant to Hansen and Seo (2002), to be robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  
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4 Heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations: evidence on the 
chartist-fundamentalist approach72 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It has become apparent that we cannot understand exchange rate behavior by relying 
on models with representative agents. All forms of these simplifying asset approach models 
have failed empirically (see Sarno and Taylor, 2002).73 However, not only do they disappoint 
regarding their purpose, i.e. to explain the dynamics in exchange rates, they seem to be 
conceptually misleading, as well. There is now abundant evidence that market participants 
have quite heterogeneous expectations on future exchange rates.74 This may explain why we 
observe a tremendous trading volume on foreign exchange markets, which is larger than the 
volume on the world’s leading stock exchanges, not to mention trade in goods and services. 
Obviously, investor heterogeneity is key in understanding exchange rate dynamics and thus it 
is crucial to implement some form of heterogeneity in such models (see e.g. Lux, 1998, 
Westerhoff, 2003, De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). 75  However, empirical studies on 
expectation heterogeneity have mainly studied cross-sectional differences, whereas this work 
is the first–according to our knowledge–to thoroughly examine the causes of heterogeneity in 
exchange rate expectations in the time-series dimension. 
The goal of this research is to examine whether determinants of exchange rate 
heterogeneity–as indicated by the literature–hold in a time-series examination. In doing so, we 
rely on a dataset covering monthly expectations of about 300 professionals on three major 
exchange rates over 15 years. This data serves to measure dispersion of individual 
expectations as our proxy of expectation heterogeneity. Due to the very persistent nature of 
some of the time-series, we apply the vector error-correction (VEC) framework. Our universe 
of potential determinants is derived from three strands of literature (which we introduce in 
more detail below): first, and at the core of interest, we regard determinants introduced in 
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 Co-authors: Lukas Menkhoff, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany and Michael Schröder, 
Centre for European Economic Research, Germany. 
73
 This literature begins with Meese and Rogoff (1983); their results have been frequently confirmed 
ever since, see e.g. Frankel and Rose (1995), Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual (2005). 
74
 See e.g. Frankel and Froot (1987), Ito (1990), MacDonald and Marsh (1996), Elliott and Ito (1999). 
75
 See also Chen, Lux and Marchesi, 2001, Manzan and Westerhoff, 2005, Alfarano and Lux, 2007, 
Alfarano, Lux and Wagner, 2007. 
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models of heterogeneous agents–chartists and fundamentalists–that have been widely used 
(see e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1990, Brock and Hommes, 1998, Lux, 1998, De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi, 2006). Secondly, we consider the argument that noise traders create risk and thus 
heterogeneity (e.g. Flood and Rose, 1996, Mark and Wu, 1998), and, thirdly, we take up 
impulses from information heterogeneity about the macroeconomic fundamentals which may 
also explain heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations (e.g. Sims, 2003, Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop, 2006).76 As the first strand, the modeling approach of chartists and fundamentalists, 
has dominated exchange rate research with respect to heterogeneous agents, the examination 
of the two other strands may serve as a means of verifying the robustness of the chartist-
fundamentalist approach (C&F approach).77 
We find that the universe of potential determinants of heterogeneity in exchange rate 
expectations boils down to three main variables, which provide support to models of chartists 
and fundamentalists: heterogeneity is positively related to, first, uncertainty among 
fundamentalists and, secondly, a shift from dominating fundamentalists to the minor group of 
chartists. Thirdly, these measures even hold if a risk premium is introduced, indicating 
uncertainty, which increases heterogeneity as well. Moreover, the consideration of 
macroeconomic variables measured in absolute, in change or alternatively in volatility form, 
does not contribute significantly to the explanation of expectation heterogeneity. Finally, risk 
captured by lagged exchange rate volatility explains heterogeneity only if we do not control 
for the three determinants introduced above. To conclude, the C&F approach proves to be 
useful in explaining dynamics of heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations. 
Before giving more detailed results, we introduce the literature that motivates our 
analysis. The C&F approach is currently a common way of thinking about expectation 
heterogeneity in foreign exchange markets. One of the first observation of its potential 
relevance was the documentation that foreign exchange professionals rely heavily (and 
possibly also successfully) on technical analysis (see Goodman, 1979). This finding has been 
expanded into a set of stylized facts. Its main insight related to our research implies that 
technical analysis is, indeed, of high importance among foreign exchange professionals such 
as dealers and fund managers, a finding which has held since the 1970s until the present day 
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 Referring to Mankiw and Reis’ (2002) "sticky information model", Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers 
(2003) test its implications on inflation expectations amongst others, arising from related 
macroeconomic variables. 
77
 The term "chartist-fundamentalist approach" is often used in the literature, among others by Lux 
(1998), Westerhoff (2003), Manzan and Westerhoff (2005, 2007) and Alfarano, Lux and Wagner 
(2007). 
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(see Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). The idea of switching between these kinds of analyses is 
based on the fact that technical and fundamental analyses coexist and are typically used by the 
same persons. Frankel and Froot paved the way with a series of papers aimed in this direction 
during the mid-1980s; the most complete account of their thinking is documented in Frankel 
and Froot (1990). They derive fundamentalists’ and chartists’ weight from a process, in which 
decision makers learn the right model from their past performance. Whereas fundamentalists 
anticipate that exchange rates move towards their long-run equilibrium, modeled via balanced 
current accounts, chartists take positions in line with recent exchange rate changes, i.e. they 
extrapolate exchange rate trends. 
Frankel and Froot’s (1990, 1990a) contribution comprises much of the current C&F 
approach’s intuition; their design is specific, however, and aims at explaining the US-dollar in 
the 1980s. Thereafter, Brock and Hommes (1998) simulate the dynamics of a stock market 
also by relying on heterogeneous agents, who choose between different trading strategies due 
to their prior returns. In fact, the authors generate complex endogenous price dynamics, which 
match stylized facts of financial time series. Since then, several papers have contributed 
towards refining and extending this line of research; however, the basic intuition remained 
unchanged.78 Due to this fact, we adhere to an indicative example of the C&F approach, i.e. in 
this case De Grauwe and Grimaldi’s model (2006). 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) assume–in line with Frankel and Froot (1990) and 
others–that market participants choose between a fundamentalist and a chartist trading 
strategy.79 Fundamentalists are geared to the fundamental exchange rate, stemming from e.g. 
the purchasing power parity concept (PPP), whereas chartists extrapolate the current trend in 
the exchange rate.80 The fundamental rule predicts higher expected returns and lower risks the 
farther exchange rates are from equilibrium. This implies that expectation heterogeneity 
decreases in situations, which are characterized by increasing exchange rate misalignment. On 
the other hand, the chartists’ impact has proved to be less clear-cut. Obviously, their market 
share increases, the stronger the trend in the exchange rate becomes. Nevertheless, it depends 
on the general composition of the market, whether heterogeneity actually decreases or 
increases. In our sample, participants rank themselves mainly as fundamentalist and only 
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 Latest contributions include Wieland and Westerhoff (2005), Manzan and Westerhoff (2005, 2007), 
Alfarano and Lux (2007), Alfarano, Lux and Wagner (2007), Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan (2007), 
and Chiarella, Dieci and He (2007). 
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 In the following, we use the terms chartist and technical trading synonymously.  
80
 In fact, De Grauwe and Grimaldi do not base their exchange rate on one single fundamental 
concept; however, their model presumes that corresponding fundamentals follow a random walk. 
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about 30% claimed to be chartist (see ZEW, 2004). 81  Thus, subsequent switches from 
fundamentalism to chartism will increase expectation heterogeneity. 
As a second strand of literature we consider noise trading models, such as Jeanne and 
Rose (2002). They derive a positive relation between heterogeneity and the exchange risk 
premium (see Froot and Frankel, 1989) by analyzing the impact of noise trading on exchange 
rates (although they focus primarily on the current exchange rate regime). Their model shows 
that the appearance of more unsophisticated traders drives noise trading up and subsequently 
affects expectation heterogeneity, which in turn causes distortions of uncovered interest parity. 
In this manner, noise traders drive a wedge between the expected exchange rate and the 
forward rate and thus, they create heterogeneous expectations and risk (see also Flood and 
Rose, 1996, Mark and Wu, 1998).  
Finally, a third strand of literature is provided by studies linking uncertainty about 
fundamentals to expectation heterogeneity. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) implement 
information heterogeneity in a standard monetary model. Assuming the existence of dispersed 
information without any investor holding superior information, investors have to find out 
about fundamental information from unobserved trades. As time goes by, agents learn 
fundamentals and thus (rational) confusion gradually declines, which incorporates the 
intermediate situation of information based heterogeneity of expectations. In a different 
approach, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2007a) apply the concept of rational inattention to 
foreign exchange (see also Sims, 2003, and more recently Reis, 2007). It is argued that 
potential gains from learning the complete information set are small, so agents are not fully 
informed, hold different sets of information and make infrequent portfolio decisions. 82 
Accordingly, heterogeneity should rise in periods of higher news frequency, which would in 
turn increase the differences between agents’ information sets. Such periods may be indicated 
by higher volatility of fundamentals or alternatively, by higher exchange rate volatility.83 
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 The prevalence of fundamentalists in our sample is not surprising, given that the experience from 
various surveys shows that fund managers and analysts – which dominate our sample – prefer 
fundamental analysis, while foreign exchange dealers rely more on chart analysis (see Menkhoff and 
Taylor, 2007). 
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 Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) test Mankiw and Reis’ "sticky information model" (2002). In 
particular, they do so by analyzing heterogeneity in inflation expectations. Amongst other 
determinants, changes and volatility in inflation seem to be the most important. 
83
 Frankel and Froot (1990a) find a correlation between exchange rate volatility and dispersion, which 
they attribute to model heterogeneity – such as the C&F approach – rather than to heterogeneity in 
information. 
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Our relatively long and broad dataset allows us to examine the importance of the 
above discussed strands of literature in professional expectation data. In actual fact, we find 
conforming evidence with inherent implications of the C&F approach: heterogeneity in 
exchange rate expectations increases with decreasing deviation of the actual exchange rate 
from purchasing power parity (PPP)–indicating declining consensus among fundamentalists. 
This corresponds well with Kilian and Taylor’s (2003) study, which shows that when 
exchange rates deviate from PPP-values substantially, subsequent adjustments towards their 
equilibriums are significantly stronger. Moreover, rapid changes in the exchange rate–
indicating a shift towards chartism–increase expectation heterogeneity which, once again, 
matches with the C&F approach. In addition to that, another significant determinant shows up, 
as presumed by the second strand of literature, i.e. a rising exchange risk premium boosts 
expectation heterogeneity. Further variables as deduced by the third strand, such as volatility 
in exchange rate fundamentals or in exchange rates, do not provide additional insights. This 
pattern holds exactly for US-dollar as well as GB-pound versus euro and largely for JP-yen 
versus euro. 
The remainder is structured as follows. Subchapter 4.2 describes the data we use in our 
analysis. Ancillary results revealing the existence of expectation heterogeneity are presented 
in Subchapter 4.3. The following Subchapter 4.4 contains the main results concerning the 
determinants of heterogeneity and Subchapter 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data 
Our analysis is built on two sorts of data: first, we use a dataset comprising 15 years of 
individual exchange rate expectations in order to calculate heterogeneity and, secondly, we 
use a large dataset of standard fundamental determinants of exchange rates. 
By generating dispersion, as a means of representing our measure of heterogeneity in 
exchange rate expectations, we rely on individual expectations from the well-established 
financial market survey of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, 
Germany. The survey provides information on a monthly census of financial market 
professionals, questioning their 6-months forecasts of various financial and macroeconomic 
variables. Our sample contains expectations for the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-
yen/euro (until end of 1998 /D-mark respectively), from December 1991 until August 2006, 
which sums up each with 177 observations. Compared to other financial market surveys, the 
ZEW’s survey structure is conventional and similar to Consensus Forecasts (London). 
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Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that there has been wide participation with about 300 
responses on average. Moreover, the design of the survey is of a qualitative nature, in that 
participants are only required to judge whether the corresponding variable goes up, down or 
stays unchanged. Due to the fact that our analyses require quantitative forecasts, we have to 
transform the data by means of a quantification technique. We do so by using Carlson and 
Parkin’s method (1975), which in turn enables us to run appropriate analyses. 
The expectation data is introduced in Table 4.1 which contains descriptive statistics of 
the aggregated exchange rate expectations. Two figures present the core variable in our 
analyses, i.e. heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations. For each of the three exchange rates, 
Figure 4.1 shows the histogram of dispersion, whereas Figure 4.2 presents its time-series next 
to the corresponding exchange rate. Overall, one can see remarkable variation in 
heterogeneity. 
Since the main purpose of our work lies in discovering the determinants of 
heterogeneity, we need further data. To begin with, we use daily exchange rate data of the 
US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro (-/D-mark respectively) from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, in order to calculate amongst others, exchange rate changes and respective 
volatilities. Moreover, we consider core fundamentals, which are used in standard exchange 
rate models. Taking the monetary model as the reference model, these variables are the 
following: differences of changes in money and income as well as of interest rates between 
the euro zone (Germany until December 1998 respectively) and the United States, Great 
Britain and Japan, respectively. In detail, we use a broader definition of money, i.e. M3, and a 
narrower one, M2. In order to proxy income growth on a monthly basis, we rely on industrial 
production; additionally, quarterly GDP is interpolated to generate a monthly frequency. With 
respect to interest rates, we use 6-month Libor rates. Furthermore, considering Frankel’s 
(1979) real interest differential model we also incorporate 10-year government bond yields. 
Finally, and somewhat more pragmatically, we use further variables beyond our reference 
model. First, inflation is often seen to be a better proxy to capture price trends than money 
aggregates. Secondly, the trade balance is often assessed as a further exchange rate 
determinant (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) and, thirdly, capital flows reach beyond 
money market instruments and bonds which is why we consider stock index returns, as well 
(see Hau and Rey, 2006).84 
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In the following subchapter we examine, which of the above introduced variables–as 
suggested by the three strands of literature–are related to heterogeneity in exchange rate 
expectations. 
 
4.3 Determinants of expectation heterogeneity 
To get a first idea about the relevant explanatory variables in order to explain 
heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations, we conduct basic regression analyses. More 
specifically, we identify three variables of interest, which we will thus pick up again in 
Subchapter 4.4. Before we discuss our results, we define the variables, which have to be 
constructed from raw data. 
The following variables are deduced from the first strand of literature, underlying the 
C&F approach. Frankel and Froot (1990) explicitly draw on a relation between the 
expectation formation, the related time horizon and the preferred kind of information. They 
characterize fundamentalists as forming regressive expectations and being subject to a longer 
time horizon whereas chartists form extrapolative expectations and are shorter term oriented. 
Accordingly, considering fundamentalists’ equilibrium expectations, we rely on the concept 
of PPP, which is well-known and popular among professionals as a tool to generate exchange 
rate equilibrium values. It follows that the absolute difference between the current exchange 
rate and its PPP-value determines fundamentalists’ exchange rate expectations.85 Regarding 
chartists’ stance, we simply take the most recent 1-month change of the exchange rate, again 
in absolute terms. We feel quite confident that these two variables–a regressive variable based 
upon PPP and a 1-month extrapolative term–adequately capture the behavior of chartists and 
fundamentalists according to the C&F-approach. 
With respect to the second strand of the literature, we apply the standard definition of 
the risk premium, i.e. the difference between the exchange rate expectation and the accordant 
forward rate (see e.g. Froot and Frankel, 1989, Bams, Walkowiak and Wolff, 2004). 
This brings us to the third strand of literature, hypothesizing that further fundamentals 
determine heterogeneity. We examine the influence of those variables, which have been 
introduced in Subchapter 4.2, in three ways: first, we take them in algebraic signed form in 
                                                                                                                                                        
government bond yields are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank and US, British as well as Japanese 
yields from the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, respectively. 
85
 The PPP-values are based upon long-run validity of the relative PPP-concept. Respective nominal 
values are derived from the average real exchange rate by using actual Consumer Price Indices. 
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order to allow for potential asymmetries. 86  Secondly, we consider fundamentals in their 
absolute form, which somewhat reduces complexity, since it does not allow for the above 
effects. Thirdly, we calculate their volatilities by relying on the 1-month standard deviation in 
order to capture potential second-moment-elements in dispersion. A full list of the considered 
variables is given in Appendix 4.1. 
As a first analysis, we run univariate OLS-regressions, where we regress each of the 
above variables separately on expectation heterogeneity. To cut a long story short, there are 
only few results worth mentioning. In particular, no fundamental shows a significant relation 
with heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations, independent of its measured form. This is 
somewhat surprising, when compared to literature on inflation expectations (see Mankiw, 
Reis and Wolfers, 2003), but possibly less so when we remember that hardly exist any stable 
relations exist between exchange rate fundamentals and exchange rates except for the long run 
(e.g. MacDonald, 1999, Sarno and Taylor, 2002). 
The few relations we find are presented in Table 4.2. The table shows the R-squares of 
regressions of the regressive term, the extrapolation variable and the risk variable, as well as 
exchange rate volatility on heterogeneity. Obviously, it is better to measure the series in 
absolute terms to explain dispersion instead of considering asymmetric effects in expectation 
heterogeneity with respect to the determinants’ signs. However, with regard to conducting 
multivariate regressions, we see in Table 4.3 that the correlation of volatility with dispersion 
is completely absorbed by the other variables, for any exchange rate. Volatility becomes 
insignificant whereas the other variables remain significant in the multivariate setting.87 
Overall, we find that the bulk of potentially relevant variables boils down to three, i.e. 
the two variables derived from the C&F approach and the risk premium. Moreover, since we 
do not reveal any sign of asymmetric effects underlying dispersion, we define these variables 
in absolute terms. In the next subchapter, we apply a VEC approach in order to account for 
the persistent behavior of some of the variables and thus to discriminate between temporary 
and permanent effects. 
 
                                                 
86
 See Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005) studying heterogeneity in output forecasts, and 
further studies of expectation heterogeneity in inflation, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and 
Capistrán and Timmermann (2006). 
87
 Since Durbin Watson statistics indicate strong autocorrelation, we implement dispersion with lag 
one in the multivariate regressions.  
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4.4 Expectation heterogeneity in a VEC approach 
The VEC model reveals permanent and temporary effects, with some differences 
between the three exchange rates under consideration. However, we emphasize that all three 
empirical models have a similar structure, indicating the existence of common determinants 
of heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations. 
There are two justifications for choosing the VEC approach. First, we cannot rule out a 
priori, that some explanatory variables of the multivariate regressions presented in Subchapter 
4.3 are in fact endogenous–to quote an example, dispersion could have an impact on the risk 
premium. Secondly, given that some of the time-series are very persistent, an error-correction 
approach appears justified in order to pick up the common stochastic trends, which could be 
present amongst the variables.88 
Our baseline model contains the four variables identified in Subchapter 4.3, i.e. 
dispersion as our measure of expectation heterogeneity, the PPP-deviation term, the 1-month 
extrapolation variable and the risk premium. In addition to this, we test each exchange rate 
model separately for constants and dummy variables.89 So, our baseline model shows up as 
follows: 
 
 t0t11t1kt1,1k1.t1t1,1.1t2,0t1, D'∆Γ∆Γ∆A∆ εµΦxβαxxxx ++⋅+⋅⋅+⋅++⋅+⋅= −+−+−− L  (4.1) 
 with },{}{ t2,t1,t xxx =  and },{}{ 21 ααα = ,  whereas 02 =α , 
 with Σ)(0,N~ ptε  and },{}{ t2,t1,t xxx = .  
 
Vector Χ1 includes dispersion, the PPP term and the risk premium. However, since the 
extrapolation variable is stationary, it would definitely attract a common stochastic trend in 
the system for itself. Additionally, we do not expect the speed in exchange rate changes to be 
explained in this system, so we treat the difference in the exchange rate as weakly exogenous, 
i.e. entering Χ2. Furthermore, we include economic reasonable permanent effects via dummy 
                                                 
88
 Treating misleadingly nonstationary data as stationary, we would generate spurious regressions 
without any economic meaning. On the other hand, treating persistent variables as unit-roots makes 
statistical inference more reliable than otherwise (see Johansen, 1995, 2006). 
89
 Separated for each model, we use the residual series generated by the system estimation and set 
accordant dummies, when standardized errors exceed critical values. Considered dummies need to be 
statistically significant in the respective model and additionally, have to be accompanied by a 
reasonable economic explanation (see Nielsen, 2004).  
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variables in D. Note that these dummies, affecting at least one of the cointegration relations, 
would be additionally incorporated in Χ2. 
Consulting the specification tests, we construct the specific models for dispersion in 
the US-dollar, the GB-pound and the JP-yen, respectively. By examining for significant 
outliers in our data, respective test results notify that we need to consider two dummy 
variables in the VEC models. Regarding the GB-pound, two permanent-intervention dummies 
have to be considered, one in December 1998 and the other in September 2000. Regarding the 
JP-yen, we need only the permanent-intervention dummy in September 2000. Considering the 
US-dollar, a dummy effect appears in June 1993, but we do not include it in the model since 
we cannot find an economic explanation–its consideration does not impact the results in any 
way. Furthermore, whilst US-dollar and GB-pound trace tests show one cointegration relation 
to be sufficient in the respective systems, the JP-yen in contrast, requires two long-term 
relations (see Table 4.4). Finally, in the course of testing the models for the existence of unit-
roots, no variable appears to be well approximated by an I(1)-process (see misspecification 
tests in Appendix 4.2 and, for further evidence, the multivariate unit-root tests in Appendix 
4.3).90 Thus, we handle structurally similar models for dispersion in all three exchange rates. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the unrestricted model estimation of US-dollar 
dispersion. Regarding the long-term relation, dispersion increases significantly when the PPP-
deviation becomes smaller and the exchange rate trend or the exchange risk premium rises. 
As the first two determinants are derived from the C&F approach, our findings confirm the 
relevance of the C&F approach from a new perspective. The source of innovation lays in 
testing implicit relations regarding expectation heterogeneity in exchange rates. Findings are 
in accordance with underlying model assumptions and thus confirm the C&F approach. 
Moreover, the risk variable, which is unrelated to the C&F approach variables, has the sign as 
expected by the noise trading literature. 91  Turning to dispersion’s short-term relation, 
dispersion error-corrects significantly towards its long-term equilibrium. Moreover, in the 
short run, the extrapolation variable strongly pushes dispersion. This impact works in such a 
manner that the speed of the exchange rate change positively impacts dispersion, indicating 
the enormous relevance of extrapolation in the short run.92 
                                                 
90
 By selecting the lag-length of the models, we rely on LR-tests, which show one lag to be sufficient. 
91
 However, the influence of risk may also be caused by information heterogeneity (see Bacchetta and 
van Wincoop, 2006). 
92
 We do not discuss the other error-correction equations as they are not of interest to this research. 
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The structure of the model applied to the GB-pound is identical to that applied to the 
US-dollar, with the exception of two permanent dummies, which enter the error-correction 
equations, i.e. "blips" or one-time effects (see Table 4.6). The December 1998 dummy seems 
to be associated with a pronounced change in uncertainty regarding the prospective date of the 
introduction of the euro in the United Kingdom. In our analyses, this should only affect the 
GB-pound, since the notion of either the US or Japan joining the euro is absurd and, indeed, 
this effect does not appear in one of the other models. With regard to the September 2000 
dummy, we connect this reaction to a highly controversial change of the ECB’s monetary 
policy. On September 15th, the ECB raised its key interest rate for the first time, to vitalize the 
weak euro. However, financial markets assessed this as insufficient and sentiment in the euro 
dropped even further. This argument along ECB’s policy raises the question of why we do not 
find such an effect in the US-dollar equation. Possibly, it is absorbed by the PPP-deviation 
term which is most pronounced in US-dollar dispersion among the three models. 
The model for the JP-yen differs slightly from the others as can be seen from Table 4.7. 
As regards the long-term relations, dispersion in the JP-yen reacts positively when the PPP-
deviation decreases or the risk premium increases, which is in line with the two other models. 
However, the influence of the extrapolation term on expectation heterogeneity turns out to be 
different. Heterogeneity in the JP-yen error-corrects to a second cointegration relation, in 
which the risk premium depends positively on the extrapolative term and on the PPP-
deviation. Considering both cointegration relations, the effect arising from the PPP-deviation 
term on expectation heterogeneity appears somewhat ambiguous. One may speculate on 
whether this ambiguity results from Japanese monetary policy. It is known in this regard that 
the Bank of Japan deliberately influences the JP-yen via extremely low interest rates, as well 
as exchange rate interventions (see e.g. Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann, 2004, Ito and 
Yabu, 2004), which in turn could potentially affect the respective exchange risk premium. 
Despite certain particularities of the three models, we emphasize that the baseline 
structure holds: we find that the C&F variables and the exchange risk premium show the 
expected influences on heterogeneity in exchange rate expectations. To check for robustness, 
we consolidate the unrestricted VEC models to obtain the parsimonious specifications. To 
conclude, we confirm that dispersion’s error-correction remains unchanged regarding all three 
models; as well as extrapolation’s positive influence on dispersion in the short run. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Exchange rate dynamics have not been well understood for the last 30 years. We know 
that traditional models with representative agents fail seriously when confronted with real-
world data. Thus, it is not surprising that simulation results generated by models with 
heterogeneous agents are more in line with the stylized facts of foreign exchange markets. 
Many of these models belong to the chartist-fundamentalist approach. Since their empirical 
analyses rely on simulation studies, our work contributes by analyzing the determinants of 
expectation heterogeneity in exchange rates using econometric techniques. Thus, we examine 
the relevance of the C&F approach from a different perspective. 
We take advantage of our comparatively huge dataset, covering 15 years of exchange 
rate expectations. By calculating dispersion, i.e. our measure of heterogeneity in exchange 
rate expectations, we analyze its potential determinants suggested by the exchange rate 
literature. We find that influences arising from chartists’ and fundamentalists’ behavior are 
most useful in explaining heterogeneity, which is in line with the C&F approach. 
Considering the long-term effects, heterogeneity decreases when the exchange rate is 
farther away from its fundamental equilibrium; according to the C&F approach this happens 
because in this case, professionals tend more and more to anticipate exchange rate’s mean-
reversion towards equilibrium. In addition, a stronger change in the exchange rate increases 
heterogeneity; according to the C&F approach this is caused by a subsequent shift of opinion, 
moving from the dominating fundamentalists to the minority group of chartists.  
This basic pattern is complemented by a positive influence from the exchange rate risk 
on heterogeneity. It seems plausible that a risk premium reflects uncertainty; however, this 
pattern is consistent with competing interpretations. Risk may be caused by noise traders 
(Jeanne and Rose, 2002) or by uncertainty about the relevant set of information (Bacchetta 
and van Wincoop, 2006). Nevertheless, whatever the reason is, this does not contradict the 
importance of the C&F approach. Its relevance is moreover strengthened by the finding that 
the fundamentals or the fundamentals’ volatility are not important in explaining heterogeneity 
in exchange rate expectations, at least not in our sample. 
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Tables 4 
 
 
TABLE 4.1  
Descriptive statistics of consensus expectations 
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
 cons. disp. cons. disp. cons. disp. 
mean 1.133 0.070 0.718 0.042 1.319 0.043 
std. 0.120 0.017 0.065 0.011 0.136 0.009 
25%-q. 1.049 0.058 0.671 0.035 1.231 0.036 
75%-q. 1.225 0.078 0.762 0.047 1.402 0.048 
min. 0.881 0.043 0.628 0.024 0.975 0.028 
max. 1.369 0.132 0.877 0.086 1.696 0.080 
Notes: The data series are based upon corresponding 6-months expectations data from Dec. 1991 until Aug. 
2006. All series are measured in levels and relate above-mentioned currencies to the D-mark until Dec. 1998 and 
thereafter to the euro. The variables are abbreviated as follows: aggregated point forecast–i.e. consensus (cons.) 
and dispersion (disp.). Using the method of Carlson and Parkin (1975) to derive aggregate point expectations 
requires two assumptions. First, each individual forecast is based upon a subjective probability distribution 
concerning the outcome of this forecast. However, applying the logistic distribution did not qualitatively change 
the results. Secondly, the corresponding means of the individual probability distributions follow-up a normal 
distribution, which can be justified via the Central-Limit Theorem. Furthermore, we choose a symmetric scaling 
of three percent, which displays a threshold. Hence, forecasters perceive noticeable changes in the exchange rate, 
if the latter proves to be three percent or more. Based upon a particular survey, the participants of the ZEW 
Financial Market Survey were asked to reveal the individual thresholds associated with their different forecasts. 
Nevertheless, choosing other thresholds–around three percent–did not reveal qualitatively different results. 
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TABLE 4.2  
Univariate OLS-regressions of dispersion 
 ttt xy εβα +⋅+=  with ),0(~ 2σε Nt   
 ttt xy εβα +⋅+= ||  with ),0(~ 2σε Nt   
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
extrapol. -0.006 -0.006 0.000 
|extrapol.| 0.100 0.067 0.092 
[split: (+) , (-) ] [0.062, 0.145] [0.094, 0.045] [0.078, 0.098] 
    
PPP-dev. 0.018 0.059 0.522 
|PPP-dev.| 0.029 0.059 0.550 
[split: (+) , (-) ] [0.014, 0.032] [n.a., 0.059] [0.626, -0.016] 
    
Risk 0.113 0.299 0.476 
|risk| 0.436 0.468 0.512 
[split: (+) , (-) ] [0.534, 0.259] [-0.000, 0.565] [0.044, 0.534] 
    
vola. 0.124 0.242 0.236 
Notes: The regressions are calculated upon monthly data, covering Dec. 1991 until Aug. 2006. Dispersion series 
are based upon accordant six months expectations, whereas above-mentioned currencies are related to the D-
mark until Dec. 1998 and thereafter to the euro. The numbers document adjusted R-squares of univariate OLS-
regressions, in which dispersion is calculated on the displayed variable next to a constant. We do not show 
corresponding probability values, as we focus solely on the explained variances of dispersion. The variables are 
abbreviated as follows: Current 1-months exchange rate extrapolation (extrapol.), regressive term–i.e. difference 
between the actual exchange rate and its fair value based upon relative PPP using CPI–(PPP-dev.), risk premia–
i.e. the expected (consensus) exchange rate change minus the relative bond rate (risk) and exchange rate 
volatility–i.e. corresponding 1-month standard-deviation–(vola.). Please note that strokes indicate that the 
respective variable appears in absolute measure. Moreover, splits separate the observations upon the signs of the 
respective variable, in the way that adjusted R-squares are calculated separately for positive and negative values. 
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TABLE 4.3  
Multivariate OLS-regressions of dispersion εβy
+⋅+= X'α         with ),0(~ ΩN
ε
 
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
const. 0.027*** 0.026 0.015*** 
disp.
 (-1) 0.423*** 0.655*** 0.488*** 
|PPP-dev.| -0.033*** -0.004 0.023*** 
|risk| 0.229*** 0.059** 0.076*** 
|extrapol.| 0.249*** 0.078 0.089*** 
vola. 0.024 0.187 -0.006 
adj. R2 0.641 0.746 0.755 
Notes: The regressions are calculated upon monthly data, covering December 1991 until August 2006 by using 
Newey-West standard errors. Dispersion series are based upon accordant six months expectations, whereas 
above-mentioned currencies are related to the D-mark until December 1998 and thereafter to the euro. The 
variables are abbreviated as follows: constant (const.), lagged dispersion (disp.
 (-1)), regressive term–i.e. 
difference between the actual exchange rate and its fair value based upon relative PPP using CPI–(PPP-dev.), 
risk premia–i.e. the expected (consensus) exchange rate change minus the relative bond rate (risk), current 
exchange rate extrapolation (extrapol.) and exchange rate volatility–i.e. corresponding 1-month standard-
deviation–(vola.). Please note that strokes indicate that the respective variable appears in absolute measure. 
Sticking to exchange rate volatility is solely appertained, to underline the irrelevance of exchange rate volatility. 
Without the latter, R2’s obviously remain nearly the same, and furthermore, the other regressors do not change in 
a meaningful way. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 4.4   
Cointegration rank determination (Trace tests) 
  
rank three rank two rank one rank zero 
US-dollar LR-test - 2.973 17.010 52.788*** 
 
[prob. value] [n.a.] [0.833] [0.385] [0.003] 
 LR-test #
 
- 2.879 16.655 51.446*** 
 
[prob. value] # [n.a.] [0.844] [0.410] [0.005] 
GB-pound LR-test - 2.570     9.378  60.420*** 
 
[prob. value] [n.a.] [0.880] [0.916] [0.000] 
 LR-test #
 
- 2.416   9.053   58.961*** 
 
[prob. value] # [n.a.] [0.896] [0.929] [0.001] 
JP-yen LR-test - 6.705 46.968*** 94.519*** 
 
[prob. value] [n.a.] [0.353] [0.000] [0.000] 
 LR-test # - 6.361 45.663*** 94.519*** 
 
[prob. value] # [n.a.] [0.390] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: The underlying VEC models are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood-method (ML-method), 
covering 177 monthly observations, from December 1991 to August 2006. The likelihood-ratio-tests and the 
probability values marked with a hash are the Bartlett-corrected LR-tests and p-values, necessary to consider 
sample-size effects on the power of the rank determination. Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *, **, *** to 
ten, five and one percent. It figures out, that solely considering the US-dollar and the GB-pound, in each case 
one long-term relation underlies the data, since higher-order LR-tests do not reject the null hypothesis of one 
unit-root less. Contrary to the others, the JP-yen reveals two long-term relations. 
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TABLE 4.5   
The unrestricted VEC model for the US-dollar 
tεβαxθx +⋅⋅+⋅+⋅= −− 1t1t1,1.1t2,t1, x'∆Γ∆x'∆  
 with }x,{}{ t2,t1,t xx = , with }0,{}{ 1αα =  and Σ)(0,N~ ptε . 
cointegration equation:     
 disp.
 (-1) risk (-1) PPP-dev. (-1) extrapol. (-1) const. 
β
’
(1)       1.000***  = 0.298*** -0.066** 0.710*** 0.048*** 
      
error-correction equations:     
  ∆disp. ∆risk ∆PPP-dev.  
 
α(1) -0.421*** -0.114 -0.309**  
 [t-value] [-5.310] [-1.096] [-2.041]  
 ∆disp.(-1) -0.123 -0.021 0.190  
 [t-value] [-1.318] [-0.175] [1.061]  
 ∆risk(-1) 0.030 0.002 -0.411***  
 [t-value] [0.388] [0.022] [-2.828]  
 ∆PPP-dev(-1) 0.053 0.041 0.264***  
 [t-value] [1.372] [0.818] [3.582]  
 ∆extrapol.(0) 0.309*** 0.130** 0.015  
 [t-value] [6.718] [2.163] [0.166]  
 
∆extrapol.(-1) -0.018 -0.078 -0.060  
 [t-value] [-0.341] [-1.129] [-0.589]  
 adj. R2 0.289 0.030 0.131  
 sum resid2 0.021 0.037 0.078  
Notes: The VEC model is estimated using the ML-method. The sample period covers December 1991-August 
2006. The variables are calculated in absolute values and are abbreviated as follows: dispersion (disp.), risk 
premium (risk), regressive term (PPP-dev.)–i.e. current exchange rate minus fair value upon the relative PPP 
concept using CPI data–as well as 1-month exchange rate extrapolation (extrapol.). Using calculated t-values, 
cointegration parameters are highly significant. Nevertheless, since the test-statistics are not valid, they are 
limited to providing rough indications about the significances, which is why we do not represent them. So we 
conduct Wald-tests so that the asterisks relate to the Bartlett-corrected test statistics, which we assume follow a 
χ2-distribution with degree of one. The log-likelihood of the system yields 2,264.205. Asterisks refer to the 
regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent.  
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TABLE 4.6  
The unrestricted VEC model for the GB-pound 
ttD εβαxθx +⋅Φ+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅= −− 11t1t1,1.1t2,t1, x'∆Γ∆x'∆  
 with }x,{}{ t2,t1,t xx = , with }0,{}{ 1αα =  and Σ)(0,N~ ptε . 
cointegration equation:     
     
 disp.
 (-1) risk (-1) PPP-dev. (-1) extrapol. (-1) const. 
β
’
(1)       1.000***  = 0.237** -0.014* 0.582*** 0.073* 
      
error-correction equations:     
  ∆disp. ∆risk ∆PPP-dev.  
 
α(1) -0.275*** 0.132** -0.349*  
 
[t-value] [-5.629] [2.265] [-1.747] 
 
 ∆disp.(-1) -0.017 0.195** 0.674**  
 
[t-value] [-0.261] [2.521] [2.539] 
 
 ∆risk(-1) 0.011 -0.134* -0.197  
 
[t-value] [0.186] [-1.819] [-0.780] 
 
 ∆PPP-dev.(-1) -0.036** 0.043** 0.170**  
 
[t-value] [-1.998] [2.029] [2.329] 
 
 ∆extrapol.(0) 0.155*** 0.033 0.440***  
 
[t-value] [6.011] [1.068] [4.174] 
 
 ∆extrapol.(-1) -0.006 0.027 0.193*  
 
[t-value] [-0.206] [0.817] [1.709] 
 
 ∆du0009(0) 0.017*** -0.001 0.004  
 
[t-value] [3.829] [-0.181] [0.224] 
 
 ∆du9812(0) 0.036*** -0.003 0.020  
 
[t-value] [7.828] [-0.573] [1.089] 
 
 adj. R2 0.408 0.093 0.111  
 sum resid2 0.003 0.005 0.058  
Notes: The VEC-model is estimated using the ML-method. The sample period covers December 1991-August 
2006. The variables are calculated in absolute values and are abbreviated as follows: dispersion (disp.), risk 
premium (risk), regressive term (PPP-dev.)–i.e. current exchange rate minus fair value based upon the relative 
PPP concept using CPI data–as well as 1-month exchange rate extrapolation (extrapol.). Specification tests show 
the necessity of implementing a mean-shift dummy in September 2000 (du0009) and a permanent-intervention 
dummy in December 1998. Using calculated t-values, cointegration parameters are highly significant. 
Nevertheless, since the test-statistics are not valid, they are limited to providing rough indications about the 
significances, which is why we do not represent them. So we conduct Wald-tests so that the asterisks relate to 
the Bartlett-corrected test statistics, which we assume follow a χ2-distribution with degree of one. The log-
likelihood of the system yields 2,579.982. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-
term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent.  
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TABLE 4.7  
The unrestricted VEC model for the JP-yen 
ttD εβαxθx +⋅Φ+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅= −− 11t1t1,1.1t2,t1, x'∆Γ∆x'∆  
 with }x,{}{ t2,t1,t xx = , with }0,{}{ 1αα =  and Σ)(0,N~ ptε . 
cointegration equation:     
 disp.
 (-1) risk (-1) PPP-dev. (-1) extrapol.(-1) const. 
β
’
(1) 1.000***  = 0.400*** -0.032*** n.a. 0.033*** 
β
’
(2) n.a. 1.000***  = 0.224*** 0.660*** -0.012* 
      
error-correction equations:     
  ∆disp. ∆risk ∆PPP-dev.  
 
α(1) -0.450*** -0.234** 0.640  
 
[t-value] [-6.422] [-2.566] [1.476] 
 
 α(2) -0.136*** -0.217*** 0.091  
 
[t-value] [-5.315] [-6.534] [0.576] 
 
 ∆disp.(-1) 0.020 0.221** -0.397  
 
[t-value] [0.272] [2.288] [-0.864] 
 
 ∆risk(-1) 0.047 -0.107 -0.942***  
 
[t-value] [0.857] [-1.479] [-2.751] 
 
 ∆PPP-dev.(-1) -0.001 -0.006 0.037  
 
[t-value] [-0.082] [-0.329] [0.449] 
 
 ∆extrapol.(0) 0.081*** 0.084*** -0.060  
 
[t-value] [5.103] [4.048] -[0.613] 
 
 ∆extrapol.(-1) -0.011 -0.046** -0.024  
 
[t-value] [-0.630] [-2.104] [-0.230] 
 
 
∆du0009(0) 0.023*** 0.000 0.065**  
 [t-value] [5.060] [0.028] [2.377] 
 
 adj. R2 0.364 0.265 0.070  
 sum resid2 0.003 0.006 0.123  
Notes: The VEC-model is estimated using the ML-method. The sample period covers December 1991-August 
2006. The variables are calculated in absolute values and are abbreviated as follows: dispersion (disp.), risk 
premium (risk), regressive term (PPP-dev.)–i.e. current exchange rate minus fair value based upon the relative 
PPP concept using CPI data–as well as 1-month exchange rate extrapolation (extrapol.). Specification tests show 
the necessity of implementing a permanent-intervention dummy in September 2000 (du0009). Using calculated 
t-values, the cointegration parameters are highly significant. Nevertheless, since the test-statistics are not valid, 
they are limited to providing rough indications about the significances, which is why we do not represent them. 
So we conduct Wald-tests so that the asterisks relate to the Bartlett-corrected test statistics, which we assume 
follow a χ2-distribution with degree of three. The log-likelihood of the system yields 2,468.597. Asterisks refer 
to regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
  
94 
Figures 4 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1   
Histograms of dispersion in US-dollar, GB-pound and JP-yen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The dispersion series are based upon 6-month expectations data from Dec. 1991 until Aug. 2006. These 
histograms show the distribution of dispersion, when moving from top to bottom, in the euro/US-dollar, 
euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively). 
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FIGURE 4.2  
Dispersion in US-dollar, GB-pound and JP-yen 
 
 
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1991-12 1992-12 1993-12 1994-12 1995-12 1996-12 1997-12 1998-12 1999-12 2000-12 2001-12 2002-12 2003-12 2004-12 2005-12
time
sp
o
t r
at
e
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
di
s
pe
rs
io
n
 
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1991-12 1992-12 1993-12 1994-12 1995-12 1996-12 1997-12 1998-12 1999-12 2000-12 2001-12 2002-12 2003-12 2004-12 2005-12
time
sp
o
t r
at
e
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
di
s
pe
rs
io
n
 
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
1991-12 1992-12 1993-12 1994-12 1995-12 1996-12 1997-12 1998-12 1999-12 2000-12 2001-12 2002-12 2003-12 2004-12 2005-12
time
sp
o
t r
at
e
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
di
s
pe
rs
io
n
 
 
Notes: The dispersion series are based upon 6-month expectations data from Dec. 1991 until Aug. 2006. The 
graphs show the time series of dispersion and related spot rates separately–moving from top to bottom–in the 
euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively). Dashed horizontal lines 
represent spot rates, whereas solid lines show the corresponding dispersion series. Further, two dashed vertical 
lines represent the dummy events–i.e. the left related to December 1998 and the right to September 2000. 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
TABLE A 4.1  
Consulted set of explanatory variables on dispersion 
 signed value absolute value volatility 
∆money M2 * x x x 
∆money M3 * x x x 
∆industrial production * x x x 
∆GDP * x x x 
CPI inflation * x x x 
∆relative trade balance * x x x 
6-month LIBOR rate * x x x 
10-year bond yields * x x x 
∆stock index * x x x 
1-month ∆exchange rate x x - 
6-month ∆ exchange rate x x - 
PPP-deviation (CPI) - x - 
risk premium - x - 
exchange rate volatility - - x 
Notes: Our sample contains monthly data from December 1991 until August 2006, which amounts to 177 
observations, with the exception of the financial series, for which we use daily data in order to consider the 
dates of the individual expectations. All variables marked with an asterisk are generated by the difference 
between the euro zone and the United States, Great Britain and Japan (Germany until December 1998, 
respectively). Data in money (M2, M3), industrial production, GDP, CPI as well as trade balance stem from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Furthermore, 6-month Libor rates, stock indices are taken from EcoWin. 
Daily data on German government bond yields are picked up from the Deutsche Bundesbank, US yields from 
the Federal Reserve GB yields, British yields from the Bank of England and accordant Japanese yields from the 
Bank of Japan. Daily exchange rate data of the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro (until 
December 1998 -/D-mark, respectively) stem again from the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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TABLE A 4.2   
Misspecification tests for VEC models 
tests for autocorrelation      
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
 Χ
2
 
[prob. value] Χ2 [prob. value] Χ2 [prob. value] 
LM-test (1): 10.700 [0.297] 9.888 [0.360] 13.894 [0.126] 
LM-test (2): 20.692** [0.014] 1691 [0.995] 14.198 [0.115] 
LM-test (3): 9.382 [0.403] 15.768 [0.072] 7.541 [0.581] 
LM-test (4): 14.755* [0.098] 5.546 [0.784] 11.237 [0.260] 
LM-test (5): 9.001 [0.437] 16.030 [0.066] 7.343 [0.602] 
       
test for normality       
LM-test (.): 25.591*** [0.000] 10.060** [0.122] 22.995*** [0.001] 
  
 
 
 
  
tests for ARCH       
LM-test (1): 48.789* [0.076] 72.171 [0.000] 32.578 [0.632] 
LM-test (2): 70.963 [0.512] 95.233*** [0.035] 99.153** [0.019] 
Notes: The underlying VEC-models are estimated using the ML-method, covering 177 monthly observations, 
from December 1991 to August 2006. The multivariate maximum-likelihood-test of order two shows some 
autocorrelation for the US-dollar (but up to order ten, no further autocorrelation exists). However, it seems 
noteworthy, that this traces back to residual correlation between dispersion’s and risk premium’s short-term 
relation, i.e. amounting to 0.662. Based on the parsimonious version of the model and correcting for related 
simultaneous effects, autocorrelation dies out. The test for normality reveals that the residuals do not closely 
follow a normal distribution. Accordant univariate tests reveal that this is due to skewness and kurtosis in 
dispersion and the risk premium. Moreover, tests for ARCH-effects do not indicate heteroskedasticity in the 
data. However, results based upon the Gaussian-likelihood are asymptotically robust to some types of 
deviations of the residuals from the Gaussian distribution–i.e. heteroskedasticity and non-normality (see, 
Johansen, 2006). Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. However, 
accordant VEC estimations are shown in Table 4.5-4.7, where further details can be found in the notes. 
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TABLE A 4.3   
Multivariate LR-tests of unit-roots 
 
 disp. risk PPP-dev. 
rank 1 10.526*** 26.946*** 27.326*** 
US-dollar [prob. value] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] 
rank 1 11.917*** 38.982*** 47.393*** 
GB-pound [prob. value] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] 
rank 1 25.393*** 32.063*** 34.042*** 
[prob. value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
rank 2 19.7890*** 29.334*** 27.833*** 
JP-yen 
[prob. value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: The underlying VEC-models are estimated using the ML-method, covering 177 monthly observations, 
from December 1991 to August 2006. The variables are calculated in absolute values and are abbreviated as 
follows: Dispersion (disp.), risk premium (risk), regressive term (PPP-dev.)–i.e. current exchange rate minus 
fair value upon the relative PPP concept using CPI data–as well as 1-month exchange rate extrapolation 
(extrapol.).Included constants are restricted to the cointegration space. The numbers in brackets are 
corresponding probability values of the tests. Since the Trace tests in Table 4.4 reveal the ranks, separated for 
each exchange rate, we concentrate on respective likelihood-ratio-tests. The above results show clearly, that the 
uncovered long-term relations do not constitute a unit-root underlying one of the endogenous variables. 
Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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5 Exchange rate forecasters’ performance and rationality93 
 
5.1 Introduction 
For more than 20 years we know that professional exchange rate forecasters form 
inaccurate consensus expectations (Frankel and Froot, 1987). This result has been confirmed 
for various samples and can thus be regarded a stylized fact.94 From the beginning of this 
research on exchange rate expectations there occurred another worrying result as forecasts 
could have been better by incorporating available information on interest rates (Froot and 
Frankel, 1989). Even worse, such expectational errors of consensus forecasts exist until today 
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2007). These facts of inaccuracy and ignorance raise obvious 
questions on the rationality of market participants and on the efficiency of foreign exchange 
markets. It is not clear why would professional market participants consistently form 
unnecessarily bad expectations? 
Our research wants to challenge this view by providing new evidence. In order to 
measure the performance of exchange rate forecasters we take individual data and focus on 
individual forecasting performance over up to 14 years. We find indeed that forecasters in this 
comprehensive sample do not behave irrational in the above described sense as their average 
forecasting performance is slightly better than random forecasts. In detail, their directional 
forecasts are more often correct than wrong and trading strategies built on them would yield 
more often profits than losses. This finding about average performance seems to exclude 
systematic forecasting errors, however, it is not consistent enough to exclude random 
behavior.95 Therefore, it is revealing that we find significant differences in performance which 
can be related to determinants of forecasting performance. Reassuringly, better forecasters 
show ability across currencies and they possess knowledge on fundamentals indicated by 
better interest rate forecasts. Moreover, they are more experienced and have less personnel 
responsibilities. Overall, this evidence provides a very different picture of the market than the 
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 Co-authors: Ronald MacDonald, University of Glasgow, UK, and Lukas Menkhoff, Leibniz 
Universität Hannover, Germany. 
94
  See early Dominguez, 1986, and the surveys by Takagi, 1991, MacDonald, 2000. 
95
  The average performance we find is slightly better than random forecasts but not consistently so as 
we will show later. Thus there remains some uncertainty about the degree of forecasters’ performance 
which we think is unavoidable in efficient markets. Clearly, irrationally bad forecast are a sign of 
inefficiency, however, significantly good forecast indicate inefficiency too. 
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above findings of inaccuracy and ignorance–instead, evidence seems to be well compatible 
with rational behavior of foreign exchange professionals. 
The starting point of our research is to leave the analysis of median (or consensus) 
forecasts as they are fictive. In reality, individual forecasters give their expectations (see 
Frankel and Froot, 1987). Moreover, these expectations are often not formed as point 
forecasts but as directional expectations as is the case in our survey data. Comparative 
evidence indicates that directional forecasts perform better and that trading strategies built on 
them may be profitable–which we analyze here as well (see Leitch and Tanner, 1991, 
MacDonald and Marsh, 1996, Elliott and Ito, 1999). In order to learn more about possible 
systematic determinants of forecasting performance, we use the advantage of our dataset with 
truly individual information. We are thus able to link individual expectations to further 
individual characteristics. The latter consist of two types of information: first, we are 
interested to learn whether good exchange rate forecasts are based on fundamental 
information. For this purpose we use expectation formation of forecasters on those exchange 
rate fundamentals that form the core of asset market models, such as the monetary model of 
exchange rates, i.e. interest rates, inflation rates and growth rates. Second, we have 
information about personal characteristics, such as age, experience, education etc. which we 
use to determine the performance of forecasters. 
This study is related to three strands of literature. First, we use our large data base to 
reproduce analyses on accuracy and rationality of median forecasts as conducted by Frankel 
and Froot (1987) among others. We find similar results indicating that any new findings in 
our research are not caused by an irregular sample. The second strand of literature we relate to 
is studies analyzing individual exchange rate expectations which we introduce in more detail 
in Section 2 below. Most of this literature focuses on heterogeneity, i.e. the cross-section, but 
does not analyze individual time-series properties. Those analyzing the time-series often have 
to rely on short samples. An exception inspiring our work is Elliott and Ito (1999) who 
analyze an 11 years period of 42 firms’ yen/US-dollar forecasts. They find small profits on 
average but do not provide much information on individual forecasts. Moreover, as firms–not 
individuals–contribute to their survey, these expectations cannot be linked to individual 
characteristics. There is a third strand of literature, which is also related to ours, although not 
from foreign exchange, and which is shortly discussed in Section 2 too. The study of analysts 
and fund managers in general shows that there are professionals who significantly outperform 
the market and that outperformance is related to better knowledge about fundamentals and 
some personal characteristics, such as experience. We regard these findings as a reasonable 
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guide that our findings in foreign exchange may be well in line with general insights in the 
rationality of financial market professionals and thus tentative market efficiency. 
The paper is structured into seven further parts. Section 2 relates our research to the 
literature, Section 3 introduces into data used. Then Section 4 reveals heterogeneous 
performance among our forecasters, Section 5 relates performance to the same persons’ 
forecasts of exchange rate fundamentals and Section 6 links performance to forecasters’ 
personal characteristics. In order to test robustness of our findings the main analyses are 
repeated in Section 7 for other performance measures, i.e. profits and risk-adjusted profits. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Related literature 
The literature on foreign exchange does not provide strong motivation trying to 
forecast exchange rates. In fact, the Messe and Rogoff (1983) verdict still holds that there is 
no fundamental model able to generally explain–not to speak of forecasting–currency 
movements (see recently Cheung et al., 2005): instead, exchange rates seem to be largely 
disconnected from economic fundamentals, the "disconnect puzzle" (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
2000). So exchange rate forecasting is a tedious task, which makes the finding of inaccuracy 
and irrationality easier digestible. 
However, practice provides a challenging contrast to academic pessimism. In fact, we 
observe a gigantic volume in currency transactions which easily sweeps that of the largest 
stock exchanges and which seems also being fuelled by speculation. In foreign exchange 
trading, the share of financial institutions–mainly asset managers–increases, whereas among 
them large currency hedge funds aggressively taking positions. Thus, there is no doubt that 
professionals, who are relevant in the market–which indicated by the size of their salaries and 
by the volume of assets under management–put money behind their forecasts which questions 
the conventional academic wisdom of enduring "systematic expectational errors" by 
professional exchange rate forecasters (Frankel and Froot, 1987, p.150).96 
In addition there is also evidence from academic research indicating that economic 
fundamentals are empirically related to exchange rates, although not close and robust enough 
to generate simple models. Nevertheless, the monetary model‘s fundamentals are linked to 
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 According to the Bank of International Settlements (2005), the average daily turnover in April 2004 
measured in billions of US-dollar for the US-dollar/euro, the JP-yen/US-dollar and the GB-pound 
market was 501, 296 and 254 respectively. 
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exchange rates (see e.g. Rapach and Wohar, 2002, Kilian and Taylor, 2003, and Sarno, 
Valente and Wohar, 2004). Furthermore, promising forecasting exercises by using these 
models have been demonstrated recently by Abhyankar, Sarno and Valente (2005). 
Therefore, it does not seem precluded that some forecasters may be able to interpret 
fundamentals in a useful way, so that some forecast superior to others. We follow the advice 
of Frankel and Froot (1987, p.152) who close their seminal paper on the analysis of median 
expectations by suggesting that "investigating heterogeneous investor expectations would be a 
useful avenue for future research". Indeed, research has identified various aspects of 
individual forecasting behavior which we shortly review in the following with respect to our 
focus, i.e. performance of forecasters and their characteristics. 
Forecasting performance has been very early addressed in two studies covering a small 
group of financial services professionally providing exchange rate forecasts. Goodman (1979) 
finds for 10 financial services over two and a half years in 1976 to 1978 that they are often 
well able to forecast 6 exchange rates at two horizons, i.e. 3 and 6 months. Goodman focuses 
on the kind of analytical method preferred, i.e. either fundamental or technical analysis, 
finding that only technicians provide valuable forecasts. Fundamentalists’ performance 
slightly improves at the 6 months horizon compared to 3 months. Levich (1979) significantly 
extends this first study by covering 9 financial services, forecasting 9 exchange rates at four 
horizons (1, 3, 6 and 12 months) over 12 years, 1967 to 1979. Largely in line with Goodman 
he finds that forecasters have knowledge, although to a very different degree, and that 
direction forecasts are much better (and profitable) than point forecasts. However, these 
results were overruled during the 1980s by the above mentioned studies establishing the 
insights of average inaccuracy and irrationality on the consensus forecasts, possibly because 
the latter studies employed much larger samples.97 
The first study analyzing a broader sample of individual exchange rate forecasts is Ito 
(1990). He examines the yen-dollar exchange rate expectations collected by the Japan Center 
for International Finance (JCIF) in the period May 1985 to June 1987. The data consist of 51 
observations due to mostly biweekly collections. Moreover, the data set has a panel 
dimension due to 44 firms participating which are grouped into six industries. The largest 
sub-sample is the 15 banks and brokers, followed by 20 non-financial firms from 3 industries 
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  Further evidence on small samples contributes to the impression of heterogeneity: Blake et al. 
(1986) do not find ability in the exchange rate forecasting performance of three British institutions 
over five exchange rates at two horizons during three to four years, whereas Allen and Taylor (1990) 
do find some ability in their tracking of technical analysts’ exchange rate forecasts. 
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(9 export-oriented companies, 6 trading companies, 5 import-oriented industries) and 9 non-
bank financial firms from 2 more industries (5 life insurance companies, 4 securities 
companies). The most important finding is heterogeneity in expectation formation 
demonstrated by significant individual effects in the panel analysis. In addition, the study 
raises questions on forecasters’ rationality.98 Most interesting from our point of view is, first, 
that "most of the market participants violate necessary conditions of the rational expectations 
hypothesis" (Ito, 1990, p.445). Second, however, false expectations may be due to small 
sample size as Ito (1990, p.437) states with respect to yen appreciation after September 1985 
and in general with respect to Peso problems (Ito, 1990, p.444). 
Another source of forecasting data is provided by Consensus Economics. This data 
consists of monthly forecasts of about 150 institutions from the large industrialized countries, 
including mainly commercial and investment banks, but also industrial corporations and 
forecasting agencies. Respondents give expectations on various exchange rates at four 
horizons. The individual dimension of this data is examined by MacDonald and Marsh (1994) 
who analyze the complete response of 30 forecasters on a maximum of three exchange rates, 
starting from October 1989 to December 1991. Again, forecasts are mostly inaccurate and 
irrational. Moreover, the profit measure leads to a slightly better overall result than the root 
mean square error, although still only 27% of all forecasts generated a profit. As a limitation 
of this study, the time period encompasses just 27 observations and states–confirming Frankel 
and Froot (1987)–instability of findings over time. 
An extension of this data set is provided by MacDonald and Marsh (1996), covering 
full three years from 1989 to 1992, considering all available forecasts–leading to a maximum 
of 107 forecasters–and also comparing performance measures in some detail. They find that 
30% of all forecasts made generate excess profits compared to a random walk, i.e. a no-
change prediction (MacDonald and Marsh, 1996, Table 5.4). The performance of point 
forecasts is tentatively worse than profits. The relationship between accuracy and profitability 
is positive. The performance on short horizon (3 months) is positively related to the one on 
longer horizons (12 months). However, top performers in one currency are not necessarily 
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  This is supported by Wakita’s (1989) analysis of a slightly extended sample ranging from May 
1985 to March 1988. 
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also among the best in another currency, although this examination is limited to just 22 
forecasters due to incomplete responses.99 
The first sample being long enough to cover lasting up- and downswings of exchange 
rates is Elliott and Ito (1999, p.435) who extend the sample from Ito (1990) to an eleven years 
period until May 1996 and find that "survey data can be used to obtain on average positive 
profits". Interestingly this finding is contrasted by the fact that the random walk model 
outperforms the forecasters measured by accuracy (the average squared forecast error). 
Another innovation of this paper is to investigate whether profits compensate for risk. There 
is evidence that profits are quite volatile over time and that they are related to a common 
measure of risk, i.e. the difference between the forward rate and the average expected rate 
(Frankel and Froot, 1987). However, profits are not related to another possible understanding 
of risk, i.e. dispersion of forecasts. 
We summarize three main findings of these studies on individual exchange rate 
expectations: first, there is indeed heterogeneity, and the persistent biases of individuals 
indicate that they behave consistently different which makes it important to analyze individual 
forecasts and its determinants. Second, there is always the possibility of extreme exchange 
rate changes, i.e. unpredictable events, which possibly distorts performance and thus 
motivates the use of longer samples. Third, evidence indicates that inaccurate point forecasts 
may be nevertheless good directional and profitable forecasts, which puts a natural emphasis 
on the latter measurement. 
As forecasters seem to be so different in performance and approach it would be 
interesting to have more information about determinants of their behavior. One important 
question for exchange rates is whether good forecasts are related to knowledge about 
economic fundamentals. Having the Meese and Rogoff (1983) verdict in mind it is not clear at 
all whether such a relation exists. In this respect, Loh and Mian (2006) find for stock market 
analysts that those who forecast earnings more accurate also give more profitable stock 
recommendations. In foreign exchange we do not know of any such study. 
Beyond the use of economic fundamentals, literature has identified further personal 
characteristics that might help to understand (forecasting) performance. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) find that good education improves performance of fund managers. Another important 
variable is professional experience. More experienced analysts underreact less to prior 
                                                 
99
  Marsh and Power (1996) examine these 22 forecasters and assess their implicit portfolios build on 
long or short positions in three exchange rates. Although some forecasters seem to give profitable 
advice, only one forecaster does consistently so by significantly beating the no change alternative. 
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earnings information (Mikhail et al., 2004) and issue rather bold and accurate than herding 
forecasts (Clement and Tse, 2005). 
Fortunately, our dataset is comprehensive enough to address all of these questions. 
The information is on individuals, it spans up to 14 years and covers about 150 professionals. 
As we have the anonymous codes of forecasters we can link their exchange rate expectations 
to their expectations of fundamentals as well. Finally, due to the truly individual data (which 
is not firm-related information as in the JCIF and Consensus Economics data) we can link 
forecasts to some personal characteristics of forecasters. Overall, the information on 
performance is more comprehensive than before and the link to forecasters’ characteristics is 
new to this literature. 
 
5.3 Data 
Our analysis is based upon a micro dataset, comprising 15 years of individual forecasts 
from the established Financial Market Survey (Finanzmarkttest) of the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. The individual forecasts constitute the 
data from which monthly aggregate statistics, such as consensus forecasts, are computed from 
December 1991 until today and which are passed to the financial media, e.g. Bloomberg and 
Reuters. 
Compared to other surveys, the ZEW’s survey structure is conventional and similar to 
Consensus Forecasts (London), since round about 75% of the participants of the survey work 
in the banking or bank related sector (i.e. retail banks, investment banks, investment funds, 
etc.), whereas the others are either associated to the insurance or industrial sector. 
Participation with about 300 responses on average is even better than at Consensus Forecasts 
with about 150 responses. The survey asks for qualitative answers as participants judge 
whether the respective variable goes up, down or remains unchanged. The survey raises 
information on a monthly census of financial market professionals, questioning their 6-
months forecasts of various financial and macroeconomic variables. 
We study the micro data from December 1991 until July 2006, which sums up to 176 
months for our study; more precisely, we analyze the individual forecasts for the US-
dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro (until end of 1998 D-mark instead of euro) as 
well as related US, British and Japanese exchange rate fundamentals, i.e. forecasts of inflation, 
economic growths and interest rates. 
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Since we study individual forecast series, we have to conduct several adjustments, 
concerning the dataset. The initial sample observations regarding the US-dollar/-, GB-pound 
and Japanese-yen/euro forecasts appear in the first row of Table 5.1. The second row indicates 
that approximately 36% of all initial forecasts are dropped because of consistency matters. 
One reason is that participants associated to specific identification numbers (id) are 
sometimes replaced by new colleges because of e.g. job changes. In such cases, we assign the 
new participants internally a new id and we track the previous participants, as far as they 
continue participating at the survey, by keeping their original id. Moreover, to ensure reliable 
analysis of each participant’s performance quality, we set the minimum rate of participation to 
50%. In fact, this should ensure eliminating accidental forecast accuracy. So only these 
forecasters are considered who participated in the survey at least 88 times of a total of 176, 
which reduces the forecasts of about 25%. Finally, in this study we target on personal 
information of the forecasters in order to link forecast performance with specific personal 
information. This limits respective analyses to participants for whom such information is 
available which leads to another reduction of the forecasts by about 13% (see the fourth row 
of Table 5.1). 
Some further characteristics of the final dataset are reported in Table 5.2. This 
information stem from a specific questionnaire conducted in October 2006. All in all 
forecasters’ characteristics do not differ meaningfully on average between the three exchange 
rates. Even though the amount of women participating in the survey has in recent years risen 
continuously, most of them do not pass the minimum participation rate; so the share of 
women is fairly low. The average age accounts to 48, whereas experience in financial market 
practice averages 21 years. So our representative forecaster reveals being middle-aged and 
fairly experienced. This corresponds to the fact that 41 percent of participants head at least a 
department. Moreover 54% of participants have personnel responsibilities, 80% have 
operational responsibility. Finally, 67% of the participants have an academic background by 
holding either a bachelor, master or doctor degree. 
Since we are interested in links between forecasting power in exchange rates and 
competence in fundamental analysis, we base our analysis on related expectations data. As 
already mentioned the ZEW-survey questions forecasts in exchange rates as well as in several 
other economic variables. Considering the monetary model as our reference model we draw 
on related inflation, interest and economic growth forecasts for the US, Great Britain and 
Japan respectively. Regarding the exchange rate forecasts, we use daily exchange rates of the 
US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro (-/D-mark respectively). With respect to our 
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fundamental forecasts, we use the following monthly data for the euro zone (Germany until 
December 1998 respectively), the United States, Great Britain and Japan respectively: CPI-
indices in order to calculate inflation rates, industrial productions to proxy income growth 
rates on a monthly basis and regarding interest rates, we use 6-month Libor rates.100 
A graphical presentation of the main data, i.e. consensus forecasts and corresponding 
exchange rate changes over time, is shown in Figure 5.1, separately for the US-dollar, GB-
pound and JP-yen.101 At first glance one can see that the direction of consensus exchange rate 
expectations is rather sluggish compared to realized exchange rate changes. This implies that 
there may be periods of "wrong" expectations and indeed, just looking at the US-dollar figure 
shows, that such wrong expectations occurred in the early 1990s and in particular between 
1998 and 2001. Accordingly, we can reproduce the standard finding of the literature, i.e. 
inaccurate (biased) expectations over longer periods of time. However, the sign of the bias 
does sometimes switch which indicates (as mentioned in some studies before, see Section 2) 
that sample length may be important. If we consider the whole 14 years period there is indeed 
no significant bias for any of the three exchange rates. Moreover, the graphical impression 
that expectations for the yen may have often the same sign as realized exchange rate changes 
is confirmed by calculations: the hit rate of consensus expectations is 64.2% for the yen, 
58.3% for the dollar but only 48.1% for the pound (Appendix 5.2). On average 56.2% of 
expectations go into the right direction which is a first strong indication that exchange rate 
expectations are not systematically distorted in general, although this often occurs over 
periods of several years. 
Whereas we can directly use our qualitative data to calculate a consensus directional 
forecast, comparison of three-variate expectations–i.e. up, down or no change–with realized 
exchange rate changes requires a definition of a "no change"-band. We proceed by using a 
very simple but straight forward technique to derive forecast thresholds.102 These thresholds 
are either assumed or, if at-hand, taken from respective questionnaires among forecasters. 
                                                 
100
  Daily exchange rate data are obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank, whereas 6-month Libor 
rates are taken from EcoWin. Industrial productions and CPI inflation stem from IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. German government bond yields are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank and US, 
British as well as Japanese yields from the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of 
Japan respectively. 
101
  Properties of the individual exchange rate forecasts are shown in Appendix 5.1 including 
consensus, dispersion and actual exchange rate data. 
102
  Actually, several studies follow the other way round, using specific thresholds in order to quantify 
qualitative forecasts (see Dasgupta and Lahiri, 1992, Balcombe, 1996, Nardo, 2003, and Pesaran and 
Weale, 2006). 
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Fortunately, the ZEW raised individual thresholds via questionnaire, separated for all forecast 
series. So we use related median thresholds, separated for the different variables. Although we 
do not claim that this is a perfect proceeding, we judge it as being simple and transparent. 
Since we are not aware about any other appropriate alternative, we stick to this procedure 
which enables us to run appropriate analyses. 
Finally, it seems noteworthy that we do know the exact dates when participants gave 
their forecasts. Since these forecasts are collected each month in a period of two weeks, the 
forecasters underlie in principle different market conditions. To account for this fact we 
calculate forecast outcomes by considering the precise days individually. 
 
5.4 Heterogeneous performance of forecasters 
This section shows that exchange rate forecasters differ with respect to their 
performance and that these differences are statistically significant and consistent across 
currencies. 
Forecasters in the ZEW survey make directional forecasts, i.e. they predict either an 
exchange rate to go up, down or to remain unchanged over the next six months. So these 
forecasts can directly be compared to realizations of the exchange rates over the same horizon. 
The only open issue is to define the band of no change. Fortunately, the ZEW has asked its 
survey participants about this band and responses show that it has a width of three percent 
into both directions from the present exchange rate. Accordingly, we regard an exchange rate 
change by less than three percent over the next six months as consistent with a no-change 
prediction. 
As we thus have three alternatives that a forecaster can choose from, there will be only 
one correct alternative, whereas two mistakes can be made. In particular when the exchange 
rate goes up or down, there is a more or less severe forecasting mistake possible, depending 
on whether the forecasters predicted no change–which is a comparatively small mistake–or 
whether the forecaster predicted the wrong direction of change–which is a comparatively big 
mistake. In order to cover the severity of wrong forecasts we do not simply code right or 
wrong forecasts, but we code three possibilities, i.e. right, small mistake and big mistake. The 
codes for these alternatives are either 2, 1 or 0, so that higher codes indicate better forecasts. 
Forecasting performance is thus measured as directional performance and the measure can be 
understood as a hit rate. 
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Figure 5.2 gives, separated for the three exchange rates, the frequency distribution of 
hit rates that about 150 forecasters realized during the sample period. One can directly see that 
there is a lot of divergence in forecasting performance. Taking the first graph in Figure 5.2, 
regarding the US-dollar, almost all forecasters realize an average hit rate between 0.9 and 1.3, 
the median is at about 1.1. The realized hit rates for the GB pound and JP yen show somewhat 
higher values than for the US-dollar as individual hit rates lie basically in the range between 
1.0 and 1.4, the pound results being comparatively higher. 
Another way of analyzing differences between forecasters is estimating the following 
panels for each exchange rate: the dependent variable is the forecast performance as defined 
above, i.e. codes of 0, 1, or 2, and the explaining variables consist of individual dummies and 
year dummies. Table 5.3 shows the year dummies, which are mostly significant,103 and gives 
in the last line the LR-statistic which rejects the Null that the model has the same explanatory 
power with and without individual dummies. This indicates for another approach (than the 
histograms shown above) that heterogeneity is important.104 
These analyses are informative regarding divergence of performance but not yet 
regarding the level of performance. In order to assess the individuals’ quality of forecasting 
performance, an appropriate benchmark would be the performance of an uninformed 
forecaster who makes exchange rate predictions just by chance. So, the realized hit rate of 
random forecasts is calculated. Therefore, we take the exchange rate time series and allocate 
to each month either an "up", "down" or "no change" according to the effective six month 
change. This results in a concrete distribution of changes for our period of time. We take this 
given distribution and simulate on this basis 10,000 random time series, and then we calculate 
hit rates by comparing the random time series–expressing forecasting by chance–with 
effective exchange rate changes. Obviously, the average simulated random hit rate can differ 
according to the time series properties of the underlying exchange rate.105 We find for our 
sample that the benchmark to be beaten in case of the US-dollar is a simulated hit rate of 
1.0975, for the pound the value is 1.2530 and 1.0928 for the yen–these values as well as the 
respective 95% confidence bands are also shown in Figure 5.2. 
                                                 
103
  This indicates that sample period matters and that short samples may distort aggregate and 
individual results. 
104
  The same qualitative result is found from a non-parametric test (see Appendix 5.3). 
105
  In particular we do not assume that exchange rates change according to a distribution where one 
third of cases each is exchange rate up, down and no change. In fact, the simulated distribution of the 
GB-pound/euro hit rates differs from the two other simulated distributions, because relatively many 
actual GB-pound/euro changes have occurred in the indeterminate interval, i.e. "no change". 
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This information about the random forecast performance and the individual forecast 
performances–as it is graphically presented in Figure 5.2–is used to explicitly show best and 
worst forecasters in the sample. Table 5.4 gives respective information about hit rates realized 
for the US-dollar. The best forecaster realizes an average hit rate of 1.31 on 101 participations, 
which is at the one percent level significantly different from a random forecast. Overall, there 
are six individuals significantly better than the random forecast at the 5% level. Interestingly, 
there are also 14 individuals significantly worse at the same level of significance. Extending 
our attention to the 10% level of significance gives 19 successful versus 17 unsuccessful 
forecasters of the US-dollar. 
Also considering individual forecasting performance at the two other exchange rates 
considered gives an interesting result (see Appendices 4 and 5): among 146 pound forecasters, 
there are 24 significantly better than a random forecast at the 5% level of significance but 
even 37 are worse. The picture is different again for the yen, where 58 are better and only 2 
worse than the benchmark at the 5% level of significance. 
Overall, we find statistically successful and unsuccessful forecasters for all three 
exchange rates. Although the mean performance is very different for the three exchange 
rates–i.e. comparatively best for the yen, worse for the dollar and very heterogeneous for the 
pound–the coexistence of successful "hot hands" and unsuccessful "cold hands" is a new 
aspect in the foreign exchange literature.106 This finding raises the question whether skill 
depends on the specific exchange rate or whether it depends on general ability. Fortunately, 
most individuals in our sample, i.e. 145 persons, give forecasts for all three exchange rates. 
We can thus relate their hit rates across exchange rates and consistently find positive 
correlations. Table 5.5 shows that the hit rate of US-dollar forecasts can be significantly 
"explained" by the quality of pound forecast but not by yen forecasts. Among the three 
relations between currencies, it is only the dollar-yen exchange rate where the spillover is not 
significant. Nevertheless, even this coefficient is positive and the others are significantly 
positive, which indicates that performance in forecasting exchange rates is also driven by a 
general ability and not just specific to certain exchange rates. 
This provides a strong motivation to further investigate possible determinants of 
forecasting performance and in particular to investigate a possible role of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
106
  Of course, already the early studies of Goodman (1979) and Levich mention this fact but for a very 
small group of 9 or 10 participants only. 
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5.5 Forecasting exchange rate and forecasting its fundamentals 
In this section we examine the question, whether individual heterogeneity in 
forecasting performance can be traced to the performances in other economic variables. 
Principally, we follow the idea that the forecasting success in exchange rates is related to the 
accuracy of fundamental research, i.e. the analysis of exchange rate fundamentals. Since we 
have access to individuals’ exchange rate forecasts and also to their forecasts in fundamental 
variables–all formed at the same time–we can investigate whether such relationships indeed 
exist. 
There are several reasons, why such an analysis proves to be promising. First, it is 
shown in the empirical literature that exchange rates are connected to fundamentals in the 
long run (see recent studies e.g. Rapach and Wohar, 2002, Kilian and Taylor, 2003, and Sarno 
and Valente, 2006). Second, longer term exchange rate expectations underlie strong 
fundamental considerations (see Cheung and Wong, 2000 and MacDonald, 2000). Third, we 
showed already in Section 3 that the majority of participants of the Financial Market Survey 
belong to groups, which follow longer-term considerations such as analysts and fund 
managers. Fourth, a related study on the stock market by Loh and Mian (2006) reveals such a 
fundamental relationship. In fact, they show a fundamental link between the profitability of 
analysts’ stock recommendations and the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Taken together, 
this motivates us to analyze, whether the quality in fundamental analysis comes along with 
forecast success in exchange rates. A priori, we thus expect average hit rates of exchange rate 
fundamentals to be positively correlated with exchange rate hit rates. With respect to the 
considered fundamental variable set, we choose the monetary model as baseline and thus 
consider inflation, economic growth and the interest rate for Euroland, the US, Great Britain 
and Japan respectively. 
In fact, using the exchange rate fundamentals of the monetary model for all three 
exchange rates we find overall a significant relationship between forecast successes in 
exchange rates and superior interest rates forecasts. Besides, GB-pound forecasts prove to be 
significantly better on average than US-dollar and JP-yen forecasts. 
Pulling up a rule-of-thumb calculation, we note that the neutral hit rate generates a 
value of 1.1. Since most of the average hit rates lay right of 1.1, we acknowledge that the 
majority of the forecasters at least do not form poor forecasts. We do not want to over-
interpret these results, since nothing is said about statistical significance so far. Nevertheless, 
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this finding serves as an indicator concerning the overall accuracy of the individual exchange 
rate forecasts. 
In line with our procedure in Section 4, we have to generate qualitative forecast errors 
for all respective fundamentals. However, since these variables underlie different statistical 
characteristics than the exchange rate, different threshold values have to be considered. Again, 
we use the threshold values, which have been revealed by the Centre for Economic European 
Research among its participants via specific questionnaires. Subsequent reported threshold 
values are measured in percentages of the respective variables. They each indicate if a specific 
participant classifies a variable to go up or down; respective average numbers are 
incorporated into our calculations as follows: 4.5 percent for economic growth, interest rates 
and inflation as well. 
Table 5.6 represents the corresponding results of the relations in forecasting 
performances separated for the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and the JP-yen/euro. 
Regarding the US-dollar, more forecast success in domestic interest rates significantly 
correlates with higher forecast power in exchange rates. Further, US inflation hit rates 
influence negatively related exchange rate hit rates; however, the latter relationship is not 
significant at the 5 percent level. Turning to the GB-pound, again foreign inflation influences 
forecast success in exchange rates only at the ten percent level, but now positively. More 
important, higher hit rates in domestic and GB-interest rates as well, come significantly along 
with higher hit rates in exchange rates. Finally, looking at the JP-yen, only hit rates in 
Japanese interest rates correlate positively and significantly with those of the exchange rate. 
So in respect to all three exchange rate equations, we find only significant connections with 
one or both (domestic and foreign) interest rate hit rates, but consistent with our prior, the 
signs prove to be positive.  
In order to deepen these findings, we now analyze all exchange rate equations 
simultaneously. Table 5.7 shows corresponding results of the merged data, where the JP-yen 
is set as the basic currency. Different forecast success between the US-dollar, the GB-pound 
and the JP-yen exchange rate can be attributed to different complexities of respective 
exchange rates. In order to control for these constant country effects, we implement a US-
dollar dummy and a GB-pound dummy. 
In fact, the only variables which are significant at the five percent level are domestic 
and foreign interest rate hit rates as well as the GB-pound dummy. Furthermore, domestic 
inflation and the US-dollar dummy are significant at the 10 percent level. Restricting the 
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model to significant variables via a top down approach, only the two interest rates and the 
GB-pound dummy remain in the model. 
In sum, superior analyses in domestic and foreign interest rates are strongly related 
with larger forecast success in exchange rates. The significant influence arising from the GB-
pound dummy confirms the former observation in respect to Figure 5.2, where exchange rate 
forecasts of the GB-pound appear better than of the other exchange rates. However, the latter 
finding reveals a constant effect, independent of the performance of fundamental analysis. 
 
5.6 Personal characteristics of successful exchange rate forecasters 
Due to available personal characteristics of exchange rate forecasters we find that 
there are two significant influences on performance: professional experience in financial 
markets helps, whereas responsibility for personnel harms. 
The bottleneck in analyzing a possible influence from personal characteristics is data 
availability. Indeed, this data is not regularly compiled but partly stems from additional 
survey that the ZEW sometimes conducts among participants of the ZEW financial market 
survey. As a consequence, the response to this survey provides another restriction to our 
sample, further reducing the number of respondents to 93 individuals. However, we consider 
the forecasts of each exchange rate independently and thus analyze 279 cases. 
In particular we examine the possible impact from the seven items documented in 
Table 5.2 on forecasting performance. As the average forecasting performance differs much 
between currencies (see Section 4) we include exchange rate dummies in the regression. 
Table 5.8 shows the role of personal characteristics in explaining forecasting performance. 
Specification (1) gives the result when all variables are considered. It shows that beyond the 
constant and exchange rate dummies only one personal characteristic seems to be important, 
i.e. a detrimental influence from personnel responsibilities. In another specification we reduce 
the variables considered to those that remain significant. This leads to specification (2) where 
a second personal characteristic of importance appears, i.e. a positive influence from 
experience. 
As personal characteristics may be related to forecasting ability in fundamentals too, 
we include fundamental forecast performance in the regression used in Table 5.8. Thereby, 
we heighten the stakes for personal characteristics to become significant. It is thus reassuring 
that results of the extended regression shown in Table 5.9 nicely confirm the findings from 
above. Overall, the R-squared of this model increases compared to the model estimated in 
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Table 5.8 from 0.27 to 0.38. It is also interesting to see that the major influences found in 
Table 5.7–i.e. considering the impact of fundamentals forecast performance but not of 
personal characteristics–remain unchanged, although the number of observations is reduced 
from 442 to 279. We regard this as a sign of robustness and it also shows that personal 
characteristics are important beyond fundamental forecast, although the latter is 
comparatively more important than personal characteristics. 
 
5.7 The relation between directional forecasting success and profits 
As a robustness test we examine whether directional forecasting success translates into 
profits. We find, indeed, and in accordance with earlier studies that our results hold in a 
qualitative sense when the directional performance measures used so far is substituted by 
profits. 
Professionals participating at the ZEW survey give their directional expectations and it 
seems reasonable to form a trading strategy based on these expectations. Accordingly, we 
assume that the expectation of an "up" of the US-dollar is translated into a US-dollar long 
strategy, a "down" into a short position and a "no change" in a neutral position. Although the 
expectations are formed for six month horizons, the possibility of new information should be 
considered, so that effectively a position may be changed whenever the expectation changes 
which may occur once per month. Then, the return for each month is calculated, assuming 
that the asset value is always the same; in particular, this procedure excludes cumulating 
profits. Finally, these (gross) profits resulting purely from exchange rate changes are 
complemented by net profits where the interest rate difference against the euro is taken into 
account.107 Thus Table 5.10 shows the average yearly returns for the best and the worst 25 
foresters in the US-dollar/euro, which would have been realized by following corresponding 
forecasts month-by-month. 
Based on this procedure, Figure 5.3 gives the distribution of returns for about 150 
individuals, separated for the three exchange rates. This picture is obviously very similar to 
the above introduced frequency distribution of hit rates (Figure 5.2). If we take the zero profit 
position as a benchmark, we also recognize that trading strategies based on forecasters’ 
                                                 
107
  The translation of expectations in trading strategies requires making some assumptions and is thus 
open to criticism. Therefore, we regard the profit calculations as a robustness exercise only and prefer 
to stick as close as possible to the available information, i.e. directional expectations, and assess them 
via the hit rate measure. 
  
115 
expectations would yield some profits in most cases. Overall, forecasters’ performance 
measured by profits produces the same qualitative picture as the hit rate measure: 
professionals’ expectations are more often accurate than inaccurate. 
Clearly, the same qualitative result does not necessarily imply that it is driven by the 
same persons. Thus, we examine the relations–person by person–between the performance 
measured by hit rates and measured by profits, for the three exchange rates each. Table 5.11 
shows that there is a highly significant positive relation. This relation holds using either an 
OLS regression or (non)parametric correlations (see also Figure 5.4). 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
This research wants to shed new light on a long-standing puzzle in international 
finance, i.e. the finding of inaccurate and even irrational consensus exchanger rate 
expectations of professionals. In order to gain more insight we employ a new dataset which 
has three advantages: first, it is truly individual (and not firm) data, second, it is quite long (14 
years) and broad (we rely on about 150 persons), third and most interesting, individuals’ 
exchange rate expectations can be linked to more information, i.e. expectation formation on 
exchange rate fundamentals and forecasters’ personal characteristics. 
We use this comprehensive dataset to reveal three main findings: first, professional 
exchange rate forecasters have more often accurate directional exchange rate expectations 
than not, although they perform different to a significant degree, second, they make use of 
their knowledge about relevant fundamentals and, third, their performance is influenced by 
experience (positively) and by personnel responsibilities (negatively). 
These findings contribute to an assessment of foreign exchange markets that is similar 
to that of other financial markets: professionals on this market do not behave irrational in that 
they consistently form unnecessarily bad expectations but their expectations reflect their 
different degree of knowledge and ability. These results are not due to a particular dataset. 
Translating the directional expectations into consensus point forecasts for shorter samples–i.e. 
repeating the exercises of Frankel and Froot (1987) and others–reproduces their finding as 
these consensus expectations are often inaccurate and irrational. However, this does not apply 
to the full sample. Moreover, we stick to what participants of this survey do, in that they 
individually give their directional expectations. 
The distribution of forecasting performance differs significantly between individuals. 
Reassuringly, the average forecasting performance seems to be slightly in the positive domain, 
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i.e. forecasts on average are rather correct than wrong (make rather profits than losses), which 
is the expected result for functioning markets: performance is not too good or too bad which 
both would question efficiency. As this could also be due to random forecasting behavior, 
rationality of forecasters is more convincingly revealed by two structural findings: 
expectations differ, reflecting the distribution of knowledge in the market and forecasting 
performance differs, reflecting the distribution of individual knowledge and ability. 
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Tables 5 
 
 
TABLE 5.1  
Sample selection criteria and related observations 
 number of forecasts 
 
sum of 
forecasts US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
initial sample 156,040 53,750 51,384 50,906 
consistent sample 100,315 34,482 33,192 32,641 
50%participation sample 60,540 20,965 19,834 19,741 
final sample 40,344 13,859 13,280 13,205 
Notes: The Initial sample has to be corrected since we focus on identified persons, i.e. consistency criteria. Since 
participants of the survey change occasionally their professions, sometimes it happens that someone adopts the 
identity number (ID) of the former college. This would obviously bias our forecast series, therefore, we track on 
new individuals lodging them internally under new ID’s and if possible, tracking changing participants on their 
new job under their ID. Furthermore, adopting the participation criteria, we set a minimum participation rate of 
50%, meaning that only these persons are considered, who participate at least 88 times at the survey (in total, we 
deal with 176 months). Finally, we use personal information, which requires a selection via the personal criteria. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.2  
Personal characteristics of the forecasters 
 
US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
    
share of women 2% 1% 1% 
average age in years 48 48 48 
average experience in years 21 21 21 
share of participants with academic background 68% 67% 67% 
share of participants holding a chief position 40% 41% 42% 
share of participants with operational responsibilities 80% 80% 80% 
share of participants with personal responsibilities 53% 54% 55% 
Notes: These characteristics are based upon the reduced sample after adopting the personal criteria, see Table 5.1. 
This information follow of a specific questionnaire conducted in October 2006. The share of women in 
questionnaire is higher than displayed above, because the share of female participants was low in the beginning 
years of the survey and has risen continuously until today. The characteristic experience is targeted explicitly on 
financial markets. Participants are considered having an academic background if they hold a bachelor, master or 
doctor degree. Furthermore, we judge participants as capturing a chief position, if they head at least a department. 
So, operational and personal responsibilities are defined the way that participants underlying some form of 
accountability–in respect to the latter one, this must not correspond to the chief position. Finally, round about 
75% of the participants of the survey work in the banking sector (i.e. retail banks, investment banks, investment 
funds, etc.), whereas the others are either associated to the insurance or industrial sector. So, the survey’s 
composition turns out being very similar to others, e.g. Consensus Forecasts London with 75% working in 
financial institutions. 
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TABLE 5.3  
Differences among forecasters’ performances: fixed-effects model 
i
tji
i
te εγµ ++=||  
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
1992 -0.48*** [0.000] 0.25* [0.344] 0.89*** [0.000] 
1993 -0.55*** [0.000] -0.37*** [0.000] 0.46*** [0.000] 
1994 -0.46*** [0.000] -0.22 [0.000] 0.56*** [0.000] 
1995 -2.00*** [0.000] -0.93*** [0.000] 0.42*** [0.000] 
1996 -0.36*** [0.000] -0.55*** [0.000] 0.64*** [0.000] 
1997 -0.23*** [0.000] -0.60*** [0.000] 0.80*** [0.000] 
1998 -0.27*** [0.000] -0.69*** [0.000] 0.04 [0.513] 
1999 -0.74*** [0.000] -0.83*** [0.000] 
-0.04 [0.412] 
2000 -1.12*** [0.000] -1.77*** [0.000] 
-0.22*** [0.000] 
2001 -1.08*** [0.000] -0.59*** [0.000] 0.26*** [0.000] 
2002 -0.85*** [0.000] -0.76*** [0.000] 0.85*** [0.000] 
2003 -0.20*** [0.000] -0.35 [0.000] 0.90*** [0.000] 
2004 -0.38*** [0.000] -0.82*** [0.000] 0.53*** [0.000] 
2005 -0.63*** [0.000] -0.42*** [0.000] 0.83*** [0.000] 
2006 -0.69*** [0.000] 0.12* [0.060] 0.63*** [0.000] 
threshold 1 -1.37*** [0.000] -1.93*** [0.000] 
-0.59*** [0.000] 
threshold 2 -0.11 [0.271] -0.35*** [0.007] 0.83*** [0.000] 
ni 153 146 146 
nt 15 15 15 
N 20,351 19,235 19,134 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.05 
log likelihood -20,134.34 -17,560.72 -18,451.11 
LR-statistic# 
(degrees of f.) 
3,389.64*** 
(167) [0.000] 
3,003.75*** 
(160) [0.000] 
2,105.49*** 
(160) [0.000] 
LR-statistic* 
(degrees of f.) 
231.02*** 
(152) [0.000] 
582.36*** 
(145) [0.000] 
287.67*** 
(145) [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 months from December 1991 until July 2006. The dependent variable is the 
absolute forecast error of the respective exchange rate (US-dollar, GB-pound or Japanese Yen against the euro–
until December 1998 against the D-mark, respectively). Each forecast is based upon a forecast horizon of 6-
month, depending on the exact day of individual forecasting (participants have two weeks time in order to 
respond, where we take each individual date of forecast). We set the expectation threshold at 3%. However, we 
are dealing with an unbalanced panel because our sample period does not contain on each day a forecast. In fact, 
since we compute qualitative data, the calculated errors can take the values 0, 1 and 2. The latter outcome 2 
represents a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the 
exchange rate fell) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate fell). The 
minimum participation is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. We 
use an ordered probit fixed-effects model with the Huber/White-sandwich estimator for the variance, so the 
individual effects are implemented via dummies (to conserve space–individual parameters are not shown). Next 
we control for year effects, since we do not assume the difficulty of forecasting exchange rates as being always 
equal. The number of participating analysts, years and forecasts in our sample are denoted by ni, nt and N 
separated for each exchange rate. The LR-statistic# tests for the relevance of the whole model and is assumed 
being chi-square with above given degrees of freedom. However, focusing on apparent differences in the 
accuracy across analysts while conditioning on year effects, we run the LR-statistic*, which is chi-square with 
above given degrees of freedom. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term 
relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the US-dollar (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.31*** [0.001] 101 0.76*** [0.000] 93 
1.28*** [0.002] 151 0.81*** [0.000] 98 
1.24** [0.021] 97 0.91*** [0.001] 149 
1.24** [0.021] 169 0.92*** [0.003] 135 
1.23** [0.032] 88 0.92*** [0.004] 119 
1.22** [0.036] 125 0.93*** [0.005] 144 
1.22* [0.051] 153 0.93*** [0.005] 101 
1.21* [0.053] 112 0.93*** [0.005] 146 
1.21* [0.059] 118 0.93*** [0.006] 153 
1.21* [0.061] 166 0.94*** [0.009] 134 
1.21* [0.062] 157 0.95** [0.012] 169 
1.21* [0.067] 96 0.97** [0.030] 94 
1.21* [0.074] 141 0.97** [0.035] 140 
1.20* [0.078] 142 0.97** [0.036] 143 
1.20* [0.079] 103 0.98* [0.052] 108 
1.20* [0.079] 108 0.98* [0.053] 113 
1.20* [0.080] 172 0.99* [0.062] 143 
1.20* [0.097] 91 1.00 [0.102] 108 
1.20* [0.100] 142 1.00 [0.102] 147 
1.20 [0.104] 148 1.01 [0.127] 153 
1.19 [0.113] 93 1.01 [0.127] 151 
1.19 [0.137] 96 1.01 [0.156] 154 
1.18 [0.149] 119 1.01 [0.159] 147 
1.18 [0.151] 130 1.01 [0.159] 146 
1.18 [0.158] 153 1.01 [0.161] 142 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 
representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the 
exchange rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 
months with sample mean participation of 133, minimum of 88 and maximum of 173 months. Though, 152 
individuals remain with a mean hit rate of 1.09. Corresponding P-values of the realized hit rates are calculated 
via bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** 
to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Interrelations between hit rate performances 
 i
hr
j
hr
i efxfx +⋅+= βα  with ij ≠ . 
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
const. 0.82*** [0.000] 0.49*** [0.004] 0.83*** [0.000] 
US-dollar - [n. a.] 0.22** [0.042] 0.08 [0.299] 
GB-pound 0.13** [0.042] - [n. a.] 0.21*** [0.000] 
JP-yen 0.09 [0.299] 0.42*** [0.000] 
- 
[n. a.] 
N 145 145 145 
R2 0.05 0.13 0.05 
adj. R2 0.04 0.12 0.09 
F-statistic 3.73** [0.027] 10.47*** [0.000] 2.57* [0.049] 
Notes: We run OLS estimations, each exchange rate as the dependent variable, respectively. Asterisks refer to 
the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. Single 
correlations between the exchange rates show up as following:  US-dollar and GB-pound 0.2064, US-dollar and 
JP-yen 0.1469, GB-pound and JP-yen 0.3203. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.6  
Hit rates performance of FX and fundamental forecasts 
i
hr
i
hr
i eXfx +⋅+= θα  
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
const. 1.04*** [0.000] 0.36 [0.110] 0.92*** [0.000] 
inflation -0.05 [0482] -0.17* [0.092] 
-0.03 [0.743] 
inflation* -0.12* [0.093] 0.16 [0.104] 
-0.01 [0.618] 
growth -0.11 [0.106] -0.05 [0.591] 
-0.07 [0.345] 
growth* -0.01 [0. 920] 0.09 [0.424] 0.10 [0.311] 
interest 0.29*** [0.001] 0.24** [0.021] 0.02 [0.794] 
interest* -0.00 [0.993] 0.35*** [0.000] 0.15*** [0.008] 
N 152 145 145 
R2 0.11 0.30 0.07 
adj. R2 0.07 0.27 0.03 
F-statistic 2.87** [0.011] 9.82*** [0.000] 1.81 [0.101] 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume 6-
month forecast horizons for the exchange rates and the fundamentals as well. We set expectation thresholds at 
different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range 
from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast 
but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the 
respective rate falls). We run regressions separated for the exchange rates using OLS. The minimum participation 
is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following mean hit rates 
result, when we set the latter restriction: US-dollar 1.10, GB-pound 1.22 and JP-yen 120. Asterisks refer to the 
regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.7  
Hit rate performance of FX and fundamental forecasts 
ij
hr
i
hr
i eDXfx +⋅+⋅+= κθα  
 full model restricted model 
const. 0.71*** [0.000] 0.55*** [0.000] 
inflation -0.10* [0.059] - [n. a.] 
inflation* -0.01 [0.562] - [n. a.] 
growth -0.07 [0.152] - [n. a.] 
growth* 0.06 [0.334] - [n. a.] 
interest 0.19*** [0.001] 0.13*** [0.008] 
interest* 0.22*** [0.000] 0.27*** [0.000] 
D1  (US-dollar) -0.03* [0.086] - [n. a.] 
D2 (GB-pound) 0.08*** [0.000] 0.09*** [0.000] 
N 442  442  
R2 0.37  0.35  
adj. R2 0.35  0.35  
F-statistic 31.13*** [0.000] 79.90*** [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We run a combined 
regression for all three exchange rates using OLS. We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates 
and the fundamentals as well and set the expectation threshold at different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, 
growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct 
qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 
a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). We add two country dummies 
in order to control for country effects with dummy 1 represents the US and dummy 2 GB. The minimum 
participation is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following 
mean hit rate results, when we set the latter restriction: 1.1713. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of 
significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Hit rate performance of FX and personal information 
iij
hr
i eYDfx +⋅+⋅+= ωκα  
 full model restricted model 
const. 1.14*** [0.000] 1.18*** [0.000] 
D1  (US-dollar) -0.09*** [0.000] -0.09*** [0.000] 
D2 (GB-pound) 0.03** [0.029] 0.03** [0.030] 
sex -0.03 [0.505] - [n. a.] 
age 0.00 [0.563]  [n. a.] 
experience 0.00 [0.748] 0.00*** [0.009] 
academic -0.01 [0.619] - [n. a.] 
chief 0.01 [0.562] - [n. a.] 
operations 0.01 [0.443] - [n. a.] 
personal -0.04** [0.013] -0.04*** [0.006] 
N 279  279  
R2 0.2708  0.2589  
adj. R2 0.2465  0.2483  
F-statistic 11.10*** [0.000] 24.45*** [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We run a combined 
regression for all three exchange rates using OLS. We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates 
and set the expectation threshold at 3%.  The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualitative 
forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 a double 
forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). The minimum participation is set at 
50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. We add two country dummies in 
order to control for country effects with dummy 1 represents the US and dummy 2 GB. Moreover we control for 
the following personal characteristics of the participants: Sex (1 male, 0 female), age, experience (in years), 
academic (1 university degree, 0 not), chief (1 yes, 0 no) operations (1 operational responsibilities, 0 not) and 
personal (1 personal responsibilities, 0 not). Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-
term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.9  
Hit rate performance of FX, fundamental forecasts and personal information 
iij
hr
i
hr
i eYDXfx +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ωκθα  
 full model restricted model 
const. 0.62*** [0.000] 0.57*** [0.000] 
inflation -0.16** [0.032] - [n. a.] 
inflation* 0.01 [0.806] - [n. a.] 
growth -0.08 [0.184] - [n. a.] 
growth* 0.14* [0.062] - [n. a.] 
interest 0.20*** [0.008] 0.13* [0.052] 
interest* 0.22*** [0.000] 0.25*** [0.000] 
D1  (US-dollar) -0.02 [0.362] - [n. a.] 
D2 (GB-pound) 0.09*** [0.000] 0.09*** [0.000] 
sex -0.03 [0.488] - [n. a.] 
age 0.00 [0.749] - [n. a.] 
experience 0.01 [0.251] 0.01** [0.014] 
academic 0.01 [0.341] - [n. a.] 
chief 0.01 [0.272] - [n. a.] 
operations -0.01 [0.725] - [n. a.] 
personal -0.04*** [0.005] -0.03*** [0.003] 
N 279  279  
R2 0.38  0.35  
adj. R2 0.35  0.34  
F-statistic 10.81*** [0.000] 30.03*** [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We run a combined 
regression for all three exchange rates using OLS. We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates 
and the fundamentals as well. We set the expectation thresholds at different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, 
growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct 
qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 
a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). The minimum participation is 
set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following mean hit rate 
results, when we set the latter restriction: 1.1756. We add two country dummies in order to control for country 
effects with dummy 1 represents the US and dummy 2 GB. Moreover we control for the following personal 
characteristics of the participants: Sex (1 male, 0 female), age, experience (in years), academic (1 university 
degree, 0 not), chief (1 yes, 0 no) operations (1 operational responsibilities, 0 not) and personal (1 personal 
responsibilities, 0 not). Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** 
to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.10 
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the US-dollar (returns) 
winning 
hands [probability] participation loosing hands [probability] participation 
0.0908*** 0.0000 98 -0.0592*** 0.0039 136 
0.0583*** 0.0078 148 -0.0456** 0.0267 133 
0.0561** 0.0103 110 -0.0436** 0.0343 170 
0.0525** 0.0164 106 -0.0402* 0.0514 94 
0.0509** 0.0199 173 -0.0388* 0.0604 91 
0.0508** 0.0202 149 -0.0371* 0.0724 147 
0.0500** 0.0221 161 -0.0346* 0.0943 120 
0.0478** 0.0286 149 -0.0311 0.1320 141 
0.0468** 0.0322 89 -0.0311 0.1325 108 
0.0458** 0.0358 134 -0.0298 0.1488 109 
0.0413* 0.0582 97 -0.0277 0.1800 91 
0.0392* 0.0724 118 -0.0274 0.1855 158 
0.0384* 0.0779 90 -0.0267 0.1964 158 
0.0380* 0.0810 153 -0.0267 0.1968 113 
0.0375* 0.0850 152 -0.0261 0.2062 151 
0.0362* 0.0965 112 -0.0231 0.2639 93 
0.0346 0.1117 136 -0.0230 0.2656 163 
0.0342 0.1159 124 -0.0222 0.2832 104 
0.0336 0.1227 157 -0.0221 0.2838 95 
0.0335 0.1236 170 -0.0211 0.3074 154 
0.0324 0.1362 168 -0.0172 0.4039 98 
0.0309 0.1562 170 -0.0169 0.4121 148 
0.0294 0.1769 130 -0.0164 0.4259 103 
0.0290 0.1826 150 -0.0156 0.4492 144 
0.0287 0.1869 126 -0.0156 0.4497 148 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The excess return (gross returns) ranges 
between -0.5074 and 0.7266 (-0.4810 and 0.6687). The minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we 
consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months with sample mean participation of 133, 
minimum of 88 and maximum of 174 months. Though, 153 individuals remain with a mean excess return of 
0.0549 (mean gross return of 0.0705). Corresponding p-values of the realized excess returns are calculated via 
bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to 
ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5.11 
Relation between hit rates returns in exchange rate forecasting 
 i
hr
i
re
i efxfx +⋅+= βα  
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
const. -1.01*** [0.000] -0.64*** [0.000] 
-0.79*** [0.001] 
hit rate 0.98*** [0.000] 0.52*** [0.000] 0.80*** [0.000] 
N 152 146 146 
R2 0.1793 0.1637 0.1024 
adj. R2 0.1738 0.1579 0.0961 
F-statistic 32.77*** [0.0000] 28.20*** [0.0000] 16.42*** [0.0001] 
Notes: We run OLS estimations, each exchange rate as the dependent variable, respectively. Asterisks refer to 
the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. Single 
correlations between the two performance measurements show up as following:  US-dollar 0.4234, GB-pound 
0.4047 and JP-yen 0.3200. Further, rank-correlations add up to: US-dollar 0.4645, GB-pound 0.3488 and JP-yen 
0.2730. 
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Figures 5 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1  
Consensus forecasts and corresponding 6-month exchange rate changes 
- 0 . 2 0
- 0 . 1 5
- 0 . 1 0
- 0 . 0 5
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1 0
0 . 1 5
0 . 2 0
1 9 9 1 - 1 2 1 9 9 2 - 1 2 1 9 9 3 - 1 2 1 9 9 4 - 1 2 1 9 9 5 - 1 2 1 9 9 6 - 1 2 1 9 9 7 - 1 2 1 9 9 8 - 1 2 1 9 9 9 - 1 2 2 0 0 0 - 1 2 2 0 0 1 - 1 2 2 0 0 2 - 1 2 2 0 0 3 - 1 2 2 0 0 4 - 1 2 2 0 0 5 - 1 2
t i m e
c
o
n
s
en
s
u
s
 
c
ha
n
ge
 
fo
re
c
as
t
- 0 . 2 0
- 0 . 1 5
- 0 . 1 0
- 0 . 0 5
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1 0
0 . 1 5
a
ct
u
a
l U
S-
do
lla
r 
c
ha
n
ge
 
- 0 . 2 0
- 0 . 1 5
- 0 . 1 0
- 0 . 0 5
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1 0
0 . 1 5
0 . 2 0
0 . 2 5
1 9 9 1 - 1 2 1 9 9 2 - 1 2 1 9 9 3 - 1 2 1 9 9 4 - 1 2 1 9 9 5 - 1 2 1 9 9 6 - 1 2 1 9 9 7 - 1 2 1 9 9 8 - 1 2 1 9 9 9 - 1 2 2 0 0 0 - 1 2 2 0 0 1 - 1 2 2 0 0 2 - 1 2 2 0 0 3 - 1 2 2 0 0 4 - 1 2 2 0 0 5 - 1 2
t i m e
co
n
s
en
su
s 
ch
an
ge
 
fo
re
ca
st
- 0 . 0 4
- 0 . 0 2
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 4
0 . 0 6
0 . 0 8
0 . 1 0
a
ct
u
al
 
G
B-
po
u
n
d 
ch
an
ge
 
 
- 0 . 3 0
- 0 . 2 5
- 0 . 2 0
- 0 . 1 5
- 0 . 1 0
- 0 . 0 5
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 5
0 . 1 0
0 . 1 5
0 . 2 0
0 . 2 5
1 9 9 1 - 1 2 1 9 9 2 - 1 2 1 9 9 3 - 1 2 1 9 9 4 - 1 2 1 9 9 5 - 1 2 1 9 9 6 - 1 2 1 9 9 7 - 1 2 1 9 9 8 - 1 2 1 9 9 9 - 1 2 2 0 0 0 - 1 2 2 0 0 1 - 1 2 2 0 0 2 - 1 2 2 0 0 3 - 1 2 2 0 0 4 - 1 2 2 0 0 5 - 1 2
t i m e
co
n
s
en
su
s 
ch
an
ge
 
fo
re
ca
st
- 0 . 0 4
- 0 . 0 2
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 4
0 . 0 6
0 . 0 8
0 . 1 0
ac
tu
al
 
JP
-
ye
n
 
ch
an
ge
 
 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. The graphs show 
the time series of consensus (solid lines) and related spot rate changes (dashed lines) separately–moving from 
top to bottom–in the US-dollar/-, GB-pound/- and JP-yen/euro (until 1998, /D-Mark). 
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FIGURE 5.2  
Histograms of hit rates on exchange rate forecasts 
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Notes: The hit rates are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from Dec. 1991 until 
July 2006. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast 
error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the exchange rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast 
of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). This histograms show the distributions of the hit rates, when 
moving from top to bottom, in the euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- 
respectively), considering only participants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 5.1).  
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FIGURE 5.3  
Histograms of net returns on exchange rate forecasts 
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Notes: The net returns are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from Dec. 1991 until 
July 2006. This histograms show the distributions of the net returns, when moving from top to bottom, in the 
euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively), considering only 
participants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 5.1). The returns range for the US-
dollar from -0.51 to 0.73, for the GB-pound from -0.41 to 0.56 and for the JP-yen from -0.34 to 0.90. 
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FIGURE 5.4  
Scatter plots of (yearly) net returns and corresponding hit rates 
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Notes: The (yearly) net returns are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from Dec. 
1991 until July 2006. The scatter-plots show the net returns and corresponding hit rates, when moving from top 
to bottom, in the euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively), 
considering only participants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 5.1). The returns 
range for the US-dollar from -0.0592 to 0.0908, for the GB-pound from -0.0484 to 0.0695 and for the JP-yen 
from -0.0404 to 0.1138.  
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Appendix 5 
 
 
Table A5.1  
Descriptive statistics of aggregated forecasts and actual exchange rates 
 US-dollar/euro GB-pound/euro JP-yen/euro 
6-m. ∆ FX 0.0031 0.0003 -0.0009 
std. 6-m. ∆ FX 0.0701 0.0581 0.0838 
min. 6-m. ∆ FX -0.1488 -0.1649 -0.2392 
max. 6-m. ∆ FX 0.1459 0.1922 0.1847 
    
∆ consensus -0.0093 0.0153 0.0130 
std. ∆ consensus 0.0602 0.0260 0.0254 
min. ∆ consensus -0.1736 -0.0300 -0.0308 
max. ∆ consensus 0.1155 0.0800 0.0783 
    
∆ dispersion 0.0698 0.0412 0.0431 
std. ∆ dispersion 0.0161 0.0108 0.0089 
min. ∆ dispersion 0.0431 0.0234 0.0278 
max. ∆ dispersion 0.1323 0.0860 0.0795 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. All variables are 
measured in changes and therefore marked with the symbol ∆. Using Carlson and Parkin’s (1975) quantification 
procedure and setting a 3% threshold, we generate consensus forecasts. Asterisks refer to the significance level: *, 
**
, 
***
 to ten, five and one percent.  
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TABLE A 5.2  
Bias and hit rate in consensus exchange rate forecasts 
tterror εα +=∆  
 with   e tttt fxfxerror 6, −∆−∆=∆ . 
 US-dollar/euro GB-pound/euro JP-yen/euro 
Sub periods 
   
(1)     bias (6-months) 0.0751*** 0.0120 -0.0191 
[prob. value] # [0.000] [0.556] [0.304] 
    (2)     bias (6-months) -0.0487*** -0.0518*** -0.0417 
[prob. value] # [0.021] [0.000] [0.118] 
    (3)     bias (6-months) 0.1667 -0.0062 0.0210** 
[prob. value] # [0.298] [0.522] [0.036] 
    
total period 
   
Bias (6-months) 0.0146 -0.0154 -0.0143 
[prob. value] # [0.318] [0.121] [0.248] 
    
hit rate 0.5833* 0.4808* 0.6418* 
 [0.086] [0.099] [0.083] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. The sub periods are 
defined as follows: (1) 1992-1995, (2) 1996-2000 and (3) 2001-2006. The errors underlying the consensus bias 
are based upon the difference between the actual exchange rate change (1-month and 6-month, respectively) and 
the related consensus forecast. A positive (negative) sign means that the foreign currency-strength is on average 
overrated (underrated). Using Carlson and Parkin’s (1975) quantification procedure and setting a 3% threshold, 
we generate consensus forecasts. All regressions are estimated by Newey-West standard-errors. The hit rate 
shows the share of inherent accurate direction forecasts–significance levels are based upon χ2-tests–whereas 
respective positive (negative) trends are considered 2% (-2%) are exceeded. However, we present only hit rates 
for the total period, since for several sub periods several cells are not filled by any empirical observations, which 
in turn inhibit inferring statistical statistics. Asterisks refer to the significance level: *, **, *** to ten, five and one 
percent.  
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TABLE A 5.3  
Differences among forecasters’ performances: a nonparametric test 
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
average 
rank 
expected 
prob. 
realized 
prob. 
expected 
prob. 
realized 
prob. 
expected 
prob. 
realized 
prob. 
1.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 
1.125 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
1.250 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 
1.375 0.0018 0.0000 0.0018 0.0068 0.0018 0.0068 
1.500 0.0049 0.0065 0.0049 0.0274 0.0049 0.0000 
1.625 0.0111 0.0131 0.0111 0.0342 0.0111 0.0068 
1.750 0.0218 0.0131 0.0218 0.0479 0.0218 0.0342 
1.875 0.0377 0.0654 0.0377 0.0685 0.0377 0.0411 
2.000 0.0583 0.0588 0.0583 0.0548 0.0583 0.0890 
2.125 0.0813 0.0000 0.0813 0.0000 0.0813 0.0000 
2.250 0.1027 0.0719 0.1027 0.0616 0.1027 0.1096 
2.375 0.1179 0.1307 0.1179 0.0616 0.1179 0.0685 
2.500 0.1235 0.1111 0.1235 0.0959 0.1235 0.0959 
2.625 0.1179 0.1307 0.1179 0.1301 0.1179 0.1164 
2.750 0.1027 0.1699 0.1027 0.0616 0.1027 0.1164 
2.875 0.0813 0.1046 0.0813 0.0685 0.0813 0.0753 
3.000 0.0583 0.0523 0.0583 0.1164 0.0583 0.0890 
3.125 0.0377 0.0000 0.0377 0.0000 0.0377 0.0000 
3.250 0.0218 0.0327 0.0218 0.0548 0.0218 0.0890 
3.375 0.0111 0.0131 0.0111 0.0616 0.0111 0.0137 
3.500 0.0049 0.0261 0.0049 0.0274 0.0049 0.0342 
3.625 0.0018 0.0000 0.0018 0.0068 0.0018 0.0000 
3.750 0.0005 0.0000 0.0005 0.0068 0.0005 0.0068 
3.875 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0068 
4.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 153 146 146 
M 25 25 25 
D* 0.09 0.14 0.11 
K-S 0.4246 [0.] 0.6357 [0.] 0.5136 [0.] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. N denotes the 
number of persons, M the number of possible outcome (average ranks) and D* the largest difference between 
expected and realized cumulative density. K-S represents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic and is calculated 
as follows: K-S = (M * N / (M + N))0.5 * Dmax. We show for each exchange rate the expected and the realized 
average density, respectively. Each analyst is ranked in 2-year periods (8 periods in sum) depending on its hit 
rate in the performance quartile (1 worst and 4 best). The possible outcomes equals to (4 - 1) * 8 + 1 and the 
possible sequences to 416. The test-statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis of no accuracy differences 
among the forecasters in the sample. Though, expected probabilities arise when multiplying calculated densities 
under null by the sample size, whereas realized probabilities are taken from the empirical sample. Asterisks refer 
to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE A 5.4  
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the GB-pound (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.45*** [0.000] 150 0.95*** [0.000] 89 
1.43*** [0.000] 104 1.00*** [0.000] 96 
1.43*** [0.000] 88 1.03*** [0.000] 90 
1.42*** [0.001] 111 1.03*** [0.000] 93 
1.42*** [0.001] 137 1.04*** [0.000] 109 
1.41*** [0.002] 118 1.04*** [0.000] 119 
1.40*** [0.002] 89 1.05*** [0.000] 115 
1.40*** [0.003] 140 1.06*** [0.000] 171 
1.40*** [0.003] 153 1.07*** [0.000] 97 
1.39*** [0.004] 152 1.07*** [0.000] 110 
1.39*** [0.005] 145 1.07*** [0.000] 151 
1.39*** [0.006] 118 1.07*** [0.000] 161 
1.39*** [0.006] 144 1.09*** [0.000] 146 
1.39*** [0.007] 168 1.09*** [0.000] 156 
1.38*** [0.009] 107 1.09*** [0.000] 96 
1.38** [0.011] 132 1.10*** [0.001] 94 
1.38** [0.011] 103 1.10*** [0.001] 125 
1.37** [0.017] 113 1.11*** [0.001] 100 
1.37** [0.024] 156 1.11*** [0.001] 110 
1.36** [0.031] 150 1.12*** [0.002] 91 
1.35** [0.045] 173 1.12*** [0.003] 136 
1.35** [0.046] 159 1.12*** [0.003] 143 
1.35** [0.046] 125 1.12*** [0.003] 102 
1.35** [0.047] 145 1.13*** [0.005] 141 
1.35* [0.054] 172 1.13*** [0.005] 113 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 
representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the 
exchange rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 
months with sample mean participation of 132, minimum of 88 and maximum of 173 months. Though, 146 
individuals remain with a mean hit rate of 1.23. Corresponding P-values of the realized hit rates are calculated 
via bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** 
to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE A 5.5  
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the JP-yen (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.37*** [0.000] 151 0.91*** [0.001] 107 
1.37*** [0.000] 125 0.95** [0.011] 95 
1.35*** [0.000] 144 1.00 [0.105] 97 
1.34*** [0.000] 161 1.00 [0.105] 102 
1.33*** [0.000] 141 1.00 [0.105] 130 
1.32*** [0.000] 88 1.01 [0.129] 169 
1.32*** [0.000] 130 1.01 [0.153] 90 
1.30*** [0.000] 151 1.01 [0.165] 150 
1.30*** [0.000] 159 1.01 [0.173] 135 
1.30*** [0.000] 156 1.03 [0.250] 111 
1.29*** [0.000] 143 1.03 [0.299] 150 
1.29*** [0.001] 167 1.03 [0.301] 119 
1.29*** [0.001] 142 1.05 [0.446] 122 
1.29*** [0.001] 118 1.06 [0.574] 132 
1.29*** [0.001] 105 1.07 [0.709] 98 
1.28*** [0.001] 152 1.09 [0.958] 156 
1.28*** [0.002] 145 1.09 [0.966] 166 
1.27*** [0.004] 168 1.09 [0.982] 153 
1.26*** [0.004] 108 1.09 [0.983] 142 
1.26*** [0.004] 139 1.09 [0.997] 162 
1.26*** [0.004] 147 1.09 [0.997] 108 
1.26*** [0.004] 89 1.09 [0.997] 108 
1.26*** [0.004] 117 1.10 [0.899] 90 
1.26*** [0.004] 121 1.11 [0.789] 111 
1.25*** [0.006] 172 1.11 [0.717] 141 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 
representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the 
exchange rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 
months with sample mean participation of 132, minimum of 88 and maximum of 172 months. Though, 146 
individuals remain with a mean hit rate of 1.18. Corresponding P-values of the realized hit rates are calculated 
via bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** 
to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE A 5.6 
Hit rates: persistent forecasters on exchange rates (5% level) 
strong 
hands JP-yen 
GB-
pound 
US-
dollar  
weak 
hands JP-yen 
GB-
pound 
US-
dollar 
1 x  x  1  x x 
2 x x   2 x x  
3 x x   3  x x 
4 x x   4  x x 
5 x x   5  x x 
6 x x       
7 x  x      
8  x x      
9 x x       
10 x x       
11 x x       
12 x x       
13 x x       
14 x x       
15 x x       
16 x x       
17 x x       
18 x x       
19 x  x      
Notes: When we just look at significant (5% level) forecasters, 106 individuals remain. Of the strong hands 13 
are bankers (of which 7 are analysts) and are 5 insurers (of which none is analyst). Of the weak hands 3 are 
bankers (of which 2 are analysts) and 2 are industrials. However, for 1 strong insurer we miss accordant 
information and in respect to the weak hands we miss information for 2 industrials. So we have professional 
information for 18 strong guys which reveals 7 of them being an analyst (~39% in all) and for 3 weak guys of 
which are 2 analysts (~66% in all). 
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